Category: Brexit

So, the expected has happened. Prime Minister May’s minority government has been unable to deliver a Brexit which keeps her MPs happy. Two senior ministers have resigned, and should there be a confidence vote over Brexit, it is likely that May will not muster a majority and her government will fall.

The figures who have jumped ship are hard Brexiteers, but the tightrope for May is that many of her own MPs want a soft Brexit. With almost no margin in the commons, she cannot please everyone, and likely cannot stand.

If the UK government falls, there will be a new election. Its outcome is uncertain. Both Labour and the Conservatives are pro-Brexit, with only the Lib-Dems as anti-Brexit, but the Lib-Dems, after their coalition government with the Conservatives, are unpopular and distrusted.

Brexit has been bungled from the beginning: May’s third option was never going to fly, neither enough of her party nor the EU want it. There are only two real options: Something close to Norway’s arrangement, in which Britain will have to pay for access to the common market, or a hard Brexit and reliance on World Trade Organization norms and enforcement.

I personally hope Corbyn wins. I believe he is the best chance for Britain. Various claims otherwise, being in the EU does compromise what an actual left-wing government can do in terms of unions, re-nationalization, and many other issues. The European Union, as it is right now, is a neoliberal organization and its laws and regulations enshrine neoliberal economic relations. That it is also socially liberal obscures this point.

We’ll see how this plays out, but it’s important. Remember that the current world order started in Britain, not the US, with the election of Thatcher. Britain is a bellwether for the Anglo world.

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The Left-wing Case for Brexit

By Ian Welsh

On May 2, 2018

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Jacobin recently had an excellent article on left-wing Brexit, which I suggest you read. But this is the graf I want to focus on:

for a Corbyn-led Labour government, not being a member of the European Union “solves more problems than it creates,” as Weeks notes. He is referring to the fact that many aspects of Corbyn’s manifesto — such as the renationalization of mail, rail, and energy firms and developmental support to specific companies — or other policies that a future Labour government may decide to implement, such as the adoption of capital controls, would be hard to implement under EU law and would almost certainly be challenged by the European Commission and European Court of Justice. After all, the EU was created with the precise intention of permanently outlawing such “radical” policies.

That is why Corbyn must resist the pressure from all quarters — first and foremost within his own party — to back a “soft Brexit.”

This is the issue. As Jacobin’s European editor wrote:

And as regards Britain, the facts are EU rules impede Corbyn’s program: you can’t properly nationalise if you can’t abolish internal markets, you can’t build public industry with its state aid rules, you can’t renationalise the NHS with its public procurement rules, etc, etc

— Ronan Burtenshaw (@ronanburtenshaw) April 30, 2018

I have pointed this out multiple times before. The European Union, in its current form (post-Maastricht) is neoliberal at its core. The Euro (which Britain at least did not adopt) was also intended to break local labor power and gut wages.

Watching the EU break Greece upon the wheel to bail out German bankers indirectly, so that they wouldn’t be seen to directly bail them out ought to have been the corpse on everyone’s doorstep that alerted people to the fact that the people running the EU, are, in certain ways, really, really bad people.

The main reason to fear Brexit isn’t “economic apocalypse,” it’s that the EU elites will do everything they can to make Britain pay to send a message.

In other words, mafia logic: “Once you’re part of the family, you don’t ever leave.”

I agree with Jacobin: Britain’s best hope of an economy which works for most Britons is Jeremy Corbyn becoming Prime Minister and instituting the policies he has said he would. Moreover, having this work is the best hope for the left in a world where all major multinational institutions and treaties are coercively neoliberal–intended to take economic decision-making out of the hands of voters and to enable free movement of capital above all other considerations.

None of this is to say that Brexit will be without some dangers and costs, but those dangers are mostly of the “save us from ourselves” variety: Tories and Blairite Labour MPs are even nastier than EU elites. And the loss of the ability to work freely on the continent, or for continentals to work freely in Britain is also a loss (though one that need not be inevitable).

But equally, the EU makes it impossible to pursue a lot of actual left-wing policies.

You can have the EU, or you can move to the left.

It’s that simple.

The results of the work I do, like this article, are free, but food isn’t, so if you value my work, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

The Paradox of Brexit

By Mandos

On March 4, 2018

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(YEP IT’S A MANDOS POST)

Hardly a week ever goes by when I am not alerted to the increasingly absurd cruelty of the social welfare services of the UK. I’ve lived in economically below-average, minority-populated parts of the US, off and on, and the US has a bad reputation for social welfare—mostly due to its absence—but in all that time, I never heard of the kind of sheer, deliberate twist-the-knife cruelty that is apparently daily life for some of the UK’s most vulnerable citizens. I’m starting to think that no welfare is better than evil welfare. Which I suppose was the entire point of the exercise.

