Ian Welsh

The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

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Follow Up and And Reply On My “How to Lose Allies” Post

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On September 10, 2025

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First, I want to follow up on this: “I am due to have a conversation with a friend that lives in Denmark tomorrow and I’m going to ask him about energy prices.”

His reply, and I paraphrase as I did not record it or take notes: “if we still had to make our house payment, we would be totally screwed. The amount of money that we pay for energy now is about equal to what our house payment used to be. It’s about five times higher than it normally is, but what’s even worse is the high cost of energy filters out into everything in the Danish economy. A simple item like bread is three times higher than it used to be. Specialty items are three or four times higher than they used to be. Fish from fisherman that we go to the docks to buy from because we live on an island is four times more expensive because they’re paying four times more for the energy they’re using to go out and fish. It’s brutal and it’s all because the United States or somebody allied with it blew up the Nord stream pipeline. I try to keep my mouth shut about this because most people have drank the Kool-Aid, but I really hope Russia wins because I’m sick of all this global elite bullshit.”

These words were spoken by a well educated American married to a Dane with two teen-aged Danish children. If the Danish economy is suffering like this Germany must be fucked.

Where does Europe get its energy now? From the US, now exporting LNG (liquid natural gas) to Europe for 4x the price of Russian and Turkmen natural gas. Here is my question as a Texan: why haven’t natural gas prices risen in tandem with the export of the commodity? People I have asked who recieve natural gas royalties are pissed because there is no price increase pass through. So, owners of the wells are getting screwed and so are the buyers of the product. Welcome to Oligarchical America.

Next I want to address a handful of commenters in my post, best reprersented by Mark Level. He writes, in a very gracious and polite comment that he takes issue with my outline of American Grand Strategy. He notes, “This insane hobby-horse (or idee fixe, choose your metaphor) dates back far more than 120 years, probably 3x that long, and originates in British Colonial phobias about Russia and “the East” generally. Halford John Mackinder developed this lunacy & published it almost exactly 120 years ago, but it had a long pre-natal development among arrogant Imperial gits in Asia. (Gits and twits, upper-class British twits, like the Monty Python sketch.) See here, and the delightful childish fantasy of being Alexander Magnus from this Mackinder thought bubble . . . .”

Please note, first and foremost, I used the word hostile power or hostile coalition. Hostile being the primary variable.

I’ve read Mackinder’s works. Anyone who has traveled across the Silk Road pretty much has to read them. His idea is not necessarily original. It’s more a fusion of ideas that came out of the late 18th century and 19th century Western European dominance of the world that began, as I previously mentioned, with the defeat of Venice in 1509,  Portugal’s conquest of a Spice Empire, and its desrtuction of the Ottoman Navy in the Indian Ocean, thus having no rivals, and of course Spain’s rapacious theft of New World gold and silver.

During the 17th and 18th century, a new idea developed with the growth of the British Navy, who outstripped the Dutch and pretty much took over their empire. New York City was, after all, New Amsterdam. What these developments presaged was an idea that centered around the ascendancy of the Littoral powers over the Continental Empires that had ruled Eurasia for millenia. Gunpowder, boats, better firearms, better steel and in the New World, devastating disease leading to genocide in many cases up and down North and South America. The Littoral is defined by strategists “as those land areas (and their adjacent areas and associated air space) that are susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea.” Thus the emphasis on a strong navy by Alfred Thayer Mahan who proved just how dominant Littoral Powers could be. For a time, that is, only for a time, as I see it.

Add to this ascendancy the wars of the Western European powers of the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire primarily fought during the 18th century for two strategic reasons, primarily by two very different nations with very different vital national interests at stake.

One, was the United Kingdom’s insistence that no power could dominate the Low Lands of the Netherlands and later Belgium because if they could, it would threaten an invasion of the British Isles, plus their massive exports of wool textiles, fueling the nascent industrial revolution. Smart, if ruthless policy.

Second, we must understand France‘s main goal during the wars of this time (and for several centruies prior) was to ensure a divided Germany. So long as the German states were littered into 100 different little principalities France had nothing to worry about. Thus France could go on dominating the continent. The first seismic change to this was the War of the Sixth Coalition which saw for the first time Russia flex its true potential when Russian troops occupied Paris. France’s cataclysm occured not in 1941 but in 1870 with her defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. The result of which was Prussia unifying all of Germany into one empire, adding insult to injury by having the Kaiser crowned in Versailles and taking Alsace Lorraine away as its prize.

Fuse those two strategies together and it is not too far an intellectual leap, considering the Great Game going on at the time between the UK and the Russian Empire, for Mackinder to conjure up his ideas. Were his ideas taken up by the United Kingdom? You bet, but by 1917 when it was clear that the United Kingdom could no longer maintain the balance of power in Europe and the United States had to intervene, (everyone should read AJP Taylor’s magnum opus, The Struggle For Mastery in Europe, to understand the balance of power and its collapse in 1917) US foreign policy intellectuals adopted it. And rightly so.

I think it’s the correct idea. But my reasons for thinking it’s the correct idea are not gonna make many of you happy. You might have to face some hard truths. Oh yeah, I did tell you I was a Realist in the old school manner of the word? In fact there have been a few times when Ian has chastened me pretty seriously for my realism. With that admisssion I will make another one: I don’t mind the criticism from Ian or from others. Ian is probably the smartest person I’ve ever met in my life and I listen to what he has to say. And when I say listen to him, I mean, I consider his words deeply. A man who cannot change his mind will never change anything. Nevertheless, I digress.

