In my long post about silver prices, I talked about a reversion to the mean. This is something that frequently happens in life: something overshoots the norm and then it swings back and overshoots the abnormal. Slowly but surely it finally settles smack in the middle of the bell curve, to use a shit metaphor.
This is what we’re seeing in silver right now. For 150 years silver has underpinned a great deal of US monetary decisions. Then, for the last 50 years the United States fostered and protected a rentiers silver market by turning a blind eye to manipulations in the paper markets at the Comex and simultaneously creating a rentier situation for the distributors of silver buillon in the country. If I went into detail how that happened this post would never end. Needless to say it was a very cozy arrangement that is unraveling every day and it’s something that has the large silver distributors very, very worried.
I’ll give you the short version: the US mint prints the coins, proofs, bars, etc. It then sells that silver to about five large national distributors for a little bit under the spot price of silver. Then those large distributors turn around and mark up the silver bulliion by about 25% and charge huge premiums for every coin, bar, proof, etc., Cozy! Like I said, and like all good rent markets it produces no value. N0w, sometimes this has been done to keep silver in a stable range for industrial purposes, but after the US wholesale deindustrialized beginning with Clinton but turbocharging under Bush–to fund our illegal wars–the justitication fell apart.
While we sold off all our capital stock to China, its demand for silver became unslakable. As I noted in a previous post one gigawatt [error corrected, mea culpa, SPK] hour of power from solar panels requires 1,000,000 ounces of silver and that’s just for solar panels. Silver goes into so many more things than we can possibly imagine. Pick someting electronic in your house; its got silver in it. Silver is the single most important industrial metal in the world because it is the most conductive and oxidizes less than only one other metal: gold.
But I’ve digressed from my argument.
For at least 150 years, starting with the opium wars, the balance of trade from East to west was very much skewed to the west: let’s call it what it was: economic pillage masquerading as lifting up all our little brown sisters and brothers. All of the wealth in the east, and that includes India, was over the course of 350 years, siphoned west. That’s economic fact, although people don’t teach economic history, which is a shame. They should.
I say all of this because the Comex has literally become a casino. For example, the total number of registered bars, registered meaning it’s in the vaults and it’s there for delivery has fallen under 100,000,000 ounces it’s now 98,000,000 ounces.
To make matters worse, there are 65,000 contracts of open interest on silver futures at the Comex right now, due in two weeks, that if optioned require the delivery of 325,000,000 ounces of physical silver. Where is that kind of silver going to come from? Pawn shops? Coin dealers? GTFO! Comex is in the grips of a slow, existential crisis, that it’s going to lose.
If those contracts are exercised at the end of February, because they’re March contracts, there is absolutely no telling what kind of chaos the US financial system might endure. Why do I say the entire financial system? The dreaded ‘D’ word.
Remember mortgage backed securities, CDOs, CDO2, synthetic CDOs etc. . .
There are similar derivatives in the silver market, but they exist in a black box, undisclosed so nobody really knows how much the open interest or notional value really is or who owns the risk—although the prevailing guess is about $1trillion USD notional. If the Comex implodes the cascade effects might well resemble what happened to those two Bear Stearns Hedge Funds in the summer of 2007 that set off the 2008 Financial Crisis.
Even if the Comex manages to extend contracts out a few more months, the physical supply of silver does not exist. I repeat there is no physical supply anywhere that can meet this year‘s demand for silver. Only two places comes close to the silver necessary for global demand: one is already fully allocated in the Canadian vaults in Ottawa in Toronto and that silver is not going to be let go of. The other is silver owned by retail investors. But as I have said before: silverbugs aren’t going to sell for $95, not $120, not $175. Not going to happen.
So in two weeks time, it looks like the Comex is going to implode.
How about over in the East? What’s China doing?
Chinese market regulators are actually doing their job. Here’s how, as I am quoting Dario at this link:
“What the Shanghai future exchange just did and what they did yesterday is effectively saying that starting from the last month of February that (it’s not a coincidence is the same day when the settlement for March 2026 futures contracts and the Comex begins starting) from that day any participant in the exchange that is not purchasing contracts for [physical] hedging purposes and even if purchased for hedging purposes they haven’t been allocated [a] physical delivery quota all their quota for silver in the front end contract is going to be brought down to zero.
