Ian Welsh

The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Category: Russia and Eastern Europe Page 1 of 19

The Old Gray Lady Runs RussiaGate 2: They’re Coming for OpenAI

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On July 10, 2026

12 Comments

Guest post by Nat Wilson Turner.

New York Times: "China, Russia and Others Seek to Inflame Debate Over A.I. Data Centers"

Thursday’s New York Times brings back their old RussiaGate spirit with a front page banner headline about “foreign interference” and data center opposition.

Here’s a key quote:

…a push by foreign adversaries to seize on what polls have shown is deep ambivalence — verging at times on hostility — about the spread of the data centers needed to power A.I. in the United States and elsewhere.

China, Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iran have sought to use state media outlets to turn the controversy over data centers in the United States into “a domestic fracture point,” according to a new analysis by Alethea, a threat intelligence company, which identified scores of articles and posts on social media this year.

These campaigns, whose impact on public opinion remains to be seen, have raised alarms in Washington, where A.I. is seen as a top issue heading into this year’s midterm elections.

The foreign efforts appear intended to stoke the debate over data centers that has united political figures across the political spectrum — from Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, a progressive, to Stephen K. Bannon, the erstwhile adviser to President Trump.

“Foreign actors aren’t manufacturing American debates over the future of A.I., they are exploiting them,” said Jessica Brandt, a former official with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who tracked foreign influence efforts during the Biden administration.

The goal, she added, is to “deepen our divisions in order to dent our appeal and weaken us from within.”

Interesting sources, some company called Alethea and a former Biden admin DNI spook as our sources.

We’ll come back to them later, but first I’m curious as to why the NYT is only now covering this story when OpenAI put out a press release saying basically the same thing on June 10 except focused solely on China.

After all, OpenAI’s report was convincing enough to sway such luminaries as Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR), Republican Leaders on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-KY), Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, The Bitcoin Policy Institute and prominent tech investor Kevin O’Leary, per WIRED.

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Another Decent Summary Of The Ukraine War

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On July 10, 2026

17 Comments

I’d have just linked and excerpted, but this account is currently private. My comments in italics.

It’s immediately apparent when someone has zero exposure to Ukrainian language reporting on the war, which is the norm. There’s an entire parallel infospace where actual AFU soldiers and even the mainstream Ukrainian media speak quite frankly about the war in a way that would shock most casual observers. So what are the Ukrainians saying about the current strategic balance?

• Ukrainian residents of large cities need to evacuate them because major cities will be unlivable this winter (former Minister of Defense Dmytro Kuleba) Civilian infrastructure was not significantly targeted by Russia till Ukraine started hitting Russian energy infrastructure. Escalation does not favor the weaker side.

• Ukraine has no Patriot interceptors left and all Ukrainian infrastructure will be destroyed unless something changes (MoD aide Serhiy Bezkrestnov) This is credible because the interceptors have been going to Israel and US forces in the Middle East by priority, so much so that we had reports of missiles being transferred from the Pacific. It also explains why the US is talking about letting Ukraine manufacture its own patriot missiles.

• Russia’s deployment of jet-powered Gerans is increasing while 200 older gas powered Gerans attack Ukraine every day (Sergei Bezkrestnov, MoD)

• Russian EW and air defense are becoming more advanced and are being deployed more widely, mitigating the effects of the Ukrainian mid-range drone campaign, while Russian drones are increasingly equipped with AI image recognition terminal guidance. Ukrainian EW and AD aren’t keeping up (Oleksandr Karpyuk, AFU) This is the opposite of what is being reported elsewhere. I don’t know the truth of it, but Russia does have industrial power and Chinese backing.

• The Russians retain the initiative essentially everywhere on the front line (Ukrainska Pravda) Fits with what I read from other alternative sources.

