Ian Welsh

The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Category: Russo-Ukraine War Page 1 of 2

Russo-Ukraine War: Strategic Pause

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On April 20, 2026

18 Comments

~by Sean Paul Kelley

Amidst the chaos, propaganda, and war porn that is our attack on Iran news of the Russo-Ukrainian war has been hard to come by. One thing is certainly clear after my deep dive into recent developments along the front is that there is a strategic pause on the part of Russia and to a lesser degree that with the Ukraine.

First, the lines have not moved much in the last few months. There are a few reasons for this. One is the Russians are having a tricky time consolidating some of their gains. The reasons for this are two fold: one is it it’s the mud season. It’s rainy and it’s thawing and that is not a good combination for an offensive mechanized or infantry. And two, when your opponent knows the lay of the land better than you do – they are after all fighting in the Ukraine – they take advantage of it. The Ukrainians have done just that.

There’s a bigger reason for the moderate successes that the Ukrainians are having. The Ukraine has ceased launching large offensives– mostly because they don’t have large scale units to launch large offensives with any longer, those units have been attrited by the Russians. The AFU underwent a serious reorganization on operational levels-there are now a handful of semiautonomous Corps running the war. No longer being micromanaged from Kiev makes for quicker decision making and faster counter-attacks.

Considering the Ukrainians know the lay of the land, their drone production has either apparently grown a bit, or it stayed steady because the drone wall has kept the Russians from concentrating their forces. If you can’t concentrate your forces, you can’t pursue a serious offensive. Then again it is the mud season so the Russians might just be consolidating their lines and waiting till things dry up to bring up reinforcements.

As History legends noted in his Q&A yesterday, Russian columns are identified sometimes 10 klicks from the front and the drones descend on them and wreak havoc. Moreover, the Russians had seen a great deal of success sending 6 to 8 men teams to assault Ukrainian positions, but this success has been transitory as of late as the Russians have been sending in teams of 3 to 5 men only to get obliterated by drones. The Ukrainians are making excellent use of first person, drones, and other drones as well.

This aids the Ukrainian small scale counter-attacks. This is smart from the point of view of the Ukrainians having less soldiers. And as I said before they know the lay of the land and they can use the geography to their advantage, mud thaw and all.

The Russians don’t yet have an answer to the wall of drones, but I have heard some rumors that the Russians have developed an FPV drone operated with a fiber optic cable that is automatically reeled out and reeled in like an open face fishing rod. I would certainly like to see one of those because that’s a pretty clever innovation. It would literally be like fishing. You just don’t want to get tangled up in brushes or trees on a tree line, which is where most of the individual soldiers are to be found.

The Russian army, smaller than official Russian claims, but larger by far than that of the Ukraine needs to find an answer to this. I’m extrapolating from some of Legends comments here but it seems to me the Russian answer to the drone wall, which for all intents and purposes equates to short range air superiority, is to find a way to dominate air space between the lines, No Man’s Land, which now stretches some 10 kilometers in places. But that’s a tech issue, not a man power issue, which Russia might be facing in the near future. It makes one wonder if a Russian version of the A-10 Warthog might accomplish under such circumstances? But I digress . . .

Russian official pronouncements say they are recruiting 25,00 to 30,000 soldiers a month. If they were doing that they would have an army of 700,000 men plus on the front lines in the Ukraine. With that many soldiers they could walk over the Ukrainians. But that isn’t the case.

Adjacent to Russian recruits are casualties. Russian KIAs are much less than the Ukraine claims. The most recent transfer of dead bodies between the Ukraine and Russia handled by the Red Cross was 1000 Ukrainian bodies to 41 Russians. That’s a KIA ratio of almost 25 to 1. This occurred on April 9. These numbers, if this ratio holds up, are absolutely surreal. How the Ukraine can continue to fight is a question for historians 100 years hence.

That said on January 29 of this year 1000 bodies were returned to the Ukraine and 38 were returned to Russia. Between December 19 and the 20th of 2055, 1003 bodies were returned to the Ukraine and 26 were returned to Russia. In June 2005 under the auspices of the Istanbul Deal up to 6000 bodies were returned to the Ukraine none were reported to have been returned to Russia.

I’m not accusing the Red Cross of accounting fraud, but the numbers for Russian KIAs have to be larger. If the 41 bodies transferred in January are the result of the capture of Pokrovsk then damn, that’s simply generalship on a galactic level. Alas, those numbers won’t hold up, but if they did that means we’re looking at a ratio of about 9000 Ukrainian KIA to 104 Russian KIA. My guess is it is more like the 12-1 range based on personal observations and conversations with Russians in Russia.

In reality, the Russians are doing a better job of collecting their dead and wounded (and those of their foes). Moreover, as Ian mentioned to me, “doing a better job of collecting dead implies control of the ground where the casualties happen.” That does not bode well for the Ukraine. I hate to make assumptions, but that’s my bet. And they’re using the Red Cross numbers to score propaganda points.

