The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Category: Trade Page 6 of 13

Thinking Out Ukraine Sanctions

Question:

If you could not buy anything you wanted using Western currency, why would you sell anything to the West?

Western sanctions on Russia are fairly close to: “You can sell us oil, wheat, and gas, but we’ve frozen all your foreign currency reserves we can touch (almost all of them), and we won’t sell you anything that’s useful to you. Anyone who tries to do so using our system is committing a crime, even if not in one of our countries, and we will punish them.”

It’s hard to imagine that Russia is going to keep selling us what they have. Naked Capitalism reprinted a good article by Olga Samofalova (second half, you can skip the first.):

Stopping gas supplies to Europe is even more disastrous in terms of consequences for both sides. Russia will not be able to transfer West Siberian gas, which goes through European pipelines, to other markets. There is no gas pipeline for such a volume to China or other Asian countries. To send gas by sea by tankers, it needs to be liquefied, but Russia does not have so many LNG plants for this, or gas carriers too. This means that Russia will have to stop production. ‘In the western direction, if without Turkey, there is about 150 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia. Where will we put so much gas if we don’t supply it to Europe? Nowhere. We’ll have to stop lifting the gas. This means that the world market will lose these volumes, and immediately there will be a large deficit of gas in the supply-demand balance of the European Union,’ says Yushkov.

‘No matter what anyone says, Europe will have nowhere to take such volumes of gas from. The world is not able to increase production by 150 billion cubic meters. Europeans will try to switch to other energy sources. An attempt to switch to coal will fail, since Russia is also the largest supplier of coal to the EU. The Europeans will try to launch everything that is possible: all the shut-down nuclear power plants [to reopen], the closed coal deposits in Germany and Poland.’

Now, this isn’t quite accurate. One of the main reasons that Iran is finally getting a renewal of the Iran deal is that the West needs oil and gas supplies from Iran back on the market. But even so, there will be a huge effect.

The core thing to understand here is that we in the West don’t know how to handle supply shocks. The last generation that knew how was the Lost, and they’re all dead. No one alive even remembers a properly-handled supply side shock, as we mishandled the OPEC oil shock catastrophically, and even those people are mostly aged out, unless they’re 80 and in Congress.

The Covid supply shocks have pretty much proved it. We could go into all the issues like price gouging, monopoly concentration, supply chain dispersal, just-in-time, consolidated shipping, the hollowing out of the trucking industry, and blah blah, blah, but it doesn’t really matter. Bottom line, we aren’t handling it well. All we really know how to do is raise interest rates and use central bank policy to keep wages below the rate of inflation, thus making the majority of the population even poorer.

So what happens when Russia cuts us off from a whole pile of minerals, hydrocarbons, and food that we need? Russia is the number one wheat exporter. Ukraine is #5. Gas we’ve already discussed. Oil will spike. Energy costs will go through the roof. Most titanium comes from Russia and is used to build planes, and if Boeing and Airbus have cut Russia off even from repair manuals and spare parts, why should they let the West have any?

I’m not 100 percent on this, but if Russia reacts the way I believe it would be rational for them to act, then we will have a supply shock bigger than the OPEC crisis, especially as it is being added to the Covid shock. Our companies will, of course, use the opportunity to increase their profits even more and price gouge (something they mostly didn’t do in the 70s), and we will get massive inflation.

I lived through the 70s. In the late 70s, during a period of about two years, the price of candy bars (you can tell how old I was) went from 25 cents to a dollar.

This is likely to be worse.

The Russians are also just not going to pay back their debts to Western countries in any form they can use. A law has already been passed where companies owing money to countries with sanctions can pay in rubles to the Russian government, who will then handle any negotiations, for example. More such measures will continue. Freezing reserves amounts to theft, and Russia is not going to pay back thieves.

Russia will probably also break all Western IP. With some under-the-table Chinese help, they’ll then set up production.