• The mid-range drone campaign has had zero effect on the situation on the front line (Ukrainska Pravda)

• The triumphalism in the Western press is exaggerated and premature. The most realistic Ukrainian goal now is simply to stop the continuous degradation of the AFU’s position, which has been underway since 2023 (Ukrainska Pravda)

• The Russian campaign against Ukrainian fuel infrastructure, gas stations, and power plants will result in a “Crimean situation” across much of Ukraine unless drastic measures are taken (Dmitry Leushkin) Again, Ukraine escalated and Russia matched the escalation, but has more capacity.

Reading Ukrainian reporting, the mid-range drone campaign is turned on its head. Ukrainian planners hope to manufacture 100,000 mid-range drones by the end of the year not in the expectation that it’ll fundamentally shift the balance in their favor, but to help close the gap with the years-long Russian glide-bomb campaign. This target is extremely ambitious, but if achieved, it would put them roughly at parity with the number of glide bombs Russia drops on Ukraine in a year.

The issue is that none of these drones have anything approaching the payload of a Russian glide bomb, with drones like the Hornet delivering something like 4.5kg of explosive to a FAB-250’s 100kg. Drones are more versatile, but the Ukrainians have a long way to go to catch up. In most ways, the drone war is a game of leapfrog, but the Ukrainians still have major disadvantages that have strong effects on the frontline. All the information above was shamelessly cribbed from @EventsUkraine, who tirelessly compiles reports from the Ukrainian media and Telegram multiple times a week. Reading his Substack will expose you to a side of the war that’s rarely visible in the Western press.

This seems more aligned with what I’d expect. He notes elsewhere that he thinks that Ukraine can keep up manpower losses for another few years. I’m not sure, nations tend to collapse before the very end of their manpower.

Basically, a war of attrition favors the side with more weapons, more advanced weapons and more manpower. Which is what I noted at the very start of the war. Ukraine has done amazingly well, far better than most expected, in large part due to massive NATO support, which Trump has recently doubled down on: he seems to have given up on peace.

It should also be noted that the increased attacks in Russia, which are made with Western supplied weapons, whose targeting is chosen by Westerners, and which are overseen by Westerners are degrading Putin’s ability resist hardliners calls for direct strikes against European sites. This war could easily escalate especially if Ukraine makes a high symbolic value attack that hits a major cultural site or kills a lot of civilians.

In “turn about is fair play” Russia appears to have been helping Iran with satellite data and targeting, which is exactly the sort of blowback many of us warned about.

Empires die messy. America’s is dying, and a lot of people are dying with it. Let’s hope this doesn’t turn into a world war at some point, as it did twice during Britain’s decline.

 

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Russia War Situation & A Possible EU/Russia War

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On June 29, 2026

45 Comments

This is elevated from comments, by Purple Library Guy.

Picked up and posted on the front page because it’s a balanced assessment. No, Russia isn’t losing, and it’s interesting that so much Western media is suggesting it is. That said, Russia isn’t having everything its way either. – Ian

As to the current war, Russia is winning, but I’d have to say I don’t think they’re real happy with how it’s going. The damage Ukraine is doing to Russia is real, the damage they’re doing to Russian logistics in Crimea is serious and could lead to a Ukrainian offensive with some success in that area. They have had some success in counterattacks in Zaporozhia. Drones have allowed them to hang tough on the defensive for far longer than they could have without that huge technological shift on the battlefield. It is not going all Russia’s way, or how the Russian high command would prefer it to be going. They’d really prefer all that stuff wasn’t happening.

But that said, Russia has nonetheless done FAR more damage to Ukraine and the Ukrainian armed forces than Ukraine has done to them. At the moment, Ukraine and Russia are attacking each other with similar amounts of long-distance drones, but Russia has much better defenses so does not get actually hit with as many. Still more than they’d like, but not as many. But on top of that, Russia is still doing damage with bombs dropped from planes, missiles, and even some old fashioned artillery. Ukraine doesn’t have much of any of that. They do have some missiles, mostly from the Brits, but not in comparable numbers. Where Russia has lost serious logistics capability in one place on the front, Ukraine’s logistics and military capabilities and manufacturing have been seriously eroded over the whole country.