Regardless, I don’t expect to see much movement either way on the front lines– except for a few skirmishes here and there – until the mud season dries up and summer arrives. Then Russia will begin it’s assault on the big banana.

 

Short Take on Iran, Russia and the Ukraine: Cui Bono?

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On March 3, 2026

41 Comments

~by Sean Paul Kelley

Cui bono? (From the Latin, who stands to gain?) Who benefits from our war on Iran, internationally speaking? And who loses?

First, the Ukraine loses bad the longer the attack on Iran continues, as all the oxygen is sucked into a vortext surrounding the Persian Gulf. All the weapon systems the Ukraine desperately needs are being consumed rapidly over the skies of Iran and the Gulf States. This will undoubtedly hasten the Ukrainian Armed Forces collapse as a meaningful battlefield foe. Score one for Russia.

Second, energy prices will rise, and if the Straits of Hormuz get shut the Europeans will have to re-evaluate their energy supplies vis-a-vis Russia. Score two for Russia. Also, score one for Texas oilmen, who have watched WTI rise from $58 a barrel a month ago to $73.78. Royalty checks be getting phat!

Third, diplomatic pressure will decrease on Pootie-poot and Lavrov due to European energy desperation and all the diplo-oxygen being sucked out of the UN and other multi-lateral forumns, as if a thermobaric bomb went off. This widens Putin’s and Lavrov’s room to manuever even more. It also increases the chance Russia delivers a devastating denouement to the ‘Rules Based Order’ with an unmistakable battlefield victory. As my teachers said about school-yard fights when I was growing up (I went to an all boys school most of my life): you get your ass whooped, you probably deserved it. Score three for Russia.

Fourth, with the US murder/assassination of Iran’s Surpreme leader the precedent has been set, nay, locked the fuck in, for Russia to lob an Oreshnik or two Zelensky’s way and damn the consequences. The US could hardly protest. Not with a straight face. Score four for the Russkis.

Not to beat a frog at the bottom of a well, as the Chinese proverb goes, but the Ukraine is the biggest loser thus far and Russia the biggest winner as of today. The Euros are losing as well, but seem determined to snatch fantasy from the maw of reality. Israel is also on the losing end. Have you seen some of the explosions in Tel Aviv? This Iranian strike is positively surreal. Looks like that Israeli Iron Dome has turned into an Iranian Golden Shower.

Then again, if Bibi pops off a nuke or two, all bets are off.

Friday Morning Highlights and Lowlifes

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On February 27, 2026

48 Comments

~by Sean Paul Kelley

Couple of random notes this Friday morning, mostly economics related, some silver news and my personal reaction to portions of the discusssion in Ian’s “Is Virtue An Advantage Or Disadvantage For Societies?” post.

First, econonomics. It looks more and more like we are heading into a 2008-style credit crisis/crunch.

Don’t believe me? Well, the FED flooded the US banking system with $18.5 billion to ease liquidity concerns during the week of Feb. 17 because cockroaches be busting out of just about every private equity/credit shop present. And we all know, if you just don’t turn on the lights, you don’t see roaches.

These kind of economic events don’t do what you think they are going to do. Many people assume any economic crisis in the US will lead to a rapid dollar hegemony collapse. But as I explain, the dollar will actually get stronger:

“[W]hen the credit crunch gets a full head of steam it won’t lead to reserve status collapse of the dollar. It will, counter-intuitively, but inexorably pump the dollar higher and stronger as NYC becomes a 2008-like Black Hole for cash allocated dollars world wide desperate to fill potential insolvency holes in banks and shadow-banks/private equity credit boutiques . . . . “

That’s what happened in 2008. As I conclude, “Dollar reserve collpase will be a result of national insolvency, not a global credit-crisis/crunch.”

Basically what End Game Macro is saying in this post is the following: the economy grew little to naught post-COVID to present. It basically did what equity markets sometimes do: trade sideways for years, decades even. For example, after the 2008 Financial Crisis the S&P 500 traded sideways for four years until it broke out in late 2012, early 2013. That’w what the US economy has done since 2020: move sideways, although Biden-inspired over-immigration skewed the growth numbers, as End Game Macro notes:

“From 2021 to 2024 the U.S. saw over 11 million arrivals, more than 3 million in 2023, and net migration around 2.4 million per year in 2021 to 2023. That can lift GDP and payrolls while masking weaker per capita momentum. As the surge cools, the masking fades.”

I’m not being anti-immigrant here, I’m just stating the facts. As Trump dug his heels in and unleashed his ICE goons, the econ surge faded, and fast. End Game Macro also notes, a lá 2008 that system-wide credit stress is popping up whack-a-mole like in almost every category:

“As of February 2026 serious delinquency is flashing late cycle strain. Auto loans 5.2 percent, credit cards 12.7 percent, student loans 9.6 percent 90+ days past due with estimates as high as 16.3 percent turning delinquent late 2025, and FHA delinquency 11.52 percent. Job quality also reflects strain.”