Meanwhile, China is thrilled — whatever they’re saying. Xi recently told the Central Committee that China could not rely on world markets for food security. But as a locked-in junior partner with a land border, Russia is a safe provider, especially since a lot of markets will be closed to it, and as we mentioned, Russia’s the producer of wheat. Oil and gas supplies can always be interdicted at the Straits of Hormuz by the American navy, but Russian land supplies are not so simple, etc, etc.

Now, let’s talk about the confusion of money for real economic goods. Money does a lot of things, but money cannot buy what a society cannot produce. Conversely, as Keynes pointed out desperately (and was ignored) anything a country can actually make, it can afford. So when you see things about money, or even stock markets, remember, China is the largest industrial state. Russia is the largest wheat exporter and a vast exporter of oil, gas, and minerals. Russia can survive this if they stop their economy from seizing up, because bottom line, they can feed and heat themselves. The food may be a bit boring, but it’s food.

China is hooking up Mastercard and Visa clients who were cut off with UnionPay and their Mir Card. This isn’t something that would happen if the CCP didn’t give the green light, not a chance. Russia’s SWIFT alternative and China’s are going to be hooked together. China’s banking system actually produces more loans than the US at this time, so they’ll keep the Russians afloat.

Many people think the Chinese will screw the Russians since the Russians need them so badly. They may, but I don’t think so. This is Western thinking, the same stupid, short-sighted greed that led us to ship the majority of our industrial base elsewhere, so a few oligarchs and politicians and consultants could get rich.

China needs an ally. They need good will. Give Russia cheap loans and help when they need it, be the country that helped them when almost no one else would or even could, and Russians will remember that for generations. China doesn’t need a resentful ally, they need a willing, happy, and healthy one. They don’t need an ally who they’re strangling with debt, and right now, loading Russia down with usurious debt in the middle of this crisis would make things worse.

Remember, people often fail to pay back debts they hate.

Contrary to Western propaganda, while there have been cases where China has loaned countries too much at too high rates, generally, Chinese development loans have been below market rates. This is because what the Chinese want isn’t a revenue stream, it’s resources. So they’ll build your mines, your factories, and your transportation networks, and throw in some smart cities, hospitals, and schools too, as a form of domestic subsidy. What they’re going abroad for is resources.

So my guess is that China doesn’t screw Russia to the wall, helping cripple them further and making Russia resent them during their moment of need. They aren’t modern Westerners. That doesn’t mean they don’t expect things in return, they sure do, but what Russia needs and wants to sell them, lines up perfectly with their needs, and there’s no need to screw Russia. In fact, I expect Chinese technicians to flood Russia and help with their infrastructure issues, oil industry, and so on. It’s enlightened self-interest and enlightened beneficience. To use econospeak, this is a positive sum game.

China and Russia have issues, sure, but they need each other massively, and each of them almost perfectly fixes the other countries weaknesses and needs. Russia will definitely be the junior member of the Alliance (and Russian tendencies to think in realpolitik geopol terms mean they get this and won’t even even resent it, as long as they feel fairly treated.)

The wildcard here is India. India and Russia have had good relations, indeed, have been friends, since independence. The Indian people themselves have genuinely fond feelings for Russia that they don’t have for the West or the US. But Indians hate the Chinese because of their territorial disputes.

If I were China, I’d just go to Modi and settle the territorial disputes generously. Give them a bunch of land, lay it on thick. I don’t expect them to do this, because it’s an emotive issue, but most of the land the countries dispute is basically worthless. It just doesn’t matter if India has that land. If China were to do this, it could probably move India into its alliance group, or at least keep it neutral.

So, let’s assume that Russia survives sanctions. Western elites don’t think it will, but Western elites are used to sanctioning powers like Iran and Venezuela, not a great power that China needs in its pocket, which has a huge land border with China. It’ll be ugly.