And the attrition at the military level continues at a solid pace. Some hackers claim to have gotten hold of Ukrainian casualty numbers; apparently 2.4 million Ukrainian troops dead or missing, 400,000 of which are from so far this year. I don’t think Ukraine is replacing troops at a rate of 400,000 per half-year. Already I hear some sections of the front are held almost entirely by a few drone squads. At some point men, materiel and/or logistics erode to the point where sections of the front just can’t be held. Probably if they mount a serious counterattack around Crimea, that just accelerates the time when that happens, even if the counterattack is tactically successful.

As to a possible more direct war between Europe and Russia . . . I think they would find themselves dealing with the same problem Russia has, only much worse. Drones favour the defense massively at the level of taking territory. In such a war, Russia would be on the defensive, and Europe would be getting creamed by drones as they tried to advance. The difference being that Russia is fundamentally much stronger than Ukraine, and so the drone revolution on the battlefield can drastically slow the Russian win but cannot in the end stop it. Whereas Europe is not fundamentally much stronger than Russia in military matters, and so trying to take the offensive against a Russia with, now, much more experience in drone warfare than Europe, would lead to European armies being fed into a meat-grinder. And I don’t think Europe has the stones or the unity to keep up an aggressive war of attrition for all that long once the casualties start mounting up.

This is a very good thing, because if Europe attacked Russia and Russia felt really threatened, there would be a nuclear war and we would all die. It really creeps me out that hardly anyone seems to notice this problem any more.

Can Europe Win A War With Russia?

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On June 25, 2026

58 Comments

European elites appear to be preparing for war with Russia. Lots of new military spending, lots of anti-Russia rhetoric, willingness to let Ukraine launch drones from their territory and plenty of provocations like seizing tankers. They’re pretty open about preparing for war.

So, can they win such a war, starting in say 2030?

On paper it shouldn’t be much of a contest. Europe’s GDP is about 8x larger and its population is 3x larger. In principle, Russia should be smoked. Nor does history support “you can never beat Russia”, Germany lost in WWII, yes, but it won in World War one, nor was all of Europe fighting with it.

I’m gong to keep this simple. It isn’t GDP that matters, it’s resources and the ability to turn them into war materials, plus the willingness of the population to fight and die in large numbers.

Right now Russia alone produces more of the type of armaments that matter than all of Europe. Missiles, artillery, drones, glide bombs and so on. It has more oil and more minerals. It does have less population, but Russia’s historically been willing to absorb massive losses to defend the motherland.

Then we come to allies: Europe might have America, Russia might have China.

China is stronger. A lot stronger. Everything that Russia can’t make itself China can provide. Everything Russia needs that it can’t grow or dig up itself can be sent thru China to Russia from China’s African and Asian allies and there is no way for either the US or Europe to intercept all of that.

Nor is there any possibility that China will let Russia lose in any big way to Europe. Europe wants Russia broken up and subordinate to America and Europe. That would be an existential threat to China, and they know it. America can lose Europe and it will suck, but it isn’t existential.

This is how I predicted that Western sanctions would not work on Russia. I predicted it when the war started. Again, because everything Russia needed they could either produce themselves or get from China and even then Western elites were clear that the idea was to break up Russia and that China was the ultimate enemy.

The Chinese would have to be morons not to give Russia whatever support they needed, and unlike the West, China is not ruled by idiots or fools.

Europe can fight a very nasty war with Russia which wrecks both of them. But it can’t win in any meaningful fashion. European elites selling war or genuinely planning on war are either liars or fools or both. Europe’s problems cannot be fixed by war. Keynesian war stimulus will not fix their economic problems which are a result of the fact that they’re falling behind technologically and losing their industry to high input costs, including energy. They have less and less manufactured goods to sell to the rest of the world, can’t force the rest of the world to give them what they want or sell it below cost any more, and have no significant natural resources to sell to the rest of the world. Nor are they big leaders culturally any more, especially as China’s cultural sector takes on the standard great power glow—tons of money and people to work on it, and it must be great because China is great.