The very same people who advocated for this cruelty and have had years to make it worse are the people now in charge of making Brexit happen in the UK. And everyone knows they’re making a mess of it—predictably, with the same twist-the-knife cruelty that is certainly no ward against incompetence. As I have written before, even if they were to run the Brexit show well, what they want from Brexit contains no redeeming value whatsoever. They’re still proud of their austerity and are only at best grudgingly willing to restrain it when it looks like they might lose a critical handful of voters here and there. Yes, even such a debased character as the British Tory voter can show rue where his drivers, on their own, cannot. The British Tory voter, however, will still let his leaders guide him into the sewage lagoon of the tax paradise which they are chomping at the bit to build.

A Brexit with less dislocation was possible, give or take an Irish peace accord or two. That Brexit requires a Britain that did not stake its economic foundation on being local banker to a currency union it didn’t join. This would require a Britain that, long before the Brexit referendum, had not gone down the neoliberal route in the first place, had not succumbed to the ideology of austerity, and had not perfected welfare cruelty.

But therein lies the paradox of Brexit. Brexit was only going to come after a referendum for it. But the conditions to reach the “Yes” vote are precisely these conditions of frustrated failure, if you are inclined, as many are, to see the phenomenon fundamentally through an economic-stress lens. In a non-austerian, non-neoliberal political alternate history—one that, I emphasize, has always mostly been within the UK’s power to execute, despite EU membership—a “Yes” vote would probably have been unachievable. That is why you could never really have a good Brexit, and why, when Brexit really takes place for good, a possible future Corbyn government is going to be left holding a nasty bag of failure that will likely preclude any major reforms in a left-wing direction.

From a progressive/left-wing/whatever perspective, from the perspective of a humane political economy, the flaw in anti-EU/pro-Brexit thinking is one of “dictionary-definition” conservatism. I was mostly opposed to the pro-globalization policies for goods and capital on the whole. But now that it has occurred, it’s a reactionary mistake to attempt to roll it back, rather than assess where the world is now and consider new ways of creating a humane economy in the future. That reactionary mistake plays into the hands of the Rees-Moggs and Boris Johnsons of the world, and worse.

Was All-Powerful Russia Responsible for Brexit, Trump, and Catalonia?

By Ian Welsh

On November 26, 2017

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Dark Lord Vladimir Putin

I am given to understand that, in addition to causing Trump to win the US election, Russia is responsible for Brexit, and for the Catalonian independence vote.

Russia, with a GDP of less than half that of California, has, in other words, the most effective election tampering program, in the form of internet trolls and fake news, the world has ever known (or at least since back in the 50s, when the CIA was pretty good at this stuff, and willing to overthrow the government of any country that voted the wrong way).

Is this credible?

Or is Russia being used as a scapegoat for election results neo-liberal elites don’t like?

This isn’t to say Russia may not have tried to influence elections. Sure as hell, the US spends a ton of money influencing foreign elections, but is Russia “the reason”?

It seems unlikely to me, and to whatever extent it might be true, it would only be true in the sense that truly close election results have a thousand parents. If it’s close, any number of things made up the margin.

But I think it’s largely bullshit. That it is an attempt to evade responsibility by domestic elites for screwing things up, or in the case of political opponents like Clinton’s Democrats, for running terrible electoral campaigns (or both).

Trump was possible because a lot of people are very unhappy. Brexit was possible because a lot of people are very unhappy. Catalonia was possible because a lot of Catalonians are unhappy with how Spain treats them.

Or, if you wish, two out of three are driven by racism, or regional anger, or…your choice of reason. They were possible because there were already serious problems.

Something like Trump or Brexit or an independence referendum doesn’t happen primarily because of foreign interference, it happens because a lot of people are unhappy with the status quo. In such circumstances, perhaps foreign interference might make the difference, but it wouldn’t do shit unless it was already razor close.

Look home, not abroad, for why people are willing to vote for actions which elites consider unthinkable.

The primary reason for it is always, always, elite mismanagement of some sort or another.

Brexit and the Work-to-rule of the Managerial Class

By Mandos

On November 13, 2017

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(YES THIS IS A MANDOS POST; MANDOS ALERT MANDOS ALERT MANDOS ALERT)

I mostly concur with Yves Smith’s assessment of the on-going, cruel tragicomedy that is Brexit. However, she points out a Twitter thread that has been making the rounds, and it is interesting. It concurs with everything I have read about grassroots Brexitism:

Been conversing (on and offline) with grassroots Brexitists again. Really struck by their intense lack of interest in the details of how to make it happen – verging on hostility to it, as if the search for practical steps to make it work is a trap (1/9)

— Alan Finlayson (@ProfAFinlayson) November 9, 2017

However, Prof. Finlayson analyzes this in terms of Utopianism, which is not entirely wrong:

I think that’s one more piece of evidence for the fact that Brexitism is a species of Utopian ideology, for which the belief in its happening is more important than its actually happening (2/9)