Here are my reasons for why I believe the prevention of a single hostile power or coalition of hostile powers from dominating the Eurasian landmass is smart policy. Please, if you take anything away from this sentence, take the meaning hostile. 

Number one: the Monroe Doctrine. Oh, I hear you screaming already. But the fact is that if this were not “our” hemisphere, not a one of us would have the standard of living we do today. Our hegemony of the Western Hemisphere is the primary foundation of our wealth and our power. You might not like it. I grimace frequently at the crimes we comitt to protect it. But, the Westphalian System is not built on justice. It is built on the acceptance of international anarchy. Each nation to its own. There is no single sovereign power governing planet Earth. Thus, violence is the supreme authority from which all other authority is derived. Is this a grim Hobbesian outlook? Yes. I don’t like it and I’m pretty sure you don’t either. But as a realist, I take the world as it is, not as I desire it to be. A hostile power or coalition of hostile powers that dominate Eurasia can take that hegemony away. You might not like it but trust me when I say you don’t want that to happen.

Second, a hostile power or coalition of hostile powers that dominate Eurasia can take more than our hegemony away, it/they can invade us. We don’t want that either. Thus we have a powerful navy that projects power to keep Eurasia divided–for the time being, because I think if we get into a war with China, their indirect way of war–read your Sun Tzu–will probably outwit us on the high seas. I’ve spent a great deal of time in China and have a healthy fear of their capabilities. However, my greatest fear is that in our arrogance we will engender the very hostility we must prevent and by our own devices bring about the doom we should seek to avoid. We have lost our edge, our generosity of spirit and our understanding of power. We have become a mean spirited, two-bit, cheap and vulgar people. And sadly, because so many of us are beaten down economically by rich elites who are delusional, we’re going to lose a big war in a painful way. A war that could be avoided, but probably won’t be. I hope I’m wrong, but don’t think I am.

That said, these very wise words, written by Robert D. Kaplan recently, convey the gravity of our present predicament, “There is no prediction. It is only through coming to terms with the past and vividly, realizing the present that we can have premonitions about the future.” Moreover, as a wise woman wrote about history, “the more I study history, the more I learn the art of prophecy.” Deeply contradictory statements, yet both true in their essence.

Are we any more perceptive now about what awaits our planet than were the Russians of 1917, or all of Europe in 1914, and, for that matter, the Germans of the 1920s and the early 30s?

Do we honestly think we know better than they did? With all of our gadgets and our technological triumphalism I bet you there are a handful of you out there that think we do know better than they did. I hate to disappoint you, but we don’t. History is the story of contingency and human agency, not inevtiablity.

So, there it is. Rip me to shreds if you wish. I’ve suffered enough Shakespearean arrows of outrageous fortune in my 54 years to handle it. In fact, I welcome your ideas and if you got this far I’m grateful for your time.

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How To Lose Allies and Create Enemies

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On September 7, 2025

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In 1936 Dale Carnegie published his seminal self-help work, “How to Win Friends and Influence People.” As a book dedicated purely to interpersonal relations I read it in my late-teens early-twenties and took a few damn good lessons away from it. But, I’m not writing today to discuss Dale Carnegie. I’m here to write the first chapter of a book entitled, “How to Lose Allies and Create Enemies.”

The American way of war and diplomacy (the two are inseparable, remember your Clausewitz) has grown too open-ended. We excel at the operational art of war and tactics, more often than not winning battle after battle. Yet, like Hannibal at the gates of Rome in the aftermath of Cannae we have forgotten how to turn tactical and operational victory into strategic peace. Part of this is we have, either consciously or unconsciously, forgotten question five of the Powell Doctrine: is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless engagement. This question represents to me the supreme invocation and obligation of every great statesman: prudence. Or restraint, if you prefer.

We also have fetishized, military, and military technology. Our armed forces call it total spectrum dominance. (If the technological advances made in the Russo-Ukrainian War are not giving our generals and intellectual colonels indigestion we are well and truly fucked.) This reliance on Big Data during wartime has made American generals dangerously indecisive while the sip coffee and wait for the accrual of more and more data. But, as U.S. Grant said, “in war anything is better than indecision. We must decide.” It has also made us forget the absolute supreme importance of strategy. Now, in warfare there are tactics, operations and strategy. But my focus here is more on the outright diplomatic arrogant dismissal of grand strategy since 1992. I ask each and every one of you who cares about the subject: have you heard any discussion anywhere in the last 30 years about what kind of grand strategy we should have?

No, you have not, which is criminal because American grand strategy has been the same, and should have remained so during the so-called Uni-polar Moment, for more than a century.

Since the days of the Great White Fleet 120 years ago the United States has had a simple grand strategy, one easily understood by a high school educated American citizen: no one power or coalition of hostile powers can dominate the Eurasian landmass. If that were to occur they would have the resources to invade the Western Hemisphere with ease. Full Stop.

Today Americans are so globally and geographically ignorant, enamored with their gadgets and so overcome with financial difficulties–all features not bug bequeathed by our ruling class–that this simple idea is now difficult to understand by the average Josephine.

How did we get here?