If Europe fights a real war with Russia all it will do is drive itself into the ground so it can go back to what it was for most of history: a barbaric backwater irrelevant to most of the rest of the world.

They need to fix their society and economy, and starting wars they can no longer win won’t do that.

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The Oreshnik

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On May 13, 2026

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~by Sean Paul Kelley

I’ve spoken to a handful of nuclear weapons and arms control analysts/experts and all pretty much agree that the Oreshnik, while a terrifying weapon, is actually a very positive development in regards to making nuclear weapons obsolete. Here’s why: prior to the successful deployment of the Oreshnik, there were only two weapon systems capable of bunker busting crucial enemy C3 nodes: thermobaric weapons, like the US MOAB fuel-air explosive bombs and the Russian Tosochka-2 and Tos-3 Drakon missiles. These weapons are useful for eliminating hardened C3 bunkers/nodes just behind the front lines but aren’t capable of striking hardened intermediate range targets. The only weapon capable of eliminating hardened C3 bunkers deep behind the lines are intermediate range city-busting nukes. Think a nuke that can take out Cheyenne Mt. or its Russian equivalent, or perhaps the NATO C3 bunker in Brussels.

Enter the Oreshnik.

The Oreshnik rarely carries an explosive load. It derives its destructive power from kinetics; physics; sir Isaac Newton’s laws at work. The Oreshnik moves so fast when it releases its MIRVed warheads that it is enveloped in plasma from friction with the air molecules.

Its warheads separate and move at such a stupendous speed that when they fall out of the sky it resembles a lighting strike. When they strike their target the speed and force is so immense they penetrate up to 150 meters. They leave no impact crater, but the reactive metal they are made of—a Russian state secret to be sure—for all intents and purposes becomes lava, shattering the bedrock, steel, liquifying concrete and discharges a shockwave that eviscerates everything within 300 meters or more.

After this cataclysmic ruination a molten material bubbles up through the point of entry, like a volcano bleeding liquids that were once solid. Such a scene was attested by onlookers in the Ukraine after a 2025 Oreshnik strike on a covert-NATO-Ukraine C3 bunker near Lviv.

It is the Oreshnik’s ability to accurately strike an intermediate range target—accurate to within 5 meters, +/- a small margin of error Mea culpa. The missile is accurate to within 100 meters. I regret the error.—that obviates the needs for city-busting nukes.

Why destroy an entire city to wreck a single C3 bunker when you can preserve the lives and assets of an entire city whilst destroying the C3 bunker with ease?

That’s not to say the Oreshnik is ushering in some new golden age of nuclear arms reduction.

That’s absurd.

But, it does eliminate a great deal of past risk.

And that’s not a bad thing, if you ask me.

Russo-Ukraine War: Strategic Pause

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On April 20, 2026

18 Comments

~by Sean Paul Kelley

Amidst the chaos, propaganda, and war porn that is our attack on Iran news of the Russo-Ukrainian war has been hard to come by. One thing is certainly clear after my deep dive into recent developments along the front is that there is a strategic pause on the part of Russia and to a lesser degree that with the Ukraine.

First, the lines have not moved much in the last few months. There are a few reasons for this. One is the Russians are having a tricky time consolidating some of their gains. The reasons for this are two fold: one is it it’s the mud season. It’s rainy and it’s thawing and that is not a good combination for an offensive mechanized or infantry. And two, when your opponent knows the lay of the land better than you do – they are after all fighting in the Ukraine – they take advantage of it. The Ukrainians have done just that.

There’s a bigger reason for the moderate successes that the Ukrainians are having. The Ukraine has ceased launching large offensives– mostly because they don’t have large scale units to launch large offensives with any longer, those units have been attrited by the Russians. The AFU underwent a serious reorganization on operational levels-there are now a handful of semiautonomous Corps running the war. No longer being micromanaged from Kiev makes for quicker decision making and faster counter-attacks.