And I’m not even going to touch on the downward revisions to US employment except to say we’ve not gained a single job, but actually lost millions. The BLS hints at the size of the disaster in jobs “recovery.”

Last econ note: big move in India just confirms my thesis/argument/assertion that the combined wealth of the West is undergoing a multi-decade transfer back to the East:

“For decades, the price of silver in India—the “diamond hands” of the silver world—was dictated by a small group in London and USA. Indian ETFs used the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) prices, which often had nothing to do with the actual physical demand on the ground in India.

The Move:

On February 26, 2026, SEBI officially announced that starting April 1, 2026, Indian mutual funds and ETFs will no longer rely solely on London’s “AM fixing” prices. Instead, valuation will be based on polled spot prices from recognized domestic exchanges like the MCX.”

That’s one serious high hard one to the Comex and LBMA! This is a big fucking deal.

Next up: war in the Ukraine.

I’ve repeatedly argued that the Ukraine has lost all any and all possibility of regaining strategic initiative, and this reinforces it, way wickedly:

As I have noted ad nauseam for months now: the #Ukraine has lost any chance to sieze the initiative on the battlefield. All the #AFU can do is ineffectively counter-attack like a punch-drunk boxer. Trading lives for time will not work out for #Zelensky in the end and the end is coming sooner than he thinks.

On that note, the Red Cross confirms the Ukrainian to Russian KIA ratio. And it is bloody awful: 34/1. People often tell me that my belief in realism in foreign affairs is deeply immoral. Fuck that shit. International liberal hegemony is 100% at fault for all the deaths in the Ukraine. All. Of. Them. The denizens of Davos are uttely complicit.

In another grim note: Russia is in the initial stages of attacking The Big Banana. For the first time artillery shells are falling down with impunity on the city of Kramatorsk, like rain does on an average Portland Wednesday.

In regards to the conversation on Virtue and especially regarding the 800,000,000 number of Chinese lifted out of poverty. Well, Ian is correct. I did the numbers here back in September.

As regards Chinese leaders being better or worse than those in the West, especially the US: Ian, again is correct. The best way to view the argument is by winnowing it down to two prepositions. The Western view of liberty has its origins in peasant upward mobility in the aftermath of the Black Death and the clash of classes. Ergo: in the West we have the freedom “of” speech, assembly, bear arms, etc. . The Chinese view of liberty derives its origins from a long exigetical tradition of the origins and limits of dignity. In essences, the Chinese see liberty as freedom “from” poverty, warlordism, chaos, illness, crime, rapine, etc. . .  Both views are valid. Both views are limited. But at present the Chinese view of liberty is more effective in increasing the common good than that of the West.

On the posssible, now looking more probable, war with Iran, the US has ordered the evacuation of its embassy in Israel. I don’t know what could make it more obvious, you?

More as it happens.

And more happens. This comment by Ray Dalio reminds me when I was a young broker I read Robert Rubin’s memoirs, In an Uncertain World, and took to heart many of his investment rules, going so far as to write many down on old fashioned white catalog cards–this was before the internet, btw! and memorize what I wrote down. Don’t judge me. I was young and dumb.

Love Rubin or hate him, like James Carville said, when I get resurrected I want to come back as thet bond market. Rubin knew how to invest and make consistent returns. So did Barton Biggs, long time chief investment strategist at my alma mater, Morgan Stanley. Those two men shaped my view of economics, markets and political economy more than anyone or anything else. And yes, I read Jesse Livermore’s memoirs. They did little for me precisely because at his heart Livemore was un-disciplined. And discipline is key to making money.

If you take your own advice you’ll do well. If you’re like me and stayed retarded longer than markets remained illogical, well, you’re fucked. If I’d taken my own advice I’d have a small fortune like a handful of former clients do to this day.

One of my key rules: if you want to get rich, speculate in the stock market, but if you want to be truly wealthy, invest in bonds. In other words, the real wealth, massive cash-flow comes from debt service. That’s just an ugly reality humanity has yet to escape.

Another rule to live by: if an investment goes more than 15% against you, cash out. You can recover from a 15% loss, but a 25% or 30% or even 50%? Not a chance in hell. Ever.

Last rule: if you double your money in an investment, sell half of your gain and let the rest ride. I guarantee you’ll never lose a dime on that investment if you follow that rule.

One last comment on Rubin: he was a ‘careful contrarian’ and being a contrarian has served me very, very well. It’s a painful and lonely place to occupy at times so be prepared to man up. In the end recognize when you feel the least amount of risk is the precise moment of the most risk, the instant before you lose your ass.

Maybe more, maybe not. Time dictates all.