Assume Russia retaliates and there’s a big inflation shock. The West tries to get China to enforce sanctions, China says all sorts of mealy-mouthed stuff, but basically doesn’t do anything. The West then has three options:

  1. Full scale sanctions on China. If they do this, the OPEC crisis will look like a walk in the park. It will be a great depression. China is the world manufacturing center and the West cannot, yet, decouple.
  2. Targeted sanctions, like the chips sanctions that damaged Huawei so badly. These won’t make China change its mind, but it’s what Westerners do, especially Americans, so I assume this is the default.
  3. Try and cut a deal.. “All sanctions off and some stuff you want if you cooperate.” This is probably the best option for the West, but I don’t think China will go for it, because ever since Obama, the US has said that China is actually enemy . They’ll probably figure (I would) that once Russia is taken out, all deals are off and China is next in the crosshairs.

So what happens is probably (targeted sanctions), at first. The West hurriedly moves some production back home (but not much, rentier societies are too high-cost for manufacturing) and a ton to low cost western allies, like Mexico. Once it feels confident, it ratchets up the sanctions, and we are in full cold war. I’d guess four to eight years, but it’s really hard to time these things. You can know something is inevitable, like this cold war, and not be sure when. I’ve been talking about this for years, and now it’s started. The Cold War is on: It’s just only with Russia right now. It will spread to China. If the West gets too emotional and foolish and tries to force China right now, it could happen with a year.

So we move into a new Cold War, in the middle of terrible inflation and possibly even a depression. One can expect most of the South to go with China/Russia. They may have voted against Russia in the UN General Assembly, but their arms appear to have been twisted hard. As soon as its credible to move to the monetary area China and Russia are setting up, they’re going to move their monetary reserves en-masse — unless they’re a Western client state, because the West has now repeatedly stolen other countries reserves.

This means most of Africa. Most of South America will want to, as China is their primary source of development loans, but they may be too scared. Any Asian country which isn’t an American ally will go. India is an unknown.

But at the end, you have China which is world’s most populous country, with the biggest industrial base, and even (in purchasing power parity terms) the highest GDP on the other side, along with Russia, and the Number 2 nuclear power, likely still with a massive military, and a ton of southern resource states, all oriented around China. (Though some, like the oilarchies, will try to remain neutral.)

I don’t see this as a competition in which we are the top-dog. Feels like a 60/40 thing to me, and we’re the 40. For too long, we have thought that money and financial games were the same thing as an economy, and that we could just buy whatever we wanted so it didn’t matter who made it, grew it, or dug it up. That world is ending. It was killed by us, with our sanctions, ironically.

Welcome to interesting and shitty times. Put aside  your belief in our superiority: We’ve been top dogs for about 200 years now, in some places 500 years, so it’s hard. But all periods in which one group is dominant end, and we’re probably living through that end.

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Ukraine and the Coming Inflation

Brief post. Articles about inflation have been coming out, and they’re right, inflation is going to get a lot worse because of the sanctions on Russia, especially when Russia retaliates. If you can afford to stock up now, do. If you want big ticket items other than, perhaps real-estate, you should buy now. If you have a business which needs certain key goods or processed items, buy what you can now.

Russa isn’t really an industrial power, except for arms, but it provides not just energy but an array of minerals that are key to industrial production. While there will be workarounds to sanctions, you should still expect this to hit costs. Russia is also the largest exporter of wheat in the world, with Ukraine as , and you can expect food prices in general to keep rising.

Further, it’s hard to say how attempts at enforcing sanctions with China (who will resist), and perhaps with India and other countries, will cause unpredictable inflation spikes in other products.

As for real-estate, the affect is hard to entirely predict. So far, the British have resisted urging to truly sanction Russian money (because it would collapse London real-estate and hurt the City badly), but we’ll see if that continues. Whatever the case, a lot of Europe may be subject to real-estate price reductions due to sanctions, and this might be true in New York. I lack enough expertise to be sure, you should look into it if it concerns you.

