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Central Bank Inflation Targeting Wasn’t Quite the Problem

Martin Wolf, one of the best economics commenters, notes that the widespread idea that central banks, over the past 30 years, had found the holy grail of policy in inflation targeting, was clearly wrong.  That’s good as far as it goes, and he’s right.  But it’s worth taking farther—the problems with inflation targeting included the definition of inflation, the inflation target and the uncontrolled flow of money

Inflation as measured during this period did not take into account asset bubbles.  Wolf almost notices this, when he notes that the Fed didn’t see it as its job to stop asset bubbles.  But he doesn’t go quite far enough: asset price increases are a type of inflation.  If it costs more to buy a dollar of future income, a house, or a share in a company, that’s inflation.  To manage inflation properly, as a central bank, requires first to know what inflation is, and that means adding asset inflation into an inflation index.  This would be the opposite of the current “core inflation” index, which is non-asset inflation minus food and energy prices, ostensibly to remove volatility (which is not the way to remove volatility, the way to remove volatility is to use a moving average.)  Of course, in the real world, increases in fuel prices and energy prices are, well, inflation.  Add in credit price increases as well, and you’d have a measure which actually measures inflation.  Target that, and you’d be targeting something real.

The second issue is simpler, the inflation target was too low.  It seems like inflation being low is nothing but good, but in fact the lower it is, the more sectors of the economy are actually in deflation at any given time.  If inflation is 5% and consumer goods, say, are 4% less than that, they aren’t in deflation.  If inflation is at 3% and consumer goods are at 4% less, they’re at -1% and are deflating. As the last little while (and the Great Depression) have taught us, deflation is not a good thing, and yet for a long time large parts of the economy have been in and out of deflation fairly constantly.  In addition, a higher rate of inflation discounts past economic activity, which isn’t an entirely bad thing, as it means people have to be agressive with their money.  In a world where fraud and financial speculation wasn’t the best way to make returns, that is a good thing.  (In our world, perhaps not, admittedly.)

Finally, open financial flows turn bank policies into something of a joke.  As Wolf himself notes, foreign central bank independence from the Fed was largely chimerical: other central banks had to lower interest rates along with the Fed, and if they didn’t, then hot money would pour in from the US, or for that matter, from Japan, which was running its interest at zero or near zero for much of the past 20 years.

As a result, the effective interest rate was whatever the lowest interest rate of a large credible central bank with relatively stable currency was.  (If you’re borrowing from a country with an unstable currency, and the currency appreciates suddenly, your apparent low interest rate can turn into a trap which costs you greatly.)

This meant that even if central banks wanted money to be expensive, for those people and corprorations able to borrow from foreign sources, it wasn’t, and the asset bubbles, inflation and so on which came from that came even if the bank was trying to be conservative.  Real independent monetary policy is greatly damaged by free money flows between countries, which is even before you get to its damaging effect on real free trade and comparative advantage.

And old management maxim is that you get what you measure.  Central banks weren’t measuring all inflation, and so they weren’t managing asset inflation, which is one main reason we got asset bubbles.  Add to that that even where they were targetting inflation, they were targetting it at too low a level and that international money flows made it difficult to run an independent bank policy even in countries which might have wanted to, and you had a very flawed central banking system in virtually every country in the world.

So it’s not clear to me that inflation targetting is necessarily a bad policy.  It seems more likely that it might have been a good policy, implemented in a very bad way.  It disciplined the small actors in the economy, small businesses and ordinary workers—restricting their wages and their goods inflation, while allowing rampant inflation in securities and real-estate and (in the 90s) stocks.

The people who weren’t disciplined, then, drove a truck through the hole created and caused a disaster.  The lesson isn’t “we shouldn’t target inflation”, the lesson is “we need to target all inflation” not just inflation which effects some people.

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4 Comments

  1. Where Martin Wolf leaves off, Henry C. K. Liu picks up:

    Central Banking Practices Monetarism at the Expense of the Economy

    Ironically, asset appreciation is viewed by monetarists as growth and not inflation. Inflation is supposed to be caused primarily by wage increases. While the preservation of the value of money is not an unworthy cause, neoclassical economics theory has given the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the US, doctrinaire justification to avoid policies that promote full employment. Anti-inflation bias has also prevented the central bank to reverse the falling income of working families, particularly wage earners and farmers. Central bankers speak of “liquidation of labor” to detach economic demand for labor from the natural demand of labor in a growing population. As a result, monetarists subscribe to stabilization of the nominal money supply rather than total aggregate nominal demand….
     
    Artificially high asset prices absorb liquidity to stall economic activities to lead to high unemployment. High unemployment in a depression is merely a sign that the market economy is performing its prescribed function. It is the natural socio-economic mechanism for stabilizing production and consumption. Unemployment needs to be eliminated, but it cannot be eliminated by monetarist measures designed to hold up asset prices in a depressed market economy. Countercyclical fiscal measures are indispensable for the elimination of unemployment in an economic downturn. In a depression, unemployment can only be eliminated by fiscal-driven demand management, i.e. providing deficit-financed money through increased work with high wages to the working population so that they have enough money to buy what they produce without inflation…..

    Out of Mellon’s equalitarian liquidationist formula, only liquidating labor has become an essential part of monetary economics.  Theories behind monetary economics harbor an ideological bias toward preserving the health of the financial sector as a priority for maintaining the health of the real economy. It is a strictly elitist trickling-down approach. Take good care of the moneyed rich with government help and the working poor can take care of themselves by market forces in a market economy. All are expected to swim or sink in a sea of caveat emptor risk, but bankers can swim with government-issued life jackets filled with taxpayer money on account of a rather peculiar myth that without irresponsible bankers, there can be no functioning economy. The fact is: while banks are indispensable for a working economy, badly-run bank ignoring sound banking principles are not. What is needed in a depression is not more central bank money for distressed banks suffering losses on loans from collapsed assets prices, but government deficit money to sustain full employment with living wages.

  2. marku

    It seems to me that the fed was always busy worrying about wage inflation and ignoring food and energy, so that as long as wages weren’t going up but food and energy were skyrocketing, everything was OK. Meanwhile, a lack of meaningful domestic investment opportunities (due to “free trade”) and low interest rates fed a totally hallucinatory financial casino

    What a screwed up set of priorities.

  3. Jim

    “What is needed in a depression is not more central bank money for distressed banks suffering losses on loans from collapsed assets prices, but government deficit money to sustain full employment with living wages.”

    tjfxh: I would certainly agree that a worthy use of deficit spending would be to create jobs.

    I might take it a step further and nationalize the financial institutions in the interest of the middle and working class.

  4. Formerly T-Bear

    tjfxh
    Out of Mellon’s equalitarian liquidationist formula, only liquidating labor has become an essential part of monetary economics. Theories behind monetary economics harbor an ideological bias toward preserving the health of the financial sector as a priority for maintaining the health of the real economy. It is a strictly elitist trickling-down approach.

    That sounds so out of the Chicago School of Economic Phrenology. Wasn’t Rockefeller a founding patron of the university as well?

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