So the muse is a fickle-bitch. This analysis of the transcripts of the Trump-Xi phone calls is brutally and hysterically accurate:

This time it’s particularly funny because the Chinese transcript (fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/20) has Xi telling Trump: “It is always right to do a good thing, however small, and always wrong to do a bad thing, however small.” This proverb might not sound like much but it’s actually extremely meaningful when you understand the reference.

The reference comes from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, China’s Illiad and Odyssey plus the Aeneid and a smattering of Dante’s Inferno for good measure. It’s indicative of how urbane and historically literate the Chinese are. And a clear notice that China is what historians, anthropologists and others of such ilk refer to as a “high context” culture: 

China is a High Context culture, a communicated message has different layers of meaning, While America as majority of the West is Low Context. The other culture/language that is High Context is Arabic. To understand the spoken words one need to be deeply rooted in its culture, its history and religious tradition.

Spoken like a true scholar and humble student.

I want the last word. Heh! But seriously, silver trading at the Comex closes the day sharply higher, firmly walking through a wall of resistance at $92, ending the day at $93.06, up 7%. A very bullish closing price for silver. Silver bugs should sleep happy tonight.

 

 

 

Are Multiple Russian Breakthroughs Imminent?

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On November 26, 2025

13 Comments

In my Nov. 7 analysis of the Russo-Ukrainian War I missed two serious developments on the line of contact that I simply didn’t have the bandwidth to notice. After paying closer attention I came away with a big picture question: has Russia pierced the line of contact in three places or are my sources exaggerating? For the last two weeks there has been talk and rumors, some of which I have been guilty of passing along, that Russia achieved such a goal. But where?

Most observers are in rough agreement that the following five Kupyansk, Siversk, Lyman, Huliapole, and Constantinovka are under dire threat. Pokrovsk and Myrnograd are done. Finis.

But these three are the standouts.

The first, and most obvious, is in the immediate environs of Pokrovsk. As I noted November 7, west of Pokrovsk—is all open steppe land with little to no defensive terrain—all the way to Pavlograd. Will the Russians move forward? Doubtful. I stand by what I wrote two weeks ago: “Russia will consolidate its gains in and around Pokrovsk, after the Ukrainian soldiers in the pocket are killed or surrender. For some time after I foresee Russia utilization of tactical defense within an offensive framework.” But the Russians, when they are ready, will move across the steppe towards Pavlograd, en masse.

The second and most unlikely involves troops now taking Lyman, who afterwards will move south, in tandem with troops north of Pokrovsk, to encircle both Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, two large towns serving as the final obstacles on the road to Poltava. This encirclement, if attempted, would make the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd cauldron look likes child’s play. It is doable, however, and an encirclement of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk might be just the right bait for the last of the Ukraines reserves; with only enough reserves to fight in one place, this is where they’d stand. Russia can afford to tease the Ukraine as it retains the strategic initiative. It can feint, sucker punch and attack pretty much with impunity at this point in the war. Yes, Ukrainian forces can mount local counter-offensives, but the days of counter-offensives across the entire line of contact are long past.

The third—which is the most serious for the Ukraine—is in the south, where an imminent encirclement of Hulyiapole, will wrap up the flank of Ukrainian forces in the south elimanating all resistance to Zaporozhye. This operations seems well on its way to success. The Ukrainians have no answer to the Russians here.

As I mentioned above there are other places the Russians are pressuring: Kupyansk, Siversk and Constantinovka. In all three places Ukrainian defenses crumble, Russia hammers supply lines, drops FAB-500 on mustering points, lobs Iskanders on ammo dumps and bridges, and hurls thermobaric bombs at makeshift barracks and more. The Russians are doing this as near to the line of contact as possible. Everything to a purpose: shattering the will of the Ukrainian soldier to continue the fight.

Meanwhile, Russia’s strategic bombing and drone campaign against the whole of the nation escalates sans mercy.

Of the three points I mentioned above, I see the Russians grinding away deliberately and slowly; advancing at speeds of their choice around the Pokrovsk environs, and in and around Lyman. In other words, more attrition. Maybe a feint at encirclement will draw in the last of the Ukraine’s strategic reserves, which would then be attrited away as the Russians have been doing so since 2023.

Poor US TV generals, still have no big flashy red arrows or armored movements to get their war porn on.

Only in the south might we see a real breakout; a breakout that posisbly rolls up of the entire Ukrainian flank to Zaporozhye. The Russians might be at the gates in two weeks. Maybe less, maybe more. Maybe we’ll see an operational pause and then a deliberate resumption of the churn.

One fact is beyond obvious at this point: the Ukraine has lost. The question now is: how much more will they lose.

Pokrovsk Has Fallen, Now What?