Then there is the issue of Chinese money. China won’t be subject to serious sanctions yet, the West can’t afford it. However, the Chinese themselves may be wary of future sanctions, seeing them coming and that may dry up some of their massive foreign investment. Others might increase their investment and seek second passports, so they can flee when the time comes, but I think that’s less likely to be massive than it would have been pre-Covid. Whatever the advantages of living in the West, they are outweighed by, “won’t control the plague” for most, especially older Chinese who control most of the money.

All of this is complicated by the fact that the real-estate market is changing, structurally. Covid was used by private equity and other institutional investors to snap up real-estate, including single family homes and other types that traditionally have not been institutionally controlled. If there is a drop in demand, they will simply hold as much off the market as necessary to adjust supply and demand and allow them to over-charge. Their real risk is financing, but even as the Fed increases interest rates, it will continue special operations to give the rich and large corporations essentially free loans and money, so I don’t think they’ll actually be paying market rates. (We need an article on how this sort of action vastly increases the odds of collapse, and I’ll try to get to it soon.)

Times are going to get worse, not so much because of the Ukraine invasion, but because of its fallout. By itself, it would have changed as much as the Iraq war did (some important things, yes), but because it is being treated as existential and a cause for massive economic war, even centrists have realized that it is the “End of the End of History” (which, of course, never ended).

Welcome back to history and to interesting times.

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The China Trap

I’d really hate to be China’s leadership right now. This is rock/hard place for them. If they don’t keep Russia alive, they will have no ally when it’s their turn, but the US and Europe are likely to put a ton of pressure on them for sanctions & that will start the cold war earlier than they wanted (for them — it’s already started for Russia).

Obama famously pivoted to China, calling it the biggest threat. Trump slapped on sanctions and used a ban on semiconducters to absolutely savage Huawei, the flagship Chinese tech company, whose phones were rivaling Apple and Samsung, and whose 5G technology was the most advanced and ready-to-deploy in the world.

They put immense pressure on Europe to not use Huawei 5g tech and largely succeeded.

When Biden came in, he removed none of Trumps sanctions.

In effect, the US has been declaring China its enemy for about 12 years now, through both Democratic and Republican administrations, and over the last few years, anti-China sentiment in DC has solidified. As far as I can tell, it is truly bipartisan.

China has known that a cold war with the US was inevitable for a couple of years now, though they suspected it before. They had hoped to keep Europe as a neutral customer, but Europe has bowed down to the US whenever push comes to shove, so China, like Russia, appears to regard Europe as an American satrapy — a subject state who will do what the US says.

The US and Europe will now put immense pressure on China to comply with sanctions on Russia and to not help Russia get around them.

My guess is that China will not, substantially, comply. The calculus is simple: Cold war with the US is coming, and if they let Russia get taken out, they lose a powerful ally and will then be surrounded, rather than having most of their Western flank covered by another Great Power.

Russia has repeatedly told the West to go fuck itself with regards to sanctions. They regarded, even before this war, more sanctions as inevitable. All that the war has done, they believe, is move the sanctions forward. China is likely to have the same calculus: sanctions, tariffs, and so on are never removed, only increased over time.

Both China and Russia have their own SWIFT alternatives. They will hook together and be offered to the rest of the world. As non-US allies have seen, with Venezuela, Iran, and now Russia (among others) that the US will even freeze reserves, they will join the Chinese and Russian systems and settle trade in Yuan. They will move reserves out of the US/European system.

This is, however, a huge hit to both China and the US. The US cannot currently decouple from China — it’s impossible. The US actually needs China more than China needs them. Remember, China is the largest industrial power, not the US.

It’s still a terrible trap, though, and the Chinese will, I think, play to mitigate. The US will not slap the worst sanctions on just yet, but will rush to move production to low-cost US allies.

There is an alternative, of course. China could buckle, agree to join the “rules-based order,” and play by American rules. The issues here are threefold.

First: This means China is not allowed to take control of value chains, which provides much of the real profit. Probably 15 percent or so of the value in a value chain comes just from that. They will have to keep paying US intellectual property fees, which amount to another ten to 15 percent in a lot of industries.