Two easy answers: first, thirty years of post-cold war dominance of global decision making. Decision making that made no consideration for consequences became the norm. Ignorance of future potential peer competitors become the norm. By this time the Neo-con influence of total dominance became the norm. These three norms led to serious incuriosity in our diplomatic and security apparatus, creating only careerists rising up the ladder. A true danger to national well being.

Second, and most importantly, we forgot the most important Iron Law of Westphalian international relations: great powers have no permanent friends (or enemies) only interests. After thirty years of attempting dominance and willfully or otherwise ignoring the Iron Law our power diminished and is now in visible decline. The consequences of this wearing before our very eyes is like a massive pile up on the opposite lane of interstate, yet our policy makers drive by the looming catastrophe (not even rubber-necking) laboring under the delusion that all is well and our unipolar world is robust and healthy. It most certainly is not.

With Xi Jing Ping’s announcement that it was time to bury the global rules based order, multi-polarity was born. The siege has begun. NATO is dead. Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not yet the organizational security block opposing NATO it soon will be. Not in two years, but maybe five, certainly ten.

Let’s explore the SCO a bit.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in June 2001 as a security organization to combat terrorism in Central and East Asia two full months before 9/11. Originally founded by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan it now includes as full members the following: India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus are now full members as well. Official observers are too many to list. See this link for details.

This week, under the auspices of the SCO, China, Mongolia and Russia, finally clinched the Siberian gas field pipeline deal. This is now the largest energy project on the entire planet. We have driven our adversaries into the arms of each other by our stupidity. Let me repeat that: our blistering arrogance first drove Russia into the arms of China by uparming the Ukraine. Now Trumps idiocy in levying secondary sanctions on the purchase of Russian oil has driven India into the arms of China and Russia. Ukraine was and is a corrupt failing state that we engineered a coup against a democratically elected pro-Russian president to install a comedian. All Russia asked for was Ukrainian neutrality but with every hi-tech NATO weapon in existence at his disposal the little comedian began his drama, thus precipitating a war that ultimately drove Russia into the arms of China. Even worse it ratcheted up an ongoing demonization campaign against China as an enemy because we just don’t know how to live in peace with anyone.

For now the SCO is still a security organization but it is branching out. Its first step is to become the Chinese engine of Eurasian economic integration. So to was NATO the European engine of integration in the beginning under the Marshall Plan. But China’s ambitions outstrip those of Truman’s era. The true driving force behind Eurasian integration is China’s Belt and Road project. This project which seeks to reintegrate all of Eurasia into a single Chinese dominated ecumene, barring Western Europe, is the single greatest threat to American sovereignty that we have ever faced. I do not overstate my case here. This is an enormous long-term threat we have no answer to as yet. I doubt we ever will which is why I have developed a mid-term peace plan that would prevent war with China. I’ll post it in the near future.

Regardless, I’m a sucker for Silk Road romanticism. I have traveled the length, width and breadth of the entire Silk Road: from China to Iran to Istanbul and finally Venice. But if the lands from Istanbul to China are integrated economically by Chinese power and infrastructure America—so long as we carry on with our now customary arrogance is mortal danger. In a word: fucked.

An example of the kind of fuckery we can soon anticipate—a danger I saw coming in 2015 when I noticed the ATMs in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan no longer offered American Dollars but Chinese Renminbi—is the singular most important and major project discussed at the SCO Summit: creation of an alternative payment system to the Swift banking architecture of the west that emerged in the later years as an offshoot to the the Brenton Woods Agreement after World War II.

You know you want even more fuckery. So here it is: Xi has secured an agreement from all the members of the SCO to create an SCO Development Bank, which will rival the IMF and World Bank in the West. He’s been trying to secure this for a decade. Trump delivered it to him in a week of tomfoolery and double-speak on social media.

Need more? No problem. Another item up for discussion between several of the SCO countries was the Arctic: investments in the Arctic; how to exploit the Arctic; how to dominate the Arctic. Note: no Americans were at the SCO as observers, not even as a member of the Arctic Council. Think about that for just a moment. Our diplomats are completely ignorant of discussions that our allies, like the South Koreans are engaging in with the SCO. Is this diplomatic insanity, malfeasance, malpractice, or just outright stupidity? I report, you decide.

Another edifying aside of mass fuckery: at the beginning of Trump‘s second term Indian Prime Minister Modi visited Trump, and there was a palpable sense of excitement about Indian and American relations going forward. There is very real potential for joint naval and space operations between the two nations. Moreover, India could be the third pole we need to contain China. Thus, it was clear from Trump‘s first term that Modi and Trump had a good relationship. Of course, this says much, much more about Modi and Indian desires than it does Trump perspicacity (he probably doesn’t even know what that word means by the way). Nonetheless Trump outright betrayed Modi when he agreed to the EU and NATO levying secondary sanctions against China and India for importing Russian oil. This should come as no surprise. After all, Trump’s raison de vivre is winning the daily 24 hour news cycle first and foremost. Why not fuck Modi in the process of domestic glory? Thus he pushed a potential ally and leader of the largest population on earth into the arms of the SCO. And made him a star at the BRICS summit where he could ham it up with Putin and Xi.