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On November 7, 2025

26 Comments

~by Sean Paul Kelley

With the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket by Russia now complete, it is only days, a week or two at most, until mopping up operations are complete. This is an indisputable Russian victory, but don’t expect the war to change much. Russia’s strategy of attrition is about incremental gains that create unsustainable enemy losses, not the acquisition of territory. A fact that Western, especially retired American generals consistently get wrong. They expect the Russians to fight like Americans. That’s a terrible assumption to make.

On June 30 of this year I wrote that Russia was beginning its advance on Pokrovsk in earnest.  Now, a lot of Western commentators, like Gen. Keane, have made the claim in the legacy media, along with other retired US generals, that the Russian’s have been bogged down in and around the Pokrovsk area for a year and only have 30-something kilometers to show for their efforts. This is why I cite the above link about the start of Russia’s encirclement of Pokrovsk. American generals obsesses about big red arrows on maps, rapid armor advances taking territory, breakthroughs while Russia’s attrition of Ukrainian soldiers massively degrades the Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war. US generals, however, display staggering amounts of hypocrisy in discussions about Russia’s massive and successful strategic bombing campaign. Those selfsame generals who cheered American Shock and Awe war porn that dominated the news coming out of places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Funny how they now label the same strategy, employed now by evil Russia, as war crimes and focus on Russia’s killing of civilians, which the Russians are studiously trying to avoid and largely succeeding. But I digress.

American generals, think tankers and media personalities are ignorant, be it vincible ignorance or supererogatory, of what a strategy of attrition really is and what it looks like. Here’s the best definition I’ve got for you: using military power to gradually degrade an opponents military resources, i.e. killing as many of your adversary’s soldiers and wrecking as much of his kit as possible and/or breaking his will to fight. Nowhere in the generally accepted definition of attritional warfare does it say a word about occupying as much land as possible. That comes later. Much later.

With Pokrovsk surrounded what should we expect from the Russians? The landscape west of Pokrovsk is mostly open fields for many, many kilometers, with few tree lines, villages or ravines for Russian forces to utilize for an effective defense against the Ukraine’s drones; hardly an ideal landscape for attritional warfare. In fact, with the Ukraine’s ability to manufacture drones still intact it would be a killing field, littered with Russian armor, APCs, infantrymen and anything else the Russians might send into the open.

Make no mistake, the Russians are going to have to march across the landscape west of Pokrovsk at some point, but I posit the following near-term moves by the Russians. I’ll follow up with some developments I expect later in 2026.

First, Russia will continue encircling other salients, or cauldrons as the Russians prefer to call them, they appear to be enveloping, like the Kupyansk-Senkove salient or the potential envelopment of Konstantinivka. These areas offer excellent defensive positions and landscapes for Russia’s small-teams based attritional style of attack along the line of contact. It begins with artillery and/or missile bombardment, small teams then attack and destroy Ukrainian positions, kill or capture soldiers, retreat, then let the Ukrainians return. Rinse and repeat with drone coverage dominating overhead and you’ve got a style of war that chews up time like Andre the Giant hoovered up food at all you can eat buffets. It’s efficacy is not in doubt so long as you understand Russian strategy. If you’re ignorant of it, well, then you are expecting a big armored break-out after Pokrovsk, which won’t happen, because that’s not how Russia is conducting this war.

Second, Russia will consolidate its gains in and around Pokrovsk, after the Ukrainian soldiers in the pocket are killed or surrender. For some time after I foresee Russia utilization of tactical defense within an offensive framework, much like what American generals called the strategic defensive during our Civil War. In essence, at first they’ll capture positions, then dare the Ukrainians to take them back by appearing weak, digging in, rotating out tired soldiers, and firming up logistics. Subsequent Ukrainian attacks lead to mounting casualties. Then do it again.

In the context of capturing Pokrovsk, Russia will continue targeting the Ukraine’s industrial base, especially drone manufacturing sites. And it will hammer the nearby cities of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk with drones, missiles and FAB glide bombs, but it will be some time until Russian ground forces are within reach of mounting an attack on either city. Much will also depend on how well the Ukraine’s armed forces perform.

In war your opponent gets a vote on whether you succeed or not. Will the Ukraine’s armed forces hold up or might we see a general collapse in 2026? The Ukraine is now engaged in the widespread press ganging of men to fight on the front, reports this story at Responsible Statecraft. Some of the men press-ganged into service have reportedly died from blunt-force trauma, after beatings with iron bars and one young man died from injuries sustained attempting to jump out of the vehicle he’d been forced into. Most of the ‘busificaiton’ as it is euphemistically called has taken place in 2025 and thousands of such videos can be found here, proof that the Ukraine’s manpower shortages are growing to crisis levels. Such activities by Ukrainian recruiters also bodes ill for the armed forces, and adjacently indicative of the efficacy of Russia’s strategy of attritional warfare. Although press-ganging is not something Russia directly influences, it’s a clear symptom of the unsustainably large amounts of casualties the Ukraine has and continues to sustain.