Intellectual property, if it’s not obvious, is on the table. Certainly Russia will stop paying these fees, that’s almost certain.

Second: Playing by Western rules means, the Chinese believe, staying stuck in the middle income trap and not making it to high income. This is one of those places which is a genuine trap: Decoupling will be a huge hit, but staying in the system and playing by the rules set up to favor the US and its allies means being in a system which keeps China from becoming a rich nation.

Third: There is an emotional component. As much as many Europeans, especially eastern Europeans, hate and fear Russia, China has a deep resevoir of hate for Europe, and the US for the “century of humiliation,” for Taiwan (to them a rebellious province which they would have retaken years ago if the West didn’t support it), and of course, a lot of hatred for Japan, the West’s primary Asian ally, for its invasion, occupation, and atrocities before and during WWII.

Emotionally, the Chinese are primed to tell the West to go fuck itself. They didn’t see why they should’ve play by rules made even when they were at their weakest. The “rules-based international order” to them is nothing but a set of rules set up by people who don’t want them to be a great, rich nation again. Rhetoric from the US has solidified this impression, and I think more correctly than not.

So the “cut a deal and compromise” really means “accept the current world order and play by rules that China thinks are unfair to them, and are made without their input.”

My guess is that China will do whatever it takes to keep Russia alive and to stop Western sanctions from achieving their declared aim: To collapse the Russian economy and cause regime change. Viewed pragmatically, I think that is the right call if you are the Chinese leadership, because the other two options (acquiescing to Western rules or letting Russia collapse and facing the West w/o Russia) seem worse.

I would guess, and it is just a guess, that this takes about four to eight years, because the US would be insane to decouple now, and China also wants time to prepare. But emotions are running high and a lot of policies have been made without clearly thinking through their consequences lately, so I while I think it’s odds on, I won’t be surprised if emotions rule instead. The decoupling may happen sooner.

Welcome to the new Cold War. Remember, in this one, the world’s biggest industrial power and most populous nation is on the other side. This isn’t 1950 or even 2000. China is the biggest trade partner of more nations than the US, not the other way around.

And China needs what Russia has: wheat, oil, and mineral resources.

Cold War 2.0 isn’t one in which the West are necessarily the favorites to win.

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China’s Economic “Miracle” Was Normal

Over the last few weeks I’ve been reading books by some of the smarter members of the international elite. One thing they all seem to agree on is how amazing and unprecedented China’s economic rise was.

It wasn’t.

China industrialized and modernized the way almost all nations have:

  1. Through mercantalist policies. In China’s case, keeping the value of the currency low, taking advantage of low wages, and starting with the oldest parts of industrial value chains.
  2. By exporting to large external economies which let them: the US and Europe.
  3. By grabbing as much intellectual property as possible.

This is how America did it in the 19th century. This is how Japan did it twice (Meiji, post WWII, Taiwan and South Korea did it. This is how virtually everyone did it.

Americans got greedy and stupid, from a geopolitical point of view. They believed the nonsense “End of History” bullshit about how capitalism and democracy are intertwined and capitalism inevitably leads to democracy and they were salivating over the profits they could make in China. So they traded and they let China into the WTO.

Contrary to the idea that democracy and industrialization/modernization are intertwined; Japan and Germany did most of it under authoritarian governments and with massive government direction. Even post-WWII, Japan was a one-party state, not a real democracy. Germany’s industrialization was based on Prussia’s command economy, and the great companies were practically state organs even if they were nominally civilian.

Japan didn’t become a nominal democracy because “capitalism” it became one because it lost WWII. The Kaiser had a parliament, but still a great deal of power and he didn’t step down voluntarily, he lost power because the Germans lost WWI.

But the emphasis on authoritarianism misses what is actually interesting and almost unique about China: it has the most decentralized government spending of any major country, with over 70% of spending decisions made below the Federal government. As a rule, the center made and makes goals and guidelines, but leaves it up to regional and municipal governments to figure out how to achieve them. China has a dynamic government, and there is a lot of competition between governments, as much as between firms.