Meanwhile, what about the Second Law of Westphalian politics? You know, the law of Unintended Consequences? Well here’s a whopper for you: the agreement of the Siberian 2 pipeline between Russia, China, and Mongolia will take all of the natural gas that has been sent to Europe for the last 50 years and will now send it to China and other places for the next 30. Europe is now paying four times what it used to for liquid natural gas that is being imported from the United States. It is looking at an extremely cold winter without enough energy and that is going to drive inflation. I am due to have a conversation with a friend that lives in Denmark tomorrow and I’m going to ask him about energy prices. The chaos of rising energy prices is devastating European industry. In the last year alone Germany has lost 196,000 businesses. I repeat 196,000 businesses in Germany closed in one year. That’s devastating to any economy, but Germany long the economic engine of Europe and the EU is deindustrializing for one simple reason: the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which has been an absolute catastrophe for Europe. The United States is responsible for it.

As Kissinger said about being America’s friend, “The word will go out to the nations of the world that it may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.”

The reason we don’t know how to live in peace with anyone anymore is that after the end of the Cold War, we reigned triumphant for 35 years and could do damn well whatever we want it all over the world and nobody could oppose us. Well after 35 years it becomes a habit and habits are hard to break, especially mental ones and that’s why our ruling elites are so delusional in their thinking about international affairs. We are now creating the very monster that can actually threaten our hegemony of the Western Hemisphere. This is the most dangerous possible time in American history when it comes to international relations, and we are being ruled by fools. I fear for the future more than anyone can possibly imagine.

Meanwhile, Putin is probably incredibly surprised at how easy it now appears to fracture NATO and to gain new potential allies in Eastern and Central Europe. We are also looking at the proto-formation of a Chinese-Russian-Indian entente. Consider the immense rewards Putin will gain after starting a small war that threatened not a single American vital interest? One in which Russia simply demanded neutrality from its neighbor. The war’s consequences have propelled Russia into a potential global order shifting alliance. This was not Putin’s original intent nor goal. But because the US, under Biden and now Trump, have scored so many “own goals” this is where we are.

The US now behaves much like Venice before the 1508 when the first Holy Alliance, formed by Pope Julius II, also known as the League of Cambrai came together. It took everyone in the European inter state system to band together to defeat Venice. Of course, Venetian behavior prior to the war against it had been high handed. They raised prices on spices, silk and all the goods they imported from the East at will, bringing penury to the elites of Europe, who were the only ones who could afford such luxury. Europe had had enough. The League included France, the Hapsburg Monarchy, the Papal States and the Spanish Empire. Venice suffered a chastening defeat at the battle of Agnadello in 1509. Before this alliance, no one could defeat the Serene Republic. The League of Cambrai did collapse over personality disputes, but not before they took Venice down two pegs. And this is when Venice began its terminal decline that ended when Napoleon overthrew the republic. But after 1509 world change seriously accelerated: Spain pilfered the New World and Portugal built a spice empire in the East by rounding Africa, conquering parts of India, destroying the Ottoman navy in the Indian Ocean and upon entering the Golden Chersonese, conquered the greatest spice entrepôt in the world, the city of Malacca and its adjoining straits, thereby dominating the spice trade from Indonesia. The arrogant behavior of Venice incited all the developments leading to lost income, increasing debt and decline, just as the US is doing now. Unintended consequences have a way of creating fuckery.

The US, however, unlike Venice, is not just passively letting these nations find common interests, the US under Biden and Trump has actively pushed them together. Secondary sanctions on India were a slap in the face of a natural ally of the United States. We already know what happened: Modi went to Beijing and held hands with Putin and Xi.

Own goal!

But the biggest problem we have, as I see it, is that the US can no longer be considered a ‘rational actor’ in the anarchic Westphalian state system presently in existence. Why? One word: Trump. Trump has three huge crippling defects as a leader. Number one: his biggest donors are hard right conservative Jewish dual citizens (Yeah, I said it. You can only serve one master. Fuck off if you disagree). Donors like Mrs. Adelson and others own Trump’s Israel policy. They drive the policy supporting genocide which is not rational by any stretch of the imagination. Second, Trump is one of those pusillanimous leaders in history who acts on what he hears from the last person he talks to. This is truly, epically bad. Third: TACO. Trump always chickens out. At heart the man is a coward. But as my great-grandfather told me, there is nothing more dangerous than a coward in a corner. We must endure three more years of this.

As the Guatemalans used to say during the years of genocide: la puebla es jodida.

State & Police Vulnerabilities in an American Insurrection Scenario

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On June 12, 2025

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As unrest spreads, I think it’s worth looking at the weaknesses of American police forces in particular. Most of these vulnerabilities also apply to the National Guard.

Non-violent protest has been the dogma, especially on the center-left, for generations now. It wasn’t always thus; old time unions fought pitched battles with police and, in one case, coal miners straight-up fought the military. Blowing up buildings was not verboten, nor was assassination. US history is not what pansy-moderns think it is, and the same is true of Britain, Canada, and so on. Our forbears did not think that letting the state beat you, shoot you, torture you, imprison you, and kill you without fighting back was either virtuous, or in many cases, smart.

Modern Americans, increasingly impoverished (average Chinese have better standards of living, more on that in a later article) and living paycheck to paycheck, increasingly homeless, and with less and less to lose may decide that dying on their feet is better than lying there and letting cops beat the shit out of them, or than having ICE deport them to some third world torture prison.

If they do, and I, of course, would never suggest such a thing, then American police have significant weaknesses. The most important weakness is simple:

Modern American Police have been trained to be cowards. This sounds like rhetoric, hyperbole, or at the least, like exaggeration for affect. Let me assure you it is none of these. American police are trained to care about their own safety more than anything else. As a result they are trigger happy and unwilling to risk themselves against anything that looks genuinely dangerous.