In the near-term expect the war on the ground to continue as it has since 2023. Russia will grind it out, slowly and patiently. I always find it laughable when commentators claim that hardliners in the Kremlin are chomping at the bit for Putin to launch a massive offensive. This is stupid, Western group-think. Why is it so hard to understand that Russians are naturally endowed with a deep well of patience to draw upon? Especially Putin. That is not to say there will be no fireworks in the near future. But they will be arriving from a different direction than Russian soldiers will. They will come from above.

A near-term imperative for Russian forces is a way to achieve drone dominance along the line of contact. Russia has, by and large, achieved a hybrid-kind of air superiority. This has largely been achieved by its manufacturing prowess, producing, according to some sources, nearly a thousand Geran-2 drones a month. One report dated this September describes a new jet-powered version, the Geran-3, that is operational, largely resistant to electronic warfare and can be fitted with a 90 kilo thermobaric warhead, making them extremely lethal, inexpensive and plentiful. Russia also manufactures and utilizes on a daily basis hundreds of Gerbera decoy drones. By using the Geran-2 and 3s in conjunction with Gerbera decoys and higher value missiles like the Iskander and the hypersonic Kinzhal the Ukraine’s ability to mount anything approaching an effective air defense is nullified.

Achieving drone superiority over the line of contact is another matter altogether. The Ukraine can still manufacture enough FPV drones to give the Russians pause, forcing their continued use of small-teams to attack, destroy and then retreat. But, the Russian’s are innovating. For example, there are recent reports of the deployment of a mother-ship drone with two FPV drones attached with fiber optic cables. The mother ship drone flies at altitudes above the FPV’s alleged EW bubble and by connecting its two FPV drones via fiber optic cables achieves complete EW avoidance. While not a game changer, widespread deployment of such drones would make the war that much more difficult for the Ukraine to prosecute effectively.

Pokrovsk is a major victory for Russia, a significant morale booster for the troops and those on the home front and proves the efficacy of Russia’s strategy of attrition. But don’t expect much to change after Pokrovsk. It’s a loss for the Ukraine. The question, how big of a loss? How many troops died or will be captured once the pocket is completely mopped up remains the most important variable of the battle; how badly will it effect the Ukrainian armed forces morale is what bears watching, by Putin and Zelensky alike.

 

The Tiny Dictate to the Large

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On October 12, 2025

4 Comments

After reading this article at @RStatecraft by @connor_echols I am more convinced than ever that admitting the Baltic States into NATO was the biggest mistake NATO ever made: three miniscule states with three tiny militaries dominate policy yet contribute nothing but acrimony and accusations towards Russia. 

Just read the stridency of their claims towards Russia. Former Latvian PM: “Putin acts the way he acts, and the only options for the West are either to submit or to resist.” Or the present Estonia FM: “Russia’s war against Ukraine is driven by one thing and one thing only: its refusal to accept the Soviet Union’s collapse and its unrelenting imperialist ambitions.”

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Look, I get the Baltics are paranoid about chimerical Russian irredentism towards the three republics. NATO can’t and shouldn’t allow alliance policy to be dictated by its three smallest members, who are tiny, paranoid and are lead by some critically undereducated fools, like Kaja Kallas, who said, “Chinese are very good at technology but they are not that good in social sciences . . . . The Russians… are not good at technology at all, but super good in social sciences.”

I’ll let that one go without comment. The bottom line is tiny states are dictating the policy of huge institutions and nations, just take a look at how the Israeli tail wags the American dog.

We’re supposed to make peace with enemies, folks, not friends.

Dialogue is essential more than ever. Not paranoia.

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Russo-Ukraine War Update

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On October 9, 2025

19 Comments

~by Sean Paul Kelley

I’m going to relay a conversation I had on X today with everyone here. It’s just easier this way, as I dislocated my shoulder yesterday and sprained my wrist falling down the stairs. Let me add, that crap that movie star tough guys do when they have a dislocated should is utter balderdash. Having my shoulder relocated was excruciating. So a ton of typing is out. Copy and paste is in. But I digress.

I replied to a Tweet, an X, WTF do we call those things now? Well, I’m sticking with Tweet. This one from the US Ambassador to NATO.

The US Ambassador to NATO tweeted the following;

“Russia is losing hundreds of soldiers a day without making any significant gains in Ukraine. Russia must recognize that it’s time for peace and come to the negotiating table.” 

I replied to the Ambassador with a series of tweets:

“The @USAmbNATO clearly does not comprehend what a strategy of attrition means. Capturing territory and manuever warfare are secondary to degrading the Ukraine’s ability to fight. This Russia is succeeding at quite well. 

I would add that US Generals, who excel in tactics and the operational art of war–which includes logistics–love to quote Bradley’s axiom “amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics.”