It is also easier and cheaper to start a new business in most of China (free in Beijing to incorporate) than it is in most of America or Europe.

Meanwhile, the great danger to capitalism is capitalists being too successful, and buying the system, and then getting rid of necessary oversight and regulation. China has largely avoided that (though real-estate wealth is still a problem) and Xi Jingping has cracked down repeatedly those he considers bad actors. In one recent example he forced delivery app companies to treat their employees much better (better than in America). In another he got rid of the College prep industry almost entirely, which a lot of western observers thought was bad, but the industry was a pure “Red Queen’s Race” situation, because it existed everyone had to do it, and as with all such college prep industries it favored those with money over those without. Xi was entirely right to end it.

Democracy used to serve this purpose in the West. Almost everything FDR did, economically, was to stop capitalism from destroying itself.

Further, all evidence I have seen indicates that contrary to what I thought in the past, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) goes out of its way to recruit smart, competent people and has thus, so far, been able to avoid the generational nepotism and degradation cycle.

To bring this back to Western elites, a lot of the mistakes come from drinking their own Kool-aid. While virtually no country larger than a city state has ever modernized without mercantalist policies, the orthodox economic position of the West for decades was laissez-faire, and that’s what the World Bank and IMF made most countries do. Those policies are vastly destructive and don’t work IF you want a country to modernize, but if you really want it to become a helpless satellite state they work well. (Bad Samaritans, by Ha-Joon Chang covers this well.)

“Free” trade is not what America did, Germany did, France did, Japan did or even England did to industrialize, and it’s not what China did.

What it is truly unique about China’s industrialization is its size: it’s a subcontinental power with a huge population. Japan was never really a threat to the US, for all the screaming in the 80s, because of its population size and limited geographic extent. China is by some measures already a larger economy, and the only thing might stop it from becoming the world’s greatest power and eclipsing the United States is that climate change will  hit it hard somewhat earlier than it will hit the US, as best I can tell.

So, what matters about China is just that it’s not Western, and poised to become the first Eastern hegemonic power in about 200 years. Of course the US doesn’t like that, and of course Europe (still an American satrapy) is uneasy.

This could have been avoided easily enough, though it probably shouldn’t have been, simply by refusing to cooperate with Chinese mercantalist policies and certainly, if the US didn’t want a rival who would probably eclipse it, letting China into the WTO was insanity. (This was clear at the time, and many people objected.)

The other issue is that the West no longer has a veto on who gets to industrialize. For various reasons Japan, South Korea and Taiwan couldn’t serve as the necessary markets for mercantalist expansion, but China can and that’s what they’re offering many other nations the West never let develop. The European/US monopoly is broken.

The lesson is not to believe your own lies and bullshit. Fukuyama was obviously full of shit about “The End of History” and developed world suggested “development” policies in the last half of the 20th century were meant to stop nations from developing, which was their record, and anyone with  sense who spent a few hours examining the policies of countries which actually industrialized, could know it.


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How To Predict If The Shortages Will Be A Priority To Fix

Covid has not been a priority to fix in many countries for a simple reason: it’s making the rich a lot richer. U.S. Billionaires have seen their wealth increase by 70% during the pandemic.

Man, people dying and getting sick and having to buy much more online is good for Billionaires! What a time to be a peon!

So, as for the shortages, the question is how much they are inconveniencing people with power. If shortages are actually making the rich, richer, how can they be a problem politicians or anyone else with any power in most Western countries will take seriously?

I don’t know the answer to this, but so far what I’ve seen is that large customers are receiving limited goods first. Walmart fines supplies for late deliveries, small and medium size businesses can’t do that.

So my guess is that this will lead to further consolidation, wiping out more small and medium firms and allowing many to be bought up by their bigger brethren, and on top of that will make the big boys more money at the same time.

Of course, some industries will be losers, but overall it seems likely that at least for a time shortages will redound to the benefit of those with more money, and that they will see no urgency in ending them.