This means that they travel in packs, and when threatened, they clump up in large groups for their own safety. This was shown when cop-killer Christopher Dorner, a trained soldier, killed a cop and her fiance. The police immediately clumped into large groups and used most of the force to protect themselves and their families.

Nor is this just a matter of extreme circumstances. Anyone who’s watched how police act around demonstrations will see that even tiny demonstrations attract much larger numbers of cops than necessary. Modern police, unlike those of fifty years ago, almost always wait for SWAT teams or at least backup before entering situations they consider dangerous and their threshold for what they consider dangerous is often very low.

This makes the police easy to deal with by any coordinated group which has not been infiltrated. Simply set of a bomb or use a drone attack on police or their families. Then do it again. Then again. Make threats against a number of targets. They will clump up, be unable to search from their own fear and become ineffective.

Then the group simply hits whatever the real target is.

This speaks to the basic principle of guerilla warfare: Attack where the enemy is weak. It’s just that American police, and I’m betting the National Guard, won’t be much better. They are especially easy to move around, because American police are cowards and because their doctrine is one of overwhelming force and caution, it’s easy to push them into a defensive posture or to push them off balance.

Simple, standard insurgency techniques will work well against American police. A few IEDs near where police can be expected to go, remote triggered as police drive over them, will see the police retreat even further into a shell. Civilian drones can easily be used to make helicopter operations dangerous, as well. The police will move slowly, in force, and retreat easily when something explosive happens.

All of this will work well against US paramilitary organizations as well. ICE would be trivial, as their movements are very predictable, and they are likely even more cowardly than normal American police, as their job is almost entirely about brutalizing unresisting people.

During the Irish revolution, assassins would walk in on British officials eating breakfast with their family, kill the official (leaving the family unharmed) and walk away.

A little fear goes a very long way to gumming operations up completely.

Smart insurrectionists will not, of course, do what Dorner did and target family members, as propaganda is always part of any successful guerilla organization. (Mao discusses this at length in his class work on guerilla warfare.)

Other principles of operation should be obvious. Use a cell organization so that damage from discovery is limited. People can’t reveal what they don’t know. In the modern environment, don’t use or even carry mobile phones, except perhaps ones that are deliberately damaged so they have no connectivity. (Everyone carries a mobile phone, so operatives should appear to do so.)

Do everything old-style. The modern state is excellent at electronic intelligence, but has let human intelligence wither to a large extent.

Successful insurrectionists will have a rule that they 100 percent kill any informants or undercover operatives. No deal will be made with prosecutors or police; they always backfire in the longer run.

Of course, I hope that none of this happens, and this article is just a look at what smart insurrectionists would do, taking natural advantage of police weaknesses. The police are welcome to read this and decide to change their doctrines and training to be less cowardly and avoid the worst of these weaknesses. As a side effect, they’d also kill less people because of their fear, and that would make insurrection less likely.

Ideally, American elites will realize that they are better off and safer if everyone is cared for. From enlightened self-interest, they might start taxing themselves again and make sure that ordinary people have enough money for rent and food. They will end predatory pricing, be fair and kind, and make medical care easily available. The American people, who, like all people, would rather live a good life, will respond and prospects of insurrection will fade like mist against the noon-day sun.

But if they refuse to discontinue their policy of mass impoverishment backed by fear, it should be understood that those who finally do decide on insurrection will not find, contrary to various myths about American impregnability, which repeated losses against men in pajamas should have put to rest, that American forces of law and order (or repression, depending on your politics) are not without weakness.

May God grant that it never comes to this. If it does, may the side of good, which cares for the welfare of the people, win.

***

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The Terminator Future (The End of Meat)

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On January 16, 2024

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This is my third piece this week on how the world is changing and why. The first handled the geopolitical, the second the military tech at this moment and how that is making empire difficult.

This one is about the future.

There’s going to be a period of war which is all about autonomous robots. Drones, missiles, robodogs with guns, tiny swarms, etc…

Humans are a stupid and inefficient way to apply force: most of the human body is not designed for combat: we are slow, clumsy and easily damaged and destroyed compared to what we can build.

As the cost of autonomous robots (and they will be autonomous because remote control is a weakness) continues to plummet and as the knowledge of how to build them spreads, they will replace humans on the front lines. Humans will be victims, but not primary combatants.

At the state level this means that states which can produce the most robots will win: the robots will be expendable and used in vast numbers. The chain of resources to manufacturing and the ability protect that chain will be what matters.

For smaller groups, robots will offer cheap violence against soft targets (and sometimes hard targets.) A militia can be people who build drones then use them to attack a governor or an activist they hate.

Let’s give one concrete example. Say it’s twenty years from now, you’re China and some piss–ant country like Yemen is causing problems hitting your ships with drones and missiles. You warn them and they don’t stop.

Fine. Release a few million autonomous hunter-killer drones. They will crawl over every single inch of land, not even in the mountains will it be possible to hide. No matter how  many robots Yemen has,  you’re China, you have magnitudes more. You can’t lose.

In time there will be, as the gamers say, a “meta”–we’ll figure out how autonomous robots work, and how to fight with them and defeat them and so on. But during the adoption period (and remember, that period is usually 30-40 years and sometimes longer) those who figure out how to use robots best will punch far higher than their apparent weight, and if anyone can obtain a monopoly on some for of advanced weaponized robot which is effective (like European ironclads when no one else had any), well, they will do very well and may be able to parlay that into a long period of dominance.