Considering the Ukrainians know the lay of the land, their drone production has either apparently grown a bit, or it stayed steady because the drone wall has kept the Russians from concentrating their forces. If you can’t concentrate your forces, you can’t pursue a serious offensive. Then again it is the mud season so the Russians might just be consolidating their lines and waiting till things dry up to bring up reinforcements.

As History legends noted in his Q&A yesterday, Russian columns are identified sometimes 10 klicks from the front and the drones descend on them and wreak havoc. Moreover, the Russians had seen a great deal of success sending 6 to 8 men teams to assault Ukrainian positions, but this success has been transitory as of late as the Russians have been sending in teams of 3 to 5 men only to get obliterated by drones. The Ukrainians are making excellent use of first person, drones, and other drones as well.

This aids the Ukrainian small scale counter-attacks. This is smart from the point of view of the Ukrainians having less soldiers. And as I said before they know the lay of the land and they can use the geography to their advantage, mud thaw and all.

The Russians don’t yet have an answer to the wall of drones, but I have heard some rumors that the Russians have developed an FPV drone operated with a fiber optic cable that is automatically reeled out and reeled in like an open face fishing rod. I would certainly like to see one of those because that’s a pretty clever innovation. It would literally be like fishing. You just don’t want to get tangled up in brushes or trees on a tree line, which is where most of the individual soldiers are to be found.

The Russian army, smaller than official Russian claims, but larger by far than that of the Ukraine needs to find an answer to this. I’m extrapolating from some of Legends comments here but it seems to me the Russian answer to the drone wall, which for all intents and purposes equates to short range air superiority, is to find a way to dominate air space between the lines, No Man’s Land, which now stretches some 10 kilometers in places. But that’s a tech issue, not a man power issue, which Russia might be facing in the near future. It makes one wonder if a Russian version of the A-10 Warthog might accomplish under such circumstances? But I digress . . .

Russian official pronouncements say they are recruiting 25,00 to 30,000 soldiers a month. If they were doing that they would have an army of 700,000 men plus on the front lines in the Ukraine. With that many soldiers they could walk over the Ukrainians. But that isn’t the case.

Adjacent to Russian recruits are casualties. Russian KIAs are much less than the Ukraine claims. The most recent transfer of dead bodies between the Ukraine and Russia handled by the Red Cross was 1000 Ukrainian bodies to 41 Russians. That’s a KIA ratio of almost 25 to 1. This occurred on April 9. These numbers, if this ratio holds up, are absolutely surreal. How the Ukraine can continue to fight is a question for historians 100 years hence.

That said on January 29 of this year 1000 bodies were returned to the Ukraine and 38 were returned to Russia. Between December 19 and the 20th of 2055, 1003 bodies were returned to the Ukraine and 26 were returned to Russia. In June 2005 under the auspices of the Istanbul Deal up to 6000 bodies were returned to the Ukraine none were reported to have been returned to Russia.

I’m not accusing the Red Cross of accounting fraud, but the numbers for Russian KIAs have to be larger. If the 41 bodies transferred in January are the result of the capture of Pokrovsk then damn, that’s simply generalship on a galactic level. Alas, those numbers won’t hold up, but if they did that means we’re looking at a ratio of about 9000 Ukrainian KIA to 104 Russian KIA. My guess is it is more like the 12-1 range based on personal observations and conversations with Russians in Russia.

In reality, the Russians are doing a better job of collecting their dead and wounded (and those of their foes). Moreover, as Ian mentioned to me, “doing a better job of collecting dead implies control of the ground where the casualties happen.” That does not bode well for the Ukraine. I hate to make assumptions, but that’s my bet. And they’re using the Red Cross numbers to score propaganda points.

Regardless, I don’t expect to see much movement either way on the front lines– except for a few skirmishes here and there – until the mud season dries up and summer arrives. Then Russia will begin it’s assault on the big banana.

 

Pokrovsk Has Fallen, Now What?