— Alan Finlayson (@ProfAFinlayson) November 9, 2017

And while it’s not entirely wrong, I think it’s incomplete. I’ve written before about the Brexit phenomenon here before (and pretty much everything I said there has been borne out, not to toot my own horn too much), and one of the factors here is the role of the managerial/technocratic class. I interpret the hostility towards the details that Brexiters seem to exhibit (“Don’t talk down Brexit!!!”) partly in terms of something else. What grassroots Brexiters want is to force the managerial class, the people with the technical skills in government administration, to implement something (whatever it is) that the managerial class visibly doesn’t like and doesn’t agree with, and to do it enthusiastically as a duty to the Brexit-voting public. In any discussion, people arguing for the Remain side are therefore seen as proxies or stand-ins for that class, even if they themselves aren’t necessarily responsible for the implementation. Therefore, the Remainers demand for detail is seen as shirking, i.e. a threatened refusal to accept the legitimacy of the Brexit vote, because it is the Remainers’/managerial class’ job to come up with the details for whatever policy course is chosen especially via referendum.

The problem is that the managerial classes/technocrats in question do not believe that they can deliver a good Brexit and do not want to, and even if they go to work every day to produce the policy and administration required to do it, they are only going to do it on a work-to-rule basis. Work-to-rule is an effective labour disruption strategy—and the managerial classes are expected to do labour on someone else’s behalf in this instance, obviously—because it turns out that a lot of jobs really require the worker not only to be there and do the work in the job description, but to give an additional surplus of energy and attention for the enterprise to produce a good outcome.

Now in all probability, in particular due to the conditions under which Brexit has been unleashed, it is impossible to deliver a “good” Brexit even with the most enthusiastic of technocratic staff. But that is not the real demand—rather, the demand is that the technocratic class visibly demonstrate that it shares the identity markers and self-image of certain large sectors of British society, instead of appearing wholly alienated. However, if the technocrats genuinely don’t believe that there can be a good Brexit, that puts everyone in an impossible position: If technocrats impertinently ask the pro-Brexit public what they really expect is to signal that they are shirking their duty to come up with those ideas and that they really aren’t “of the people” (keeping in mind that enthusiastic pro-Remain positions also represent a wide grassroots in British society!). The reality of the situation is that there simply are no good ways to go about doing this, under the schedule of Article 50 and particularly under the political dysfunction of the British Tories and pro-Brexit vested interests.

Real Existing Brexit

By Mandos

On September 15, 2017

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(MANDOS POST, YOU HAVE BEEN INFORMED)

I know that on the left-wing side of the aisle, there are some people who support the idea in itself of the UK leaving the European Union and agree with Corbyn-Labour’s original pro-Brexit stand. There are some theoretical arguments in its favour that boil down to how you interpret EU law on nationalizations — I have heard arguments both for and against the idea that the EU is a practical barrier to re-nationalizing privatized British public enterprises.

But whatever the case may be, Real Existing Brexit is another story, and there’s currently every reason to believe that Theresa May’s version of Brexit is going to be an epic mess. There are ways to do Brexit “well,” and all of them start from a clear-eyed view of what it means to leave the EU and the groundwork that needs to be done to prepare for departure. That groundwork involves, among other things, ending austerity (which the UK can mostly do as it is not a Eurozone country) to make the investments in infrastructure and human capital to create greater within-border self-sufficiency and leverage for making favorable future trade deals, if desired. This preparation would have needed to start a few years before any kind of referendum.

But what the UK is getting is Tory-Brexit, the Brexit of right-wing fantasists dreaming of tax arbitrage and empire. Tory-Brexit may, in the worst case scenario, kick off with a hellish traffic jam at Dover and Calais. And the mess it may create may well propel a Corbyn-led Labour party to a Parliamentary majority. But if that happens, Corbyn will be left with not only a mess on his hands, but a lot of constraints.

Because, you see, without having done the necessary groundwork, Britain will be very much a trade-dependent country. Corbyn would not have a big “honeymoon” and may not have much time before the public would expect him to “turn things around.” And unfortunately, that will involve establishing new trade relations, but under highly unfavorable conditions.

If you catch my drift, I’m saying that what a potential Corbyn government might have to go through in the future is the sort of dilemma that plagued Syriza and Alexis Tsipras in Greece. And you probably remember how popular that was around these parts. No bargaining chips, but a desperate need to create relations.

Note that I am not arguing that Brexit shouldn’t happen — it should, in some form, because that is the only way to resolve one of the problems that lead to, well, Brexit-scenarios. That problem is that people don’t really get what they voted in favour of. They need to start experiencing the outcomes of their collective choices. It’s too bad for the many UK residents voted against Brexit, but that’s how representative democracy works. The best-case scenario for Britain would probably be some kind of Norway-style solution, but, again, that is not easy to organize, and it requires crossing what appear to be many red lines for Tory-Brexit hardliners.