Don’t be sure you know exactly how this will play out. For example, a decentralized model where every citizen builds and contributes drones may turn out to be very strong versus a centralized model. Or it may not. We don’t know yet.

But the time of meat as the right way to fight is coming to an end.

(Or has it? We’ll come to that in the next article in this series.)

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How Changing Military Technology Has Contributed To End of Empire

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On January 15, 2024

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Before WWI, strategically, machine guns were offensive weapons. They were used to expand the European empires against opponents who didn’t have them.

Come WWI, it turned out that they were defensive weapons which made offensive operations very hard if both sides had them.

Armor and air made fast offensive operations possible in WWII, and aircraft carriers made air the queen of the ocean and the king of force projection against nations without large air forces.

Over the past twenty years two major things have changed in military technology. I’ve written about both in the past.

The first is the spread of cheap and effective drones and missiles. It was always clear that drones were not going to be weapons of the powerful. What matters for weapons systems is who can afford them. If you need aircraft carriers and you’re not a major country, you’re shit outta luck. The end of medieval nobility arrived with gunpowder weapons, specifically cannons. King could afford them, nobles couldn’t, and old style castles couldn’t stand against them.

Another thing about drones and missiles right now is that defenses against them aren’t very good. Hit missile defenses with a large enough wave of attack and some will get thru, and if you have decent intelligence, some will get thru and destroy some of the air defenses.

In the old days if you wanted to bomb, bomb away and inflict terrific damage on someone without them being able to strike back, you had to have a lot of aircraft and either basing rights or aircraft carriers. Now they just have to be in missile and drone range. And often the missiles and drones are way cheaper than the defenses.

This means it’s easy to hurt the other guy. No more Israel pounding Lebanon and Lebanon can’t strike back, even though Israel’s military budget is way more than Hezbollah’s. Likewise missiles and drones are great at shutting down naval traffic, as the US, UK and Israel are discovering.

But what has happened at the same time is increased strategic ability to defend. Improvised explosive devices, cheap drones and missiles, and the way that armor (tanks, etc…) has become almost worthless. You can’t punch thru, anymore, if you don’t exhaust the defender first or take them by surprise. We’ve seen that in Afghanistan, but we saw lesser version in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US could take the cities, but everywhere else they were in danger: take out a convoy and get hit by IEDs and guerilla attacks.

It’s easy to hurt the other guy, but it’s very had to take and keep territory. “Big Arrow” war requires massive overmatch in forces.

To put it crudely, any pint-sized country or reasonable sized militia is in the game: they have weapons that can threaten anyone near them. There’s no “stand off and bomb”, not even for the US, unless it wants to withdraw from its overseas bases. The enemy can almost always hit back. If Israel goes to war with Hezbollah, Hezbollah, with at least 150k missiles can and will flatten Tel Aviv if Israel decides to flatten Beiruit.

One-sided deterrence is broken. “You win on the ground quickly and you can’t hit us from the air without us being able to retaliate.”

That the new military technology status quo.  There are exceptions, and there are particular cases (many people think that navies are essentially obsolete except for submarines in any real war, and submarine detection technology is advancing so quickly that even subs may be useless soon.) But basically, it’s hard to conquer someone who’s properly prepared (Armenia was not, Ukraine was, Hezbollah is, Hamas is.) And it’s hard to shut down drone and missile based retaliation, so you can’t have nice little colonial wars like Gulf I where you hit them and hit them and all they can do is take it.

War, war always changes.

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A New Era Of Mass Armies Approaches

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On September 29, 2023

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The army, or a part of it at the war college, has perked up and noticed some of the lessons of the Ukraine war, and that it’s a war that the US military could not fight. They’ve missed a lot of things, or felt they couldn’t/shouldn’t write about them, but they’ve figured some stuff out and written about them in a new report, “A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force” by Lieutenant Colonel Katie Crombe, and Professor John A. Nagle.

The entire thing is worth reading, but I’m going to pull out three of the main points. The first is that a volunteer US military can’t fight a real war.

The Russia-Ukraine War is exposing significant vulnerabilities in the Army’s strategic personnel depth and ability to withstand and replace casualties.11 Army theater medical planners may anticipate a sustained rate of roughly 3,600 casualties per day, ranging from those killed in action to those wounded in action or suffering disease or other non-battle injuries. With a 25 percent predicted replacement rate, the personnel system will require 800 new personnel each day. For context, the United States sustained about 50,000 casualties in two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. In large-scale combat operations, the United States could experience that same number of casualties in two weeks. (emphasis mine)

Huh. Yeah, that seems bad. And it comes just as the US military is having trouble with volunteer recruitment, though even if wasn’t volunteer recruitment couldn’t keep up with the meat grinder of a real war.

The US Army is facing a dire combination of a recruiting shortfall and a shrinking Individual Ready Reserve. This recruiting shortfall, nearly 50 percent in the combat arms career management fields, is a longitudinal problem. Every infantry and armor soldier we do not recruit today is a strategic mobilization asset we will not have in 2031. The Individual Ready Reserve, which stood at 700,000 in 1973 and 450,000 in 1994, now stands at 76,000. These numbers cannot fill the existing gaps in the active force, let alone any casualty replacement or expansion during a large-scale combat operation. The implication is that the 1970s concept of an all-volunteer force has outlived its shelf life and does not align with the current operating environment. The technological revolution described below suggests this force has reached obsolescence. Large-scale combat operations troop requirements may well require a reconceptualization of the 1970s and 1980s volunteer force and a move toward partial conscription. (emphasis mine).