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On November 7, 2025

26 Comments

~by Sean Paul Kelley

With the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket by Russia now complete, it is only days, a week or two at most, until mopping up operations are complete. This is an indisputable Russian victory, but don’t expect the war to change much. Russia’s strategy of attrition is about incremental gains that create unsustainable enemy losses, not the acquisition of territory. A fact that Western, especially retired American generals consistently get wrong. They expect the Russians to fight like Americans. That’s a terrible assumption to make.

On June 30 of this year I wrote that Russia was beginning its advance on Pokrovsk in earnest.  Now, a lot of Western commentators, like Gen. Keane, have made the claim in the legacy media, along with other retired US generals, that the Russian’s have been bogged down in and around the Pokrovsk area for a year and only have 30-something kilometers to show for their efforts. This is why I cite the above link about the start of Russia’s encirclement of Pokrovsk. American generals obsesses about big red arrows on maps, rapid armor advances taking territory, breakthroughs while Russia’s attrition of Ukrainian soldiers massively degrades the Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war. US generals, however, display staggering amounts of hypocrisy in discussions about Russia’s massive and successful strategic bombing campaign. Those selfsame generals who cheered American Shock and Awe war porn that dominated the news coming out of places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Funny how they now label the same strategy, employed now by evil Russia, as war crimes and focus on Russia’s killing of civilians, which the Russians are studiously trying to avoid and largely succeeding. But I digress.

American generals, think tankers and media personalities are ignorant, be it vincible ignorance or supererogatory, of what a strategy of attrition really is and what it looks like. Here’s the best definition I’ve got for you: using military power to gradually degrade an opponents military resources, i.e. killing as many of your adversary’s soldiers and wrecking as much of his kit as possible and/or breaking his will to fight. Nowhere in the generally accepted definition of attritional warfare does it say a word about occupying as much land as possible. That comes later. Much later.

With Pokrovsk surrounded what should we expect from the Russians? The landscape west of Pokrovsk is mostly open fields for many, many kilometers, with few tree lines, villages or ravines for Russian forces to utilize for an effective defense against the Ukraine’s drones; hardly an ideal landscape for attritional warfare. In fact, with the Ukraine’s ability to manufacture drones still intact it would be a killing field, littered with Russian armor, APCs, infantrymen and anything else the Russians might send into the open.

Make no mistake, the Russians are going to have to march across the landscape west of Pokrovsk at some point, but I posit the following near-term moves by the Russians. I’ll follow up with some developments I expect later in 2026.

First, Russia will continue encircling other salients, or cauldrons as the Russians prefer to call them, they appear to be enveloping, like the Kupyansk-Senkove salient or the potential envelopment of Konstantinivka. These areas offer excellent defensive positions and landscapes for Russia’s small-teams based attritional style of attack along the line of contact. It begins with artillery and/or missile bombardment, small teams then attack and destroy Ukrainian positions, kill or capture soldiers, retreat, then let the Ukrainians return. Rinse and repeat with drone coverage dominating overhead and you’ve got a style of war that chews up time like Andre the Giant hoovered up food at all you can eat buffets. It’s efficacy is not in doubt so long as you understand Russian strategy. If you’re ignorant of it, well, then you are expecting a big armored break-out after Pokrovsk, which won’t happen, because that’s not how Russia is conducting this war.

Second, Russia will consolidate its gains in and around Pokrovsk, after the Ukrainian soldiers in the pocket are killed or surrender. For some time after I foresee Russia utilization of tactical defense within an offensive framework, much like what American generals called the strategic defensive during our Civil War. In essence, at first they’ll capture positions, then dare the Ukrainians to take them back by appearing weak, digging in, rotating out tired soldiers, and firming up logistics. Subsequent Ukrainian attacks lead to mounting casualties. Then do it again.

In the context of capturing Pokrovsk, Russia will continue targeting the Ukraine’s industrial base, especially drone manufacturing sites. And it will hammer the nearby cities of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk with drones, missiles and FAB glide bombs, but it will be some time until Russian ground forces are within reach of mounting an attack on either city. Much will also depend on how well the Ukraine’s armed forces perform.

