MANDOS POST
Take a look at Joe Biden: He appears to have, for now at least, considerable staying power in the Democratic primary opinion polls (although, of course, this may change as the actual primaries come through). If your model of political psychology can predict a strong core of popular support for Trump without also predicting a strong core of party grassroots support for Biden, you should really rethink it from the ground up. For a core of US voters, the presence of Trump in the White House is an unprecedented emergency and an enormous well of anxiety and real, day-to-day stress.
You can call it Trump Derangement Syndrome or whatever, but the feeling is there, and implicit in this feeling is that Trump is an anomaly, a hiatus in the proper march of American institutions, that should by rights have gone to Clinton, and if not, to one of Trump’s Republican primary competitors. And the advantage of Biden, from this perspective, is precisely that Biden presents an opportunity to force the recalcitrant portions of the Democratic party and, yes, the American left (insofar as it plays electoral politics), to once again choose explicitly whether it will acknowledge and ratify that feeling, or whether it will die on a hill of particular material policies to the neglect of vital institutional decorum.
But for many left-wingers, it seems that even to admit that this is the dynamic is too much to bear. It requires admitting that the Neera Tandens of the world do not merely represent a type of think tank class traitors in cahoots with the rich, but they are actually the genuine grassroots representatives of a large portion of American society, large enough to make a big difference as to who will win the primary and the presidency.
A similar dynamic is taking place in British politics. In its Corbynite incarnation, Labour sits now on the horns of dilemma, or worse: It is perceived as too “Brexity” by enough Remain voters to make a difference, and too “Remainy” for enough Leave voters to make a difference. (As of this writing, the votes for the EU parliament elections haven’t been counted yet, but it is likely that this dynamic will remain stable until any sort of general UK election.) No matter what it does, it is very likely now that the prospect of a truly left-wing prime minister of Britain is galloping off to the distance, when it once felt so close. Let us leave aside the issue of whether Brexit itself is or can be good policy with a good outcome for most people in the abstract; it’s rather fascinating how the Brexit issue is precisely designed to press on the most divisive and ambivalent internal left-wing wounds.
I get the impression from looking at Labour’s representatives online that there exists a core of them who really, desperately wish to change the channel, to austerity and the environment–but especially austerity–but however many “deaths of despair” there may be, that is not the issue. Brexit is. And future policy outcomes, even if not directly related to EU membership, have nevertheless (and for a long time) driven through the underlying cultural cleavage represented by Brexit. Only by choosing a side at the outset, rather than engage in constructive ambiguity (Brexit, but not too much, please), could Labour have avoided the current electoral dilemma and had a shot at dealing with austerity.
A Customs Union is not the issue. How soft or hard the “deal” is–is not the issue. Nationalization is not the issue. How the Eurozone treated Greece is not the issue. Not even Ireland is the issue. Rather, immigration, free movement, and Britain’s self-perception are the issues. That remains true even if austerity and economic breakdown may be one cause of the Brexit phenomenon. The issue is a deep cultural, social cleavage of worldviews.
But who knows? Perhaps information may come to light that disqualifies Joe Biden. Perhaps on a hard Brexit, Remain voters will quickly forget what they protested against, and rejoin the Labour austerity–reversal cause in a Britain hemmed in by closed borders. Perhaps they will do so even before Brexit, giving in to the referendum in the hopes of fighting for…rejoining the EU? Restoring free movement? These seem both risky assumptions at the moment. (Admittedly the former is less risky than the latter!)
So now, what my readers may tell me is that they want to deal with austerity and they want to fight the environmental crisis and save lives and so on. And I agree! But the road to those goals runs through co-operation with parts of society that may have a different listing of priorities. They are always going to exist in some form or another; true, full social unity of purpose will never exist. We’re going to have to find a modus vivendi with those for whom Trump represents a fundamentally-threatening aesthetic emergency (as well as a material one but that seems to be secondary here). And with those for whom Brexit is not a hurdle to be gotten over in pursuit of a more urgent domestic agenda, but rather both a pressing question of material well-being and an even more pressing question of cultural priorities. The alternative is to throw up one’s hands as say, “My way, or the highway to the apocalypse,” that the world is too emotionally decadent to be saved. That, too, is a choice. But not necessarily a good one.
You go with the politics you’ve got, not the politics you want. Some of you might complain that that is simply acquiescence. No, it isn’t–it’s about recognizing first where you are, before you figure out how you’re going to get where you want to be. And folks, you’ve taken too long to figure that out.



