Ian Welsh

The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

The Market is Not The Economy

Image by Admit One

Image by Admit One

Repeat after me: “The market is not the economy.  The market is not the economy.”

Of course the market is doing well.  Geithner, Bair and Bernanke promised to put around $2-$3 trillion more into the market in various forms.  Everyone now knows that the Obama administration will do whatever it takes to turn the market and financial sector around— even if that means trillions of dollars of risk for taxpayers.

Rule of Investing: when the government puts its full muscle behind something, be sure to ride it, and don’t get in the way.

What you want to watch now are:

  • Currency Rates
    Does the dollar go up or down?  The government printing and borrowing tons of money may not look so good to foreign debtors.  Or they may decide it’s the only game in town.
  • The Treasury Market
    Same thing.  Are private investors and foreign governments willing to buy?  Or will the Fed have to buy more treasuries?
  • Oil prices
    All of this money is going to show up somewhere, and a lot of people are (literally) betting on it showing up in energy prices.

What’s probably going to happen is a technical recovery that shakes apart based on unacceptable inflation before the recovery has reached a lot of people at the middle and bottom of the economy.  Unless  Geithner’s plan fails in absolute rather than relative terms, in which case there isn’t enough lube in the universe to make what will occur even tolerable, let alone pleasant.

In the meantime, remember that the market isn’t the economy, and unless you’re connected to the financial sector, odds are you aren’t going to see much of all this money.  The banks are being bailed out, not you.

The Financial Crisis is Not a Black Swan Event

Image By Ennor

Image By Ennor

I have become increasingly concerned that some in the Obama administration are treating this economic crisis as a Black Swan event. Nassim Nicholas Taleb coined the term to describe an event that is very rare, random and unpredictable. The imporant thing about Black Swans is that, because they are random and unpredictable, you can’t stop them from happening; you can only create your systems able to  handle Black Swans if they occur. For example, a flu pandemic that kills tens of millions might be a Black Swan, and it’s one that we’re completely unprepared for, as we don’t have the excess medical capacity to handle it.

The most recent event which made me think of Black Swans is the news thatnew SEC Chair Mary Schapiro doesn’t plan on reforming ratings agencies. Now, ratings agencies were one of the key actors in this mess—they certified mortgage backed securities and other toxic derivatives as AAA quality. If they had not done so, almost no one would have bought them.

The ratings agencies are paid by the companies whose securities they rate. I trust you see the problem.

If you think that the current economic crisis is just random, a once in a century disaster (or at least once every few decades), then you won’t think making major changes is necessary. Get through the problem, go back to how you were doing things before, and everything will be fine.

But, of course, the economic and financial crisis unfolding right now was not random. This crisis was predicted by multiple people, and it was predicted because of policy steps taken by government and widely-known private actions.

We could all read the charts showing a bubble in housing prices and sales. We could all see that derivatives were also in a bubble. We knew that leverage was out of control, ballooning to 30X or in many cases even higher numbers. We knew that with financial deregulation firms had started being involved in multiple types of businesses, putting retail banks at risk from their insurance or brokerage or investment banking arms. We all knew that the US savings rate had hit unsustainable lows and that the trade deficit was too high. We knew that the carry trade was introducing tons of hot money to the system (borrowing for nothing in Japan and using that money for leveraged plays elsewhere).

And, perhaps most importantly, we should have known that executives in the financial sector paying themselves huge bonuses were concentrating on short term gains and did not care about long term viability of their companies or even care about the honesty of what they were doing, because hey, by the time it all fell apart, they’d be rich, rich, rich and never need to work again.

All of which is to say the crisis was caused by a number of factors. It was not random. It was predictable and predicted. If we just muddle through this current meltdown—spend a lot of money bailing out the banks, throw some stimulus around—and don’t fix the fundamentally-flawed incentives and structures of the system, it will likely happen again.

Alas, Mary Schapiro’s actions imply that there was nothing really fundamentally wrong with how business was done.

At the very least, the US needs to make the following changes:

  • Reduce executive compensation—significantly,
  • Bring all securities under regulation (i.e. Credit Default Swaps must be regulated as insurance including reserve requirements and the necessity to use government approved actuarial charts),
  • Reduce overall leverage to 10X for everyone,
  • Break financial companies back into functional firms (i.e. break brokerages and insurance companies and investment banks off of retail banks),
  • Disallow financial innovation which is not expressly approved by regulators and is not then fully regulated,
  • Fix its trade imbalances,
  • Fix its savings rate,
  • Move off of the oil economy,
  • Ensure that lending is done responsibly and at relatively low markups from the Fed Funds rate, and
  • Enact anti-usury laws.

If these changes aren’t made, then you can bet dollars to the donuts that a financial crisis will happen again in some form. This crisis is a structural problem, not a random mess caused by bad luck.

Originally Posted at FDL, February 19th, 2009. I’d say nothing has changed, but in fact it has, we now know pretty much for certain that the Obama administration thinks this is a Black Swan event.  The Geithner plan makes that very clear.