If the US expects to fight Russia, China, or even Iran, they’re going to face a real war.

The US has spent 20 years fighting with air, artillery and surveillance supremacy, with clear communications. American veterans who went to Ukraine were unprepared for a war where the other side has, if not supremacy, air and artillery superiority, and the Ukraine war has been a meatgrinder. Plus, the current command methods the army use don’t work in an environment like the Ukraine:

Twenty years of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operationsin the Middle East, largely enabled by air, signals, and electromagnetic dominance, generated chains of command reliant on perfect, uncontested communication lines and an extraordinary and accurate common operating picture of the battlefield broadcast in real time to co-located staff in large Joint Operations Centers. The Russia-Ukraine War makes it clear that the electromagnetic signature emitted from the command posts of the past 20 years cannot survive against the pace and precision of an adversary who possesses sensor-based technologies, electronic warfare, and unmanned aerial systems or has access to satellite imagery; this includes nearly every state or nonstate actor the United States might find itself fighting in the near future

Back in 2012 I wrote an article titled “Drones are not weapons of the powerful.” I posited that they’re cheap, easy to make and everyone would eventually get them. We’re pretty much there, in terms of large group actors (the step after that is individuals, leading to an era where even a single person or small group can launch significant attacks.).

The authors of the article agree:

These systems, coupled with emerging artificial intelligence platforms, dramatically accelerate the pace of modern war. Tools and tactics that were viewed as niche capabilities in previous conflicts are becoming primary weapons systems that require education and training to understand, exploit, and counter. Nonstate actors and less capable nation-states can now acquire and capitalize on technologies that bring David’s powers closer to Goliath’s.

There are issues the authors don’t deal with, the main one is “designed in California, built in China.” The US’s weapon building capacity is massively degraded. As one example, the Chinese can build 3 ships per one the US builds, and the ships are probably better.

Since WWII, in every war the US has fought, they’ve had air superiority or supremacy and more advanced weapons than the enemy. They’ve also had more “stuff”. But the WWII “arsenal of democracy” is dead, it doesn’t exist any more.

Another issue is that the US military has outsourced too much of its capabilities. The corporate mantra of “outsource everything except your core competency” doesn’t work in a real war. All support functions should be run by the military and soldiers. (I may write an article on that in the future.) Contractors are too expensive and unwilling to really risk their necks, and outsourcing maintainance to non-army technicians is a disaster.

The US retains one huge advantage, however, its continental position makes it hard to attack the mainland. But this is also a disadvantage if the US loses air and naval supremacy. America’s enemies can only be reached by air and sea, after all.

Anyway, one takeaway is that conscription is likely to come back. I assume they’ll first make a huge push to recruit immigrants, undocumented or not, but that isn’t going to be enough. Get ready and remember, Empires rarely fade, they go down in huge conflagarations. The British Empire’s end involved two world wars.

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Violent Determinants Of Social Hierarchy

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On May 3, 2023

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There are four primary determinants of social hierarchy. They are productive ability, social ties, ideology and violent ability. All are affected by geography.

None of these operate in isolation. Productive ability directly affects violent ability.  Ideology determines what people will and won’t do but over time tends to move towards what a Marxist would call material determinants, though that time can be a LONG time: it took about two thousand years for the early kings to rise after the introduction of agriculture, so the power of ideology, though not the only factor slowing adoption, shouldn’t be understated. Two thousand years shows a lot of resistance.

To the extent hunter-gatherers tended towards egalitarianism, and there are certainly exceptions, generally based on high surplus, it was based on the fact that one guy with simple wood and stone weapons isn’t much better at violence than any other guy, especially in a society where all men who aren’t shamans are hunters. Oh, the best might be able to take two men at once, maybe even three in exceptional cases, but if a group of other males attacks he’s done. Likewise, though ambushes can change the formula, conflicts between men and groups of men are extremely risky unless one side outnumbers the other.

This changes a lot with early bronze weapons and armor, and it changes even more with organized bodies of men trained to fight together. Professional warrior or soldier classes whip peasants. So when agriculture makes every man not a hunter, but allows for division of labor, the “every man is about as good as another” changes, especially in organized groups.

He who is able to transfer the loyalties of a group of warrior or soldiers to himself can rule. Alternately men good at violence can transfer their loyalty to each other, creating a ruling warrior caste.

Let’s take the case of ancient Greece. The Homeric age emphasizes individual combat, but nobles can train much more for it and have better gear. They rule, but the society is still remarkably flat overall. In the classical period, the primary military arms are the phalanx and the galley. The Phalanx is simple and doesn’t require a lot of training, but it does require fit men with gear acting in groups with high solidarity. If everyone doesn’t push together, in unity, they lose.

Athens citizenship was almost exactly “men who fought in the Phalanx” and “men who rowed the galleys.” The galleys were for poorer men, and the state provided the galleys, but galley rowers had to be highly trained and work in precise unity. Slave rowers could not compete with free men, and highly trained crews of citizens could and did, as with the Athenian navy against the Persians, dominate.