Hopefully I’m wrong (quite possible, not my area of expertise) on the shortages being good for most of the rich, but I’m sure I’m not wrong that if they are, the rich and powerful won’t give a damn how much other people are hurting, and won’t feel any urgency in ending the shortages.

Remember: in a lot of countries now, certainly the US and Britain, you cannot expect the government to act in your interest or care for you, unless it is in the interests of the powerful and rich that it does so. It may, if there are still existing programs not yet privatized but you should never expect it. You, your family and your friends, should make plans assuming that when bad things happen, there will be little help.

It’s ugly that this is so, but acknowledging the truth makes you more likely to survive.


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The Shortages Will Get Worse Before They Get Better

… so stock up if you can.

Depending where you are there may also be rotating power brown-outs or shortages or heating and auto-fuel.

Don’t wait on this, buy now. It’s unlikely most of you can do much about fuel or power outs, but if you can, do. For example, if you have a fireplace or wood stove, stock up on wood. You can buy chargers for your small electronic devices; blankets or sleeping bags rated for real cold, and so on.

Not all areas will have power issues, you’ll have to do a bit of research to see if your area is vulnerable.

Meanwhile stock up the normal purchases: staples, water, medicine and so on. This means keeping a larger supply on hand than you would normally to buffer supply chain shocks.

Remember that the shortage of items which require semiconductors will continue for some time. Not only is there a global shortage, but the US embargo on China causes real issues because China is where final assembly of many products is done: if they can’t get the chips they need, those items don’t get finished.

I’m going to write more on why this happened because it’s not just about Covid, it’s about a system where this was inevitable if the system got hit by big shocks, but I don’t want to dilute this particular post’s message that  you should personally prepare.


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How The Structure Of The World Economy Made Shortages Inevitable

For the second time I find myself referring readers to an essay by John Michael Greer, this time on shortages. This is the best piece I’ve read on the issue and I agree with almost everything he says. JMG’s overall worldview isn’t mine, but he’s unquestionably brilliant, and this has been nailed. Go, read.

I want to note, as does JMG, than none of this is unexpected: the fact that the just-in-time inventory and ordering system was obviously subject to shocks is a warning given by many.

I want to emphasize, though, that it’s not only “just in time”, it’s the structure of production itself, which is both very dispersed and very centralized. A final assembly factory may draw parts from dozens of other factories, none of them near it, so when one of those factories goes down, the entire show can draw to a halt.

This dispersion was a deliberate choice. Some of it started as early as the fifties, as a deliberate way to tie economies together and attempt to avoid WWIII thru mutual dependence, but as with most of our economic pathologies, it really took off after 1980 and Reagan, with the vast offshoring and outshoring of industry and production: we were told the choice was to seek the lowest costs and highest profits.

None of this was necessary; the proper use of trade and industrial policy could, and I would say, should, have been to encourage every country to produce what it could in its own country, only importing what it couldn’t make or grow itself. Comparative advantage is, and always has been, garbage and no great state has ever allowed it to determine anything. Britain didn’t industrialize under”free” trade and neither did America or Japan or anyone else of significance.

But doing it this wasn’t mostly about profits and costs; it was about tying the world together in a way which disempowered every country outside the core. The so-called value chains were initially all controlled from the West or, perhaps Japan or South Korea. Everyone paid a vig to the controlling interests in the West: the rich did very very well, they just didn’t pay their fellow countrymen and women.

This was excellent, from their point of view, because money is power and it broke the power of their domestic opposition: absolutely gutting unions, the working and eventually the middle class, leaving them completely in charge.

Meanwhile, because of the dispersion of manufacturing and its inputs, other countries mostly couldn’t create any industry they really controlled (again, South Korea, Germany, Japan are exceptions), so there was not threat.

Until they got too greedy, and the Chinese saw their weakness, and they put so much in China while China had a policy of grabbing as much knowledge of how to produce as possible.