So what the Shanghai future exchange here is saying is like okay game is over. We have to restrict the physical silver that we have left here for settlement for those that need it from an industrial perspective. So for hedging purposes and we need to keep the real purpose of the exchange going otherwise if things continue in this way we can effectively shut for business and that is going to be a huge mayhem not only across China but across Asia.
What’s China doing? Well, those communist bureaucrats that oversee the Shanghai Futures Exchange are doing something remarkable: they are working as hard as they can to preserve the sanctity of a free and fairly functioning market dedicated to true price discovery. Listen to the full podcast. You’ll listen in disbelief. The Chinese are better free-marketeers than the corrupt managers of the SEC. I’m dead serious. Chinese regulators make our SEC look like a collection of jackasses at a rodeo-clown show.
So, here is how this plays out: if Comex implodes—which is probable—but Shanghai muddles through, which given its bottom of the barrel minimum silver reserves is going to be extremely hard to pull off, but not impossible, massive amounts of wealth will accelerate their repatriation into the mainland. For over a thousand years silver formed the basis of Chinese monetary policy. They know what they are doing.
And the West? The West will reap what it sowed for near on 500 years. Our wealth is soon to be a multi-century river filling the current account surplus of the East.
Just watch.
IT SHOULD GO WITHOUT SAYING, EXCEPT IT MUST BE SAID: THIS IS NOT INVESTMENT ADVICE. THIS IS OPINION, FULL STOP. DYOR.
But aren’t most of those contracts never expecting to take physical delivery? Just gambling, er excuse me, investment hedging?
Or is the problem that given that Comex price is under the real, that all those contracts *want* to be exercised in delivery so they can arbitrage to China (who has a real price?)
I’ve always found futures confusing, thanks for any help.
Answer is complex by I’ll do my best to simplify. I’m going to base my answer on much of what Dario says in this video, so it might be worth a watch for anyone interested in how the contracts are viewed at the Comex versus SHFE.
All contracts traded on Comex are designed to take physical delivery. Understood? They are designed for industrial hedging so corporations can smooth out their expenses on needed commodities. That said, under Clinton and accelerating under Bush, the CTFC made a whole raft of rule changes that changed the PRIME AIM of the commodities markets from honest price discovery into something resembling a casino. I’ll spare you the details, but I was in the business at the time and I still can’t believe what they did.
As for arbitraging Comex prices over those on the SHFE. Rumor is someone tried it–a Chinese trader–and got hammered hard. Main reason: the cost of shipping and arranging for delivery, even if, as rumored, he made the trade when there was a $20 USD premium at SHFE, and all the subsequent logistics of physical delivery, added up rather too quickly. But as a former arbitrage clerk myself, kudos to the brother for trying. Fortune does favor the bold. Until she doesn’t: fickle bitch she is.
Futures are identical to stock options: calls-are the expectation a stock will rise-and puts are the opposite. On the commodities exchanges you buy long exepcting the price to go up, but your buying price of the long give you the right to exercise it at that price not its current high, if it did go up. Buying short means you expect the commodity to go lower. You can also combine the two into a hedging bridge of sorts, where you give yourself the right to exercise the contracts within a range. This is what hedging truly is. Not hedgefund bullshit. I used to know the head commodities trader at Pioneer Flour Mills here in San Antonio and how he explained it was elegant. One of the reasons I went into the business.
I’ve never mentioned this before but what made me leave was a long time ago I was sitting first class next to a former international business man. He asked most of the questions, but the upshot is I was sitting next to John Perkins and the questions he asked me opened my eyes to what I was truly participating in. It was only a matter of time til I left.
The US commodities exchanges were originally established, and this was hammered into me when I took my commodities trader’s exam, for price discovery and sanctity of the market mechanism. Used to be you had to own or expect to take delivery of the underlying commodity you were hedging/selling/buying. Now you don’t.
At the SHFE the rules are much similar to the pre-Clinton era rule changes. And Chinese regulators are hardcore. They’ve shutdown at least 25 trading groups accounts last week alone for breaking the rules, which Dario explains in his video.
Hope this helped.