Meanwhile In Canada the Stimulus Has Already Failed

So yeah, more jobs have already been lost that the 40 billion stimulus bill was expected to create by rather optimistic estimates.  For reference for Americans, the general rule is to multiple everything by 10, so an equivalent stimulus in the States would have been 400 billion.  In other words, the Canadian stimulus was about half Obama’s stimulus.

Ouch.

Ontario in particular is in a world of hurt, because Southern Ontario, Canada’s manufacturing heartland, has been in recession for years.  First it was because of the high Canadian dollar, then it was because of the Big 3 auto companies woes, but either way it’s turning into an industrial wasteland.  The Harper government has no real idea what to do about it (hint: small motors are good for micro generation, lads.  Get on it.)  Nor has the Ontario government been all that useful, though to be fair they don’t have 40 billion to throw at ths solution (about 20 billion of which should have gone to Ontario, since Ontario is taking about half the job losses.)

The US isn’t losing jobs at quite the same rate, but the fate of the American stimulus bill will be essentially identical, since just like the Canadian one it’s too small and put together very badly, because neither Harper nor Obama believe in liberal economic policies in any significant fashion.

Chuck “AIG should commit suicide” Grassley voted to repeal Glass-Steagall

Image by Ookami Dou
Image by Ookami Dou

Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa),the top Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, had called for AIG executives to take responsibilitity for their actions.

He specifically said AIG execs should “resign or go commit suicide.”

Of course, Chuck, by voting to repeal Glass-Steagall back in 99 had a lot to do with causing the current crisis.

Perhaps he should consider such advice more carefully in the future, since it should apply to him?

How To Reform Credit Default Swaps

Geithner was asked today if he believed in naked credit default swaps.  Apparently he does, but it was both the wrong question and answer.  Reform of credit default swaps needs to be thorough, and though through from basic principles.  Here’s how to fix credit default swaps.

The first step is a name change.  Call them insurance, because that’s what they are.  The insure against the possibility that you won’t get paid money someone owes you.  Once they’re called insurance, regulate them like insurance.

  1. Require an insurable interest.  That is, if Joe owes Fred money, Emma can’t buy insurance on Joe not paying Fred.  This is a fundamental rule in most insurance, you can’t insure someone else’s house against fire, because then you have a reason to want that house to wind up on fire, and no reason not to want it to burn down.
  2. Don’t allow over-insurance.  No debt can be insured for more than it’s worth.  If Joe owes Fred $100, then Fred can’t buy more than $100 worth of insurance.  In fact, better, he can’t buy more than $90 worth of insurance.  Again, we don’t want anyone better off if the debtor defaults than if they make the payments.  In life insurance there are many studies which show that people who are worth more dead than alive tend to die a lot more than people who aren’t over insured.  Imagine that.
  3. The mathematical models and actuarial tables used to figure out how much must be paid for insurance, the premiums, are set by government actuaries, just like they are in most other insurance businesses.  Current credit default models tended to assume things like “this housing bubble will last forever” and “there will never be another recession” and “defaults don’t cluster”.  Those assumptions were so wrong that building them into models amounted to fraud.
  4. No product which insures against credit default can be put on the market without actuaries from government regulatory bodies reviewing it.
  5. Proper reserves.  The party issuing the credit default swaps must have enough money to back them up, based on the governments actuarial charts and reserve requirements.  Life insurers and property insurers have to, so should credit insurers.  These reserves cannot be the debts the insurer is insuring.

There are other methods one could use to regulate and fix the default market, like having open exchange traded contracts, which could be made to work as well, but this is the simplest model and one that has worked well in the rest of the insurance industry.

The larger rule is simpler: no unregulated financial markets or entities without sufficient capital to cover their bets, so the taxpayer winds up stuck with the bill.  If you want to gamble, go to Las Vegas.  If you want to sell insurance, be a nice old fashioned stody insurance company who pays your executives low six figure salaries.

Reinstituting Glass-Steagall: the only way to fix financial markets

Obama was absolutely right when he said, on September 16th (2008), that modern markets have completely failed not just for the last 8 years but for most of the last 28—whenever Republicans were in charge, and a fair bit when Democrats were in charge. Ordinary people haven’t had a raise in nearly 30 years. Which leads to the question: why is Obama now letting Geithner, Summers and Bernanke spend trillions to reboot a fundamentally flawed market, one based on securitization and leverage?

I simply, completely and utterly fail to see what is so wonderful about the process of securitization or why the government should reboot a market which still includes it as a fundamental feature. What securitization does is take the risk and spread it from the people who might be able to understand it and control it (the people actually issuing the mortgages, for example) to a ton of people who could not possibly know the risk even if they wanted to. Yes, it allows you to create more financial products. Yes, it reduces the cost of capital somewhat. But are we really better off because of securitization?—Of course we aren’t. Without securitization this current market meltdown would have been a heck of a lot milder.

Ratings agency reform is not the solution: ratings agencies completely fell down on the job, and even if incentives were changed they are still not in a position to know whether a mortgage from Mr. Smith is legitimate. Are they going to visit the property? Talk to Mr. Smith? Call his employer? Of course not, they can’t. The only people who can are the people who issued the original mortgage.

