I’m going to relay a conversation I had on X today with everyone here. It’s just easier this way, as I dislocated my shoulder yesterday and sprained my wrist falling down the stairs. Let me add, that crap that movie star tough guys do when they have a dislocated should is utter balderdash. Having my shoulder relocated was excruciating. So a ton of typing is out. Copy and paste is in. But I digress.
I replied to a Tweet, an X, WTF do we call those things now? Well, I’m sticking with Tweet. This one from the US Ambassador to NATO.
The US Ambassador to NATO tweeted the following;
“Russia is losing hundreds of soldiers a day without making any significant gains in Ukraine. Russia must recognize that it’s time for peace and come to the negotiating table.”
I replied to the Ambassador with a series of tweets:
“The @USAmbNATO clearly does not comprehend what a strategy of attrition means. Capturing territory and manuever warfare are secondary to degrading the Ukraine’s ability to fight. This Russia is succeeding at quite well.
I would add that US Generals, who excel in tactics and the operational art of war–which includes logistics–love to quote Bradley’s axiom “amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics.”
I loathe this quote for a number of reasons. Most of all because US generals and their partisans use this argument from authority to dismiss often very valid criticism. I’ll give you one example: Tommy “Catastrophic Success” Franks. He, Stanley McCrystal and Petraeus are prime examples of US generals with a signal lack of imagination, relying on the strength of their logisctical prowess, e.g. The Surge in Iraq.
This was my third tweet to the Ambassador:
[The generals] insistence on this adage has lead to consequential misunderstandings of strategy and why so many continue to conflate Russia’s lack of forward movement with failure (i.e. General Kellog, ~spk). A strategy of attrition is all about the gradual erosion of the enemy’s ability to fight.”
It’s hard for me to comprehend that these men cannot understand Russia’s strategy in the Ukraine. Then an X user asked me a rather intelligent and sincere question:
For how long would you say Russia has been succeeding quite well at degrading Ukraine’s abiity to fight? For the full 3.5 years or a shorter time span? Follow up: how long will this success take to yield major changes on the battlefield?
Let me first say how pleasant it was to get a sincere question on X. Usually it’s agreement or derision, and second I thank my cultured interlocotur for a few hours of intellectual stimulation.
My reply was fivefold, and many of you have read portions of it here in the past:
All modern Russian wars–starting with the Great Northern War in 1700–begin badly for Russia. All of them. The SMO is a perfect example. The Russians were uprepared, had an ill-thought out strategy and got pushed back badly. They got whooped. But the Russian’s learn quickly.
So, they did what they normally do in such situations, traded space for time. By mid-2023 their industry was on a total war setting, minting more artillery shells than all of the US and NATO combined. They’d called up fuck-tons of troops . . .
. . . and because necessity is the mother of all innovation quickly outstripped the Ukraine in drone warfare. Plus, with their thermobaric weapons and Iskander missiles in high production they devestated fortified positions. Then they attacked supply routes. (They also innovated an EW unjammable fiber-optic drone that was devastasting ~spk added later.) Then 3-5 man teams . . .
. . . cleared the trenches. The Kursk invasion was a catastrophe for the Ukraine and by 2024 it was clear the Ukrainian army was in trouble, [seeing as] recruiting meant kidnapping, and the Ukraine began shifting divisions will nilly against attacks initiated by the Russians.
Russia [now owns] the initiative & numbers & air superiority over all the Ukraine & drone superiority over the front lines. It looks very bad for the Ukraine now. Russia grinds away, caring not about territory yet. That comes next year in 2026 when they take Odessa. Does this [clarify]?
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Intelligent and incisive he asked the following:
If they don’t take Odessa in 2026 would you adjust your analysis? Also, Russia hasn’t won all its modern wars. Crimean, Russo-Japanese & Afghanistan come to mind. Chechnya is a bit messy in terms of winners/losers. So while Russia can take heavy casualties sometimes it’s too many.
First, I didn’t say Russia has won all its modern wars. I said they all begin badly. Second, if they don’t take Odessa, I would be surprised. But it would not mean ultimate failure. Russian sabotage teams are already in Odessa. Chechnya actually became a total success.
It took more than a decade, much like the Murid War, but Chechens are now some of the most fanatically loyal soldiers in the Russian Federation. Crimea was a shit-show as was Russ-Jap and WWI and Afghan. Russian’s aren’t perfect, but they will win the war against the Ukraine.
The present military leadership knows exactly what they are doing. One action might change their strategy: an attemped decapitation strike that actually hit the Kremlin. Oreshniks would rain down on Kiev, brutal and devastating and foreign operaties (US/UK) would be targeted.
When you say they will win the war against Ukraine, what does victory entail? Full territorial acquisition? I predict more stalemate – for multiple years to come if both sides stick to the military approach at resolving the conflict. I’ve been right on that for ~4 yrs thus far.
Victory will be dictated on the battlefield. The Russians are not interested in full territorial acquisition. They are interested in landlocking the rump state. Zelensky will be killed or exiled. A pro-Russian regime will be installed. The Ukraine will be neutral . . .