I loathe this quote for a number of reasons. Most of all because US generals and their partisans use this argument from authority to dismiss often very valid criticism. I’ll give you one example: Tommy “Catastrophic Success” Franks. He, Stanley McCrystal and Petraeus are prime examples of US generals with a signal lack of imagination, relying on the strength of their logisctical prowess, e.g. The Surge in Iraq. 

This was my third tweet to the Ambassador:

[The generals] insistence on this adage has lead to consequential misunderstandings of strategy and why so many continue to conflate Russia’s lack of forward movement with failure (i.e. General Kellog, ~spk). A strategy of attrition is all about the gradual erosion of the enemy’s ability to fight.”

It’s hard for me to comprehend that these men cannot understand Russia’s strategy in the Ukraine. Then an X user asked me a rather intelligent and sincere question:

For how long would you say Russia has been succeeding quite well at degrading Ukraine’s abiity to fight? For the full 3.5 years or a shorter time span? Follow up: how long will this success take to yield major changes on the battlefield? 

Let me first say how pleasant it was to get a sincere question on X. Usually it’s agreement or derision, and second I thank my cultured interlocotur for a few hours of intellectual stimulation.

My reply was fivefold, and many of you have read portions of it here in the past:

All modern Russian wars–starting with the Great Northern War in 1700–begin badly for Russia. All of them. The SMO is a perfect example. The Russians were uprepared, had an ill-thought out strategy and got pushed back badly. They got whooped. But the Russian’s learn quickly.

So, they did what they normally do in such situations, traded space for time. By mid-2023 their industry was on a total war setting, minting more artillery shells than all of the US and NATO combined. They’d called up fuck-tons of troops . . . 

. . . and because necessity is the mother of all innovation quickly outstripped the Ukraine in drone warfare. Plus, with their thermobaric weapons and Iskander missiles in high production they devestated fortified positions. Then they attacked supply routes. (They also innovated an EW unjammable fiber-optic drone that was devastasting ~spk added later.) Then 3-5 man teams . . . 

. . . cleared the trenches. The Kursk invasion was a catastrophe for the Ukraine and by 2024 it was clear the Ukrainian army was in trouble, [seeing as] recruiting meant kidnapping, and the Ukraine began shifting divisions will nilly against attacks initiated by the Russians.

Russia [now owns] the initiative & numbers & air superiority over all the Ukraine & drone superiority over the front lines. It looks very bad for the Ukraine now. Russia grinds away, caring not about territory yet. That comes next year in 2026 when they take Odessa. Does this [clarify]?

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Intelligent and incisive he asked the following: 

If they don’t take Odessa in 2026 would you adjust your analysis? Also, Russia hasn’t won all its modern wars. Crimean, Russo-Japanese & Afghanistan come to mind. Chechnya is a bit messy in terms of winners/losers. So while Russia can take heavy casualties sometimes it’s too many.

My reply was threefold: 

First, I didn’t say Russia has won all its modern wars. I said they all begin badly. Second, if they don’t take Odessa, I would be surprised. But it would not mean ultimate failure. Russian sabotage teams are already in Odessa. Chechnya actually became a total success.

It took more than a decade, much like the Murid War, but Chechens are now some of the most fanatically loyal soldiers in the Russian Federation. Crimea was a shit-show as was Russ-Jap and WWI and Afghan. Russian’s aren’t perfect, but they will win the war against the Ukraine.

The present military leadership knows exactly what they are doing. One action might change their strategy: an attemped decapitation strike that actually hit the Kremlin. Oreshniks would rain down on Kiev, brutal and devastating and foreign operaties (US/UK) would be targeted.

He then asks, 

When you say they will win the war against Ukraine, what does victory entail? Full territorial acquisition? I predict more stalemate – for multiple years to come if both sides stick to the military approach at resolving the conflict. I’ve been right on that for ~4 yrs thus far.

My final reply was this: 

Victory will be dictated on the battlefield. The Russians are not interested in full territorial acquisition. They are interested in landlocking the rump state. Zelensky will be killed or exiled. A pro-Russian regime will be installed. The Ukraine will be neutral . . . 

. . . along the lines of the Austrian Treaty at the end of WWII. It will not be a frozen conflict. Putin’s main goal is to create a peace that endures for at least a generation after he dies or steps down. That’s what I see are Russia’s goals. I doubt the war continues past 2026.

My main beef here remains the lack, be it from wilful ignorance or delusion, of US policymakers, generals and think tank denizens, of understanding Russian strategy in the Ukraine. Understanding attrition is not difficult. Just google it and read the wikipedia entry. How difficult is that? Do they not teach boolean operators at the US Army War College?