So, while those who rowed were usually of the lowest class of Athenian citizens, they were citizens.

What was also important is that for the phalanx, men provided their own weapons and armor and the state, which was the citizens, provided the ships.

Rome started off similar: legions were full of citizens who served for relatively short periods, and who provided their own arms and armor. As with most of the Greek cities, they returned to their farms or other lives after the wars. They were not professionals: they did not make their living as soldiers, but they were able to beat professionals. Sparta may have been the best for a long period, but they didn’t win every battle, their dominance on land was real, but not determinative. Rome in the early and middle Republican period defeated armies made up of professionals regularly.

The fall of the Republic comes when the army is professionalized: this is now how people make their living, they are provided their weapons and armor, and they are loyal primarily to their generals, because their chance of real wealth is from looting and that depends on the general, including whether and how much he lets them loot.

Crassus, near the end of the Republic, simply raises his own legions without the help of the state.

Rome comes to depend on professionals, not citizens, and those professionals are not loyal to the citizenry, and as such the Roman Republic comes to an end when one of the great generals, Augustus,  defeats all his opponents. The Republic never returns, because the conditions for Republican rule are gone.

As we can see, then, if amateurs can’t defeat professionals and if armies are not raised from the citizenry by the citizenry, Republican or Democratic rule cannot continue.

The great Democracy of the last six centuries or so was Switzerland. Similar to the Greek city states, they relied on pikemen, raised from the general population by the general population and able to defeat professional militaries, including knights who had trained since childhood. Even when operating as mercenaries (as city state citizens sometimes did) they retained their loyalty to Switzerland.

But the heart of it is that they could defeat troops raised in non-free states.

But notice in all these cases: men had the franchise, because they were the ones who could and did fight. Women in Athens were treated particularly badly, indeed they were treated worse than most slaves who didn’t work in mines. Switzerland was one of the last western nations to enfranchise their women.

Let’s talk about that enfranchisement. The main feature of 20th century warfare from the WWI thru Korea was that it was mass conscription warfare. The armies were huge. This meant that women, during war, had to take over jobs done by men who were fighting.

Women thus, while mostly not fighting (WWII Russian women are a rare exception), were absolutely integral to military success. They made much of the weapons and kept society running.

When did women get the vote in the US? 1919.

The US draft ended after Vietnam, and the army was professionalized. Not coincidentally, egalitarian distribution of goods has since then spent over 40 years collapsing. This was due, in part, to the constraints on war in a nuclear armed world. Before nuclear weapons, great powers could win wars against each other and the benefits of doing so were huge as were the costs of losing. (Austria stopped existing, Germany lost a huge amount of its land and became a US Satrapy, as did Japan.)

Going all out, enlisting as many men as possible and increasing war production thru the roof all made sense.

But in Vietnam, the US never went all out, because North Vietnam was a Russian ally. They wanted to win without really winning: without conquering North Vietnam.

You don’t need a mass conscript army for a war where you’re not seriously trying to win and where, indeed, seriously trying to win may provoke a nuclear war. (This also applies to the Ukraine war to some extent.)

It is notable that democracy rises with cheap gunpowder weapons. Mass egalitarian societies, in economic terms, result from WWII, and the policies supporting them come to an end about the time that mass drafts are done away with and armies are “professionalized”, aka, become internal mercenaries.

Worse for the future may be the rise of robotic armies. If you don’t need men for soldiers, if you don’t need mass numbers of women to step in and make the robots, well, perhaps the time of egalitarian societies is done.

Or, perhaps not. Because as important as who fights is who makes the weapons. The great disaster of the war of 1812 is that decentalized American armaments production could not compete with centralized armaments factories. It was the end of the yeoman farmer ideal: the idea that decentralized armies raised from the yeomanry could defeat professional militaries.

But if drones and robots which are effective combatants and effective assassins or area denial weapons can be created by ordinary people easily, and the powers that be are unable to deny people the means of doing so, then robotics may prove to be positive in spreading power among the population.

This is one of the hopes of the future, and you should understand clearly that those who want to restrict your access to the determinants of power do not have your best interests at heart.

We’ll talk about that at a later date: it gets to the heart of much of the culture war around guns, a contentious topic and with good reason, given just how many children are being served up on its altar.

But that is for later, for now: who is good at violence matters and it determines who gets the good life and who doesn’t; who rules and who serves.

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The Bottom Line On Ukraine As An Example Of Decision Analysis

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On April 26, 2022

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I could write a lot of words on this, but let’s keep it simple.

First: Russia keeps taking land.

Second: Putin has far more reserves he can commit than Ukraine does.

Third: this means that the decision about whether to win or lose is Putin’s.

Which do you think he’ll choose.

Oh, there’s considerations around acceptable costs and a possible guerilla war later, but this it the essence of the invasion.

This is a fairly basic but important style of analysis. Ask yourself:

1) Who makes the decision?

2) Do they have sufficient resources and power to enforce their decision?

3) What do they think the right thing to do is? (This isn’t always about self interest, though it often is.)

4) What decision are they likely to make?

You can add bits to this, like “does anyone have a veto?” but this is the essence of it.

This is why I have said for years that nothing would be done about climate change till too late, because the people who have the power to make the decision don’t think it affects them, and do think that the status quo is good for them, so they aren’t going to do anything.

Most reasonably reliable analysis comes down to simple heuristics like this one. Complicated heuristics for social decision making rarely work.

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