In war your opponent gets a vote on whether you succeed or not. Will the Ukraine’s armed forces hold up or might we see a general collapse in 2026? The Ukraine is now engaged in the widespread press ganging of men to fight on the front, reports this story at Responsible Statecraft. Some of the men press-ganged into service have reportedly died from blunt-force trauma, after beatings with iron bars and one young man died from injuries sustained attempting to jump out of the vehicle he’d been forced into. Most of the ‘busificaiton’ as it is euphemistically called has taken place in 2025 and thousands of such videos can be found here, proof that the Ukraine’s manpower shortages are growing to crisis levels. Such activities by Ukrainian recruiters also bodes ill for the armed forces, and adjacently indicative of the efficacy of Russia’s strategy of attritional warfare. Although press-ganging is not something Russia directly influences, it’s a clear symptom of the unsustainably large amounts of casualties the Ukraine has and continues to sustain.

In the near-term expect the war on the ground to continue as it has since 2023. Russia will grind it out, slowly and patiently. I always find it laughable when commentators claim that hardliners in the Kremlin are chomping at the bit for Putin to launch a massive offensive. This is stupid, Western group-think. Why is it so hard to understand that Russians are naturally endowed with a deep well of patience to draw upon? Especially Putin. That is not to say there will be no fireworks in the near future. But they will be arriving from a different direction than Russian soldiers will. They will come from above.

A near-term imperative for Russian forces is a way to achieve drone dominance along the line of contact. Russia has, by and large, achieved a hybrid-kind of air superiority. This has largely been achieved by its manufacturing prowess, producing, according to some sources, nearly a thousand Geran-2 drones a month. One report dated this September describes a new jet-powered version, the Geran-3, that is operational, largely resistant to electronic warfare and can be fitted with a 90 kilo thermobaric warhead, making them extremely lethal, inexpensive and plentiful. Russia also manufactures and utilizes on a daily basis hundreds of Gerbera decoy drones. By using the Geran-2 and 3s in conjunction with Gerbera decoys and higher value missiles like the Iskander and the hypersonic Kinzhal the Ukraine’s ability to mount anything approaching an effective air defense is nullified.

Achieving drone superiority over the line of contact is another matter altogether. The Ukraine can still manufacture enough FPV drones to give the Russians pause, forcing their continued use of small-teams to attack, destroy and then retreat. But, the Russian’s are innovating. For example, there are recent reports of the deployment of a mother-ship drone with two FPV drones attached with fiber optic cables. The mother ship drone flies at altitudes above the FPV’s alleged EW bubble and by connecting its two FPV drones via fiber optic cables achieves complete EW avoidance. While not a game changer, widespread deployment of such drones would make the war that much more difficult for the Ukraine to prosecute effectively.

Pokrovsk is a major victory for Russia, a significant morale booster for the troops and those on the home front and proves the efficacy of Russia’s strategy of attrition. But don’t expect much to change after Pokrovsk. It’s a loss for the Ukraine. The question, how big of a loss? How many troops died or will be captured once the pocket is completely mopped up remains the most important variable of the battle; how badly will it effect the Ukrainian armed forces morale is what bears watching, by Putin and Zelensky alike.

 

The New Cold War Is Taking Form

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On October 31, 2025

7 Comments

We’re near the end of our fundraiser, and now about $1,100 out from our fundraising target. If you read regularly and value the site and have the money to spare, please consider subscribing or donating. Over 10k people read this site every day, and it’s free, but it and Ian do take money to run. Huge thanks to all who have given so far, a number which is now slightly over 100 people.

This speech by Russian Secretary of State Glazyev is important, and underlines how the days of dollar hegemony are close to an end:

“The easiest way to stop the arms race is by ceasing the use of NATO countries’ currencies,” he stated unequivocally. “Because to the extent that we use the dollar, euro, and pound, we finance their defense expenses.”