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Bad Faith and Criminality

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On September 19, 2025

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~by Sean Paul Kelley

In the aftermath of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, US president Teddy Roosevelt brought together negotiators from Russia and Japan to hammer out a peace. This was the first time the US was ever seen as an ‘honest broker’ in international relations. In 1919 President Wilson sailed to Paris with his 14 Points doing his level best to get the Europeans to negotiate an honorable peace. The wily Europeans outfoxed the rigid and moralizing Southerner in just about all the negotiations. Nevertheless, the US retained the aura of ‘honest broker’ until this century. I can’t say exactly when we lost it—probably when Colin Powell lied to the UN in testimony before the Second Iraqi War—but lost it we did. Somewhere in there we lost the aura of exceptional power we possessed by pissing away a metric shit-ton (yes, an American who can do metric!) of blood and treasure in the sands of Iraq and mountains of Afghanistan—and with that loss, we shot whatever credibility we retained right in the foot. But those, shall I say, are different discussions for a different day.

Lost auras being the one thing—at least we still got a chakra, right? (Ugly and poisoned though it may be.) It’s the second thing that grates the teeth at night: an everlasting chronicle of bullshit deeply eroding any sense of diplomatic norms that’s transfigured us into OG rogue nation. So, grab some popcorn, rewind the Wayback Machine and head back to 2014 cause I got a whopper to tell you.

It’s late summer of 2014 and a brushfire war is simmering between Russia and the Ukraine. The US and its European allies are eager to see the Ukraine join NATO. They bring Russia and the Ukraine together and pretty much force feed them the Minsk Accords. Then, over the course of the next eight years the NATO allies string the Russians along encouraging the Ukraine in its ever persistent demands to renegotiate the Minsk Accords.

Nota bene: yes, I write it as the Ukraine. I know the Ukrainians desire their benighted lot to be call Ukraine.

Do I care?

Not one iota.

It was always called the Ukraine—I mean, the Russians use the partitive genitive (don’t ask) when describing the Ukraine as a nation—and it will ever thus be called the Ukraine.

Now, it took the Russians—rarely gullible—a long time to figure out our stunning acts of “bad faith.” But “bad faith” it was. The US and its European allies had no intention of ever compelling the Ukraine to live up to its international agreements with Russia. They were only ever playing for time, waiting for the day they could present Ukrainian membership in NATO as a fait accompli, hoping for a démarche, a dénouement. Damned if we got war in its place.

But the forever-war nation ain’t gonna let a little war-war stop it, no, no, no! Once America sets a precedent it’s game on, bitches! So, in late May-early June 2025 the US negotiated directly with Iranian diplomats signaling that no military action was imminent. While negotiations were held, the US and Israel agreed on America logistical support for an Israeli attack on Iran. A week after Israel launched its first strikes against Iranian nuclear sites, the United States followed suit. Not only is this acting in “bad faith” it’s outright deceit, a line no nation should ever cross in the conduct of negotiations. It’s one thing to bring two sets of instructions to negotiations, one always needs a fall-back position. But deceit? WTF?

Twice then, the US has acted in “bad faith.” It’s at number three when the wise recognize a pattern, three also being proof of outright illegality in the conduct of international affairs, at least according to international and domestic law. So, there is that, you know?

Domestic law, you ask? How so?

“Young grasshopper,” says Master Po, “sit and I will tell you.” (Anyone who gets the reference wins a cookie.)

Treaties signed by the United States and ratified by the Senate are, in accordance with the 1920 Supreme Court ruling Missouri v Holland, the supreme law of the land.

Skeptical-like, you query, “what treaty did we violate, Sean Paul?”

Easy, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This treaty enshrined, in international and domestic law, a norm of diplomacy dating back 575 years to the city-state of Milan and its then ruler Francesco Sforza—a norm, or custom only violated three or four times in the last century it’s so sacred. So basic, so important is the principle of the personal sanctity of the negotiator, aka the diplomat, that it is respected by every nation on the goddamned planet.

It is the singular, fundamental law of diplomacy from which spring all the other elements of reciprocity evident in the conduct of international relations. And in typical American fashion, just days ago, we nuked that norm into oblivion when we in concert with Qatar and Israel arranged for an attack on credentialed Hamas negotiators.

I don’t have anything else to add except a few questions. Why would any nation enter into negotiations with us ever again? Who would be that stupid and reckless? And what, if anything, can ever be done to regain international trust? What I’ve detailed are fundamentally outrageous betrayals of diplomatic norms, norms developed over 500 years ago and used for centuries.

It’s not rocket sceince. Hell, it ain’t even algebra. Christ, it’s more basic than fractions. It should be easy to comprehend. And the behavior is so fucking counter-productive I would expect even the stupid to fathom.

I would be wrong.

P.S. And consequences,those things be bad, like ju-ju bee tree bad shit. Didnae take long, aye?

P.P.S. Oh, and by the way, this leads directly to the massive diversification away from petrodollar settlements, which gets us a fuckton closer to the end of the dollar as global reserve currency. That’s going to be one serious painful adjustment for Americans to make, domestic production notwithstanding.

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