In my Nov. 7 analysis of the Russo-Ukrainian War I missed two serious developments on the line of contact that I simply didn’t have the bandwidth to notice. After paying closer attention I came away with a big picture question: has Russia pierced the line of contact broken in three places or my sources exaggerating? For the last two weeks there has been talk and rumors, some of which I have been guilty of passing along, that Russia achieved such a goal and where?

Most observers are in rough agreement that Kupyansk, Siversk, Lyman, Huliapole, and Constantinovka are under dire threat. But there are three standouts.

The first, and most obvious, is in the immediate environs of Pokrovsk. As I noted November 7, is that past Pokrovsk, there is no good defensive terrain—it’s all open steppe land—on the road to Pavlograd. Will the Russians movement forward? I stand by what I wrote two weeks ago: “Russia will consolidate its gains in and around Pokrovsk, after the Ukrainian soldiers in the pocket are killed or surrender. For some time after I foresee Russia utilization of tactical defense within an offensive framework.” But the Russians, when they are ready, will move across the steppe towards Pavlograd, en masse.

The second and most unlikely involves troops now taking Lyman, who afterwards will move south, in tandem with troops around Pokrovsk who will move north, to encircle both Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, two large towns serving as the final obstacles on the road to Poltava. This encirclement, if attempted, would make the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd cauldron look likes child’s play. It is doable, however, as the Ukraine has only enough reserves to fight in one place. Russia dominates the strategic initiative and an encirclement of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk might be just the right bait for the last of the Ukraines reserves.

The third—which is the most serious—is in the south, where an imminent encirclement of Hulyiapole, will wrap up the flank of Ukrainian forces in the south elimanating all resistance too Zaporozhye. This operations seems well on its way to success, and the Ukrainians appear to have no answer to it.

As I mentioned above there are other places the Russians are pressuring: Kupyansk, Siversk and Constantinovka. In all three places Ukrainian defenses are crumbling, Russia continues to hammer their supply lines, their mustering points, ammo dumps, bridges, makeshift barracks and more. The Russians are doing this as near to the line of contact as possible. Meanwhile, they continue their strategic bombing and done campaign against the whole of the nation. Mercilessly.

Of the three points I mentioned above, I see the Russians grinding away at a very deliberate and slow advance in the Pokrovsk environs, and in and around Lyman. In other words, more attrition. Maybe a feint at encirclement will draw in the last of the Ukraine’s strategic reserves, which the Russians would then attrit in that way the Russians have been doing so since 2023.

Only in the south might we see a real breakout and roll up of the Ukrainian flank. The Russians might be at the gates of Zaporozhye in two weeks. Or maybe we’ll see an operational pause and then more grinding away.

One fact is beyond obvious at this point: the Ukraine has lost. The question now is: how much more will they lose.