Nor should risk be transferred much if at all. Risk must stay with the people who issue the mortgage. If they know it will be off their books they won’t do proper due diligence, and no one else can do it. At most, risk should be transferred once and must be transferred in whole and understandable form. In contrast, the current system takes multiple different incomes steams (say 20 or more), melds them together, chops them into tranches, and sells them to people who really have no idea what they’re buying—with middlemen at every step booking profits and washing their hands of responsibility. Risk must be assumed only by people who can understand it and manage it and who are exposed to the consequences of their decisions. In other words, risk must be assumed by people with the ability to manage that risk,who know that if they fail then they will pay the price themselves.

It is necessary for the Fed to basically regulate everyone, with the SEC occasionally peeping over it’s shoulder to see whether market manipulation is occurring. This is necessary because there are, as Obama points out, no longer clear cut differences between banks, insurance companies, investment banks, brokerages and so on. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act put an end to those differences.

Glass-Steagall, remember, was put in place during the Great Depression to stop another Great Depression from occurring. People who lived through the 1920’s believed that one of the causes of the the Great Depression was not having clear-cut boundaries between the businesses, meaning risk was not divided appropriately and companies became “too large to fail”. The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933 to mandate separating bank types according to their business (commercial and investment banking), thereby preventing the formation of banking conglomerates, and also founded the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for insuring bank deposits.

But somehow we think we know better today than the people who lived through the last Great Depression, the people who lived through the 1920’s and the last great market crackup. So we’ve repealed most of Glass-Steagall and allowed everyone to be in everyone else’s pockets, allowed huge financial conglomerates to mushroom into monstrosities, and allowed unregulated “innovative” financial “products” like collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) to grow into such huge bubbles that financial markets were huge multiples of the entire real world economy.

Then it all comes crashing down and people claim to be surprised.

Enough, already. Yes, the world is not exactly the same as it was in the 1920’s and 1930’s, but we didn’t start having these disasters till after Glass-Steagall and other Depression-era securities laws started getting repealed. The first set were repealed in the 1980’s, followed by most of the remainder in 1999 (e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, 1980;  Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act , 1982;  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999).

It’s time to reinstate the financial reforms of the 1930’s that worked:

  • Force financial conglomerates to cut themselves up and divide back into brokerage houses, investment banks, retail banks, and insurance companies.
  • Put finance companies under the clear control of regulators.
  • Reinstitute Glass-Steagall, with very mild modernization.
  • Get rid of most complex derivatives, excessive leverage, the carry trade, etc.

Obama was right: the philosophy of the past 28 years has been a failure. Let’s treat it a failure then, and re-institute what worked, re-regulate, then slowly modify from there, with complete transparency and strong regulation.

Financial markets exist to serve ordinary Americans and non-financial American businesses. They haven’t been doing that properly. It is time to make sure that they do.

Originally published in slightly different form September 16th at FDL.  Still sadly pertinent.

Geithner Plan Already Being Abused by Citibank and Bank of America

throwing_away_moneyThe Economist’s View explains how the banks are going to drive a bunch of Brink’s trucks through the holes in Geithner’s plan to stick the middle class with bankers’ losses:

It certainly looks as if Citigroup and Bank of America are using TARP funds, not to lend, which was one of the primary goals of the program, but to scoop up secondary market dreck assets to game the public private investment partnership.

So not only are they seeking to extract far more than was intended even with the already generous subsidies embodied in this program, but this activity is also speculating with taxpayer money.

This sort of thing was predicted here and elsewhere. Welcome to yet more looting.

Well, well, what a surprise.  They are using Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) money to buy up toxic assets, and selling them for a profit because they know that funds which split half the profits, but only take 15% to 20% of the losses, are going to overpay.

Perhaps you wondered why the markets rallied? It was because Geithner said very clearly that the government was going to give away a ton of money and not nationalize.

I agree with Dave Johnson at Seeing the Forest that Geithner’s plan will work—as long as we all define work to mean it will “bail out the banks, hedge funds, and rich people.”

The plan will eventually lead to a technical GDP recovery, and to employment not recovering before the next recession.  That’s the Japanification phase.  After that, well, we get a real depression, because the US (and the rest of the world) will have used up too many resources to be able to handle the next catastrophe. Since nobody will have put in place the necessary structural changes to avoid a catastrophe or gotten rid of the fools who caused this one, a catastrophe will occur.

Is anyone else noticing anything significantly different between Geithner’s actions and those Paulson would have taken?  Because frankly, I’m not.

(Hat tip to Dave Johnson)

Afghanistan is Lost Because Pakistan Can’t Be Fixed

Former Ambassador Dan Simpson has written an excellent article on why Afghanistan is lost and Obama should get out:

It is simple. It is impossible to fix Afghanistan without fixing Pakistan. It is impossible to fix Pakistan. Thus, Afghanistan is and will remain an impossible sinkhole

I’ll go one further.  The war in Afghanistan is destabilizing Pakistan.  Continuing or escalating the war in Afghanistan may not just mean Pakistan isn’t “fixed,” it may mean that Pakistan falls into anarchy or into the hands of Pakistani Taliban or other folks fundamentally hostile to the West.

In any case, go read Simpson’s full article, he makes his case very well.

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