. . . along the lines of the Austrian Treaty at the end of WWII. It will not be a frozen conflict. Putin’s main goal is to create a peace that endures for at least a generation after he dies or steps down. That’s what I see are Russia’s goals. I doubt the war continues past 2026.
My main beef here remains the lack, be it from wilful ignorance or delusion, of US policymakers, generals and think tank denizens, of understanding Russian strategy in the Ukraine. Understanding attrition is not difficult. Just google it and read the wikipedia entry. How difficult is that? Do they not teach boolean operators at the US Army War College?
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Dan Kelly
‘My main beef here remains the lack, be it from wilful ignorance or delusion, of US policymakers, generals and think tank denizens, is the utter lack of understanding when it comes to Russian strategy.’
‘from wilful ignorance or delusion’
What if US policymakers know damn well what Russian strategy is and simply don’t give a shit?
Anyway, Russia is trying to work with the US on other fronts and hopefully their ‘selective cooperation’ with the enemy will bear fruit going forward:
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2025/10/open-neither-ukraine-nor-palestine-thread-2025-233.html#comment-1209557
Sean Paul Kelley
@Dan Kelly: I don’t think US policymakers, especially the generals on TV are that clever.
Dan Kelly
Sean, I should have worded my comment differently. Whether the US is aware of Russian strategy or not they act the same way regardless because they don’t give a crap.
The not-too-clever TV generals hardly constitute the entirety of US policymakers.
Anyway, one needn’t be all that clever to figure the Russians out. They’re hardly as clever as their own propaganda makes them out to be.
Wait a minute: Are we talking about clever as in mentally bright or clever as in cunning and crafty?
Perhaps both sides are the latter in relation to we the peope of the world.
—
How do you like Russia’s arctic development plans?
Do you think that working together with the US in the interest of international institutional developers on projects wholly detrimental to the environment that sustains us will benefit the China-Russia relationship as the Putin-appointed Russian development czar and family friend Kirill Dmitriev suggests in the Sputnik article I linked to?
Sean Paul Kelley
@Dan Kelly: I need to think about your question, but first read the link you posted. I might not get back to you until tomorrow. The shoulder hurts.
Dan Kelly
I understand Sean. Feel better.
Purple Library Guy
I can only think of one reason for US policymakers to not give a shit: They’ve given up on global hegemony, and specifically given up on the NATO project in Eurasia, which was always mostly “Find some way to break Russia”. The idea of pulling Ukraine into the Western orbit generally and NATO in specific was to get one step closer to somehow strangling Russia. The idea behind the way NATO countries approached the war was ideally to win it (which was always pretty unrealistic) and failing that to exhaust Russia in the process of arriving at some not-that-decisive outcome.
The likelihood is that instead, Russia will just win, and the war will in some ways have been good for the Russian economy. And, that result will have dealt a serious blow to US capabilities to intimidate would-be disobedient states. So, US policymakers should care about that unless they’ve just quit the whole game. This is possible, but represents a really major American retreat.
Really, the biggest economic problem on the horizon for Russia is not repercussions from the war, or even sanctions, but the impending peak and then ongoing decline in crude oil demand due to the energy transition. Ironically, it’s their best friend China who will be pulling the rug out from under them. Mind you, as China’s demand declines they will probably cut out importing everyone else’s oil before they cut Russian oil, so Russia has a bit of breathing room. Canada has the same problem, except we don’t have any loyal friends who will buy overpriced tar sands bitumen from us as demand falls.
bruce wilder
Sorry about your shoulder. I know how that kind of pain can stress a person out.
I think U.S. policymakers conspicuously do not understand their own country’s interests. U.S. interests are shifting rapidly in a multipolar world in which the U.S. is experiencing the emergence of significant economic and military weakness. I won’t pretend to “know” what U.S. goals should be or how vital interests should now be identified. I do not hesitate though to regard as obsolete the inherited cliches of the unipolar moment. Worse than obsolete is the hijacking within the FP establishment of Russia/Eastern European policy by the descendants of Russophobic partisans of the Soviet eras.
Feral Finster
Nobody seriously thinks that Ukraine can win, regardless what they say in public. That isn’t the goal, however..
The goal is to use Ukrainians to kill as many Russians as possible and to soak up as many Russian munitions as possible before NATO steps in..
Anyway, we’ve heard the excuses for Russian dithering for years now.
mago
I keep looking for the genius military and foreign policy strategists and keep coming up empty but am willing to concede that the failure is my own.
That shoulder thing . . . Yikes! Have long term symptoms so can totally empathize.
Amazing that you’re functioning at the level you are. Wishing you relief and a quick recovery.
Planter of Trees
“…a Tweet, an X, WTF do we call those things now?”
I call them Xits, pronounced “zits.”
Sean Paul Kelley
@Planter of Trees: may I please steal that from you?
shagggz
@Planter of Trees: “I call them Xits” – Me too, though I pronounce them “shits.” Both great options for conveying the intended sentiment.