He provided a staggering figure: “The total volume of [Western] monetary issuance last year was five trillion dollars. Of this, two and a half trillion dollars is what the Eurasian states, among others, have taken on. If we stop using these currencies… we will practically halve the financial potential of the global hybrid war.”

“In the US, their satellites have completely destroyed international law… The World Trade Organization is not functioning, the norms of the global financial system are violated, and the generally accepted norms of business ethics are ignored,” he said, endorsing the Belarusian-led “Charter of Multipolarity and Diversity” as the ethical alternative.

He announced concrete steps to build this new system, revealing that work is “already underway to create a large social network that would unite hundreds of millions, maybe billions of citizens, who are ready to adhere to traditional norms, ethics, and follow their commitments.”

But it’s not just about money. For example the Power of Siberia pipeline means more than a hundred billion cubic meters of natural gas, which once went to Europe, will now go to China. Europe gets to buy much more expensive American natural gas. African countries are kicking France and the US out, ending their base leases, at an increasing rate, and from Japan I read:

Japan must stop importing liquefied natural gas from Russia. It means developing alternative energy sources, including the restarting of nuclear power plants.

Even as the G7 countries are stepping up sanctions against Russia, Japan finds itself in the position where it is now procuring just under 10% of its LNG from Russia.

However, there is a chance that Japan will not be treated as an exception. US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent has said that he is “expecting” Japan to cease energy imports from Russia.

Japan’s public and private sectors need to prepare to ensure that LNG availability is not disrupted.

Japan does roughly equal trade with the West, and with BRICS, with about a 2% edge to BRICS. This is a terrible position to be in, though I’d suggest that going with the rising powers rather than the falling ones is the way to go.

The problem is that America is forcing nations to choose. Playing both sides: trading with both, may not be possible going forward. There will be two payment systems, so simple financial sanctions won’t work, but other types of market controls like tariffs and import/export controls have come roaring back into use.

Trade that can be cut off or curtailed at any point, apparently arbitrarily, can’t be counted on. When one looks at America and China’s strategy, China’s is mostly “punch back”. They rarely initiate sanctions except in cases where a country chooses to side with Taiwan. America, on the other hand, is… erratic. One can’t make plans, because one never knows when the rules of trade may change.

This is another reason why I think joining BRICS and that trade bloc is the sensible move. The old “rules based order” as Glazyev has pointed out, no longer exists in practice: the rules change at a whim and aren’t fairly enforced. While this was always true to some extent (Canadians remember how the US just ignored rulings against it on softwood lumber) it has become so common that the rule is now “whatever the US wants, and who knows what that will be tomorrow?”

America is trying to force a clean split into two blocs. But the other bloc is richer, more trustworthy and arguably stronger. And if it isn’t stronger yet, it will be in a decade, guaranteed.

This also relates to America’s actions in South America, an attempt to try and keep the America’s “American”, which is bound to fail. But as the declining power America wants to use its military force while it still has local superiority and before China and Russia can sell or give local nations enough weapons to become effectively immune to US force.

This process is the culmination of one of the major themes of my writing for almost a quarter century. The US era of sole supremacy has now ended. It can no longer force China to do what it wants, and it can’t even keep the sea lanes open, as Yemen has proved.

The old era is dead. There will be a brief period of co-equality, then America and Europe will fade into has-beens. I thought at one point we might have a new real cold war. We will, but not for very long. America isn’t going to be as strong as the old USSR, it won’t be able to hold up its end, and its current policy is to bleed its vassals, especially Europe, white. That will make them virtually worthless as vassals and will most likely lead to a revolt sometime between ten and fifteen years from now, as the European standard of living collapses under de-industrialization and without its sub-vassals selling it under-priced resources.

Centuries of Western rule of the world are coming to an end, and the Middle Kingdom is resuming its accustomed role as the most important country in the world. It’s a fascinating change-over to live thru, if not much fun if one lives among the Golden billion, who are being demoted  to the Bronze or perhaps Copper billion.

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