Which leaves us where we are today: vastly vulnerable supply and manufacturing chains, an onrushing cold War, and a struggle over who controls the “value chains.”

The Chinese are damn tired of paying the West its vig because the West is at the top of value chains where most of the work is done in China or other countries. Equally they are sick of paying for IP.

US elites, on the other hand, are terrified of losing their top-seat position; their ability take a big percentage of all profits because they own the IP and control the value chains.

There are no good actors here, be clear: the Chinese have done reprehensible things and so have the Americans. But understand that America was a known IP scofflaw in the 19th century, when it was industrializing (and the Brits were stupid enough to ship know-how and factories to the US for “profits”.)

This is a standard pattern, and as long as we make it so that a few countries can skim off everyone else the struggle will always be ferocious.

John Maynard Keynes wanted to end this: he wanted a world in which every country, as noted before, produced as much of what it needed as it reasonably and was allowed to use subsidies and tariffs and policies to do this.

We created a different world; a world in which everyone was dependent, most countries couldn’t even feed themselves, and everyone needed everyone else while a few countries, but especially the US, still remained in overall control of production (again, until US elites got too stupid and greedy and the Chinese took advantage (you can’t cheat an honest man.) Some of the reasons were good, if misguided (especially in the early post-war period), most of them were greedy, stupid and shortsighted, since Keynes could see it was a bad idea even in the 40s.

Now we’re paying, but most of those who set up the system then overbalanced it thru their greed are either dead or still alive and filthy rich, and getting richer.

Life is good if  you’re in the top .01% or so. Really, really good.

And really, you know, to them the problem with mid-century Americans not of the ruling class is they didn’t know their place. Now they’re being taught their place again. No more servant problems.


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Ricardo’s Caveat

Ricardo

Ricardo

In 1817, David Ricardo formalized the Law of Comparative Advantage. Since then, it has stood the test of time as one of the very few laws that an economist can point to and say: “This is indisputably true.” It’s because of this law that you only rarely find an economist who doesn’t believe in unrestricted free trade. But Ricardo added an important caveat when he discussed free trade and comparative advantage, and it’s one that most modern economists seem to have forgotten…

Let’s quote straight from Ricardo:

In one and the same country, profits are, generally speaking, always on the same level; or differ only as the employment of capital may be more or less secure and agreeable. It is not so between different countries. If the profits of capital employed in Yorkshire, should exceed those of capital employed in London, capital would speedily move from London to Yorkshire, and an equality of profits would be effected; but if in consequence of the diminished rate of production in the lands of England, from the increase of capital and population, wages should rise, and profits fall, it would not follow that capital and population would necessarily move from England to Holland, or Spain, or Russia, where profits might be higher.

This is the Achilles heal of comparative advantage — the flaw in the foundation of free trade that causes outsourcing woes. Those who say that the law of comparative advantage proves that free trade is good are absolutely right, but they’ve forgotten his caveat.

Because, in Ricardo’s world, it was true that capital was not particularly mobile. It is not true in our world, and it wasn’t true in the Victorian world.

In a world in which I can move my capital freely between locales, in which I can also move my profits freely, and in which I don’t have to live where my capital is working, there is no reason to invest in any productive activity in my home country if I can make more money elsewhere.

The higher surplus locale is going to get as much free capital as it can soak up and as is available. The logic behind this is simple: Let’s say I have one million dollars to invest, and I can invest it in two different locales. In one place, I’ll get five percent return, in another a ten percent return. In both locales, I can take my profit and do what I want with it. I can live in either locale and, in both places, my money is secure from being seized by the government or destroyed by violence. Obviously, I’m going to put my money into the place with the higher returns.

When I get those profits, I’m going to sink any reinvestment into the place with the higher returns again. It’s a virtuous circle — if you’re the place with the higher returns, and it ends when returns even out or there is no more excess capacity.

If the higher-return country runs out of investment opportunities that pay higher than the low-return country, it makes no sense to invest in it. What matters here is the marginal rate of return — that is, the return on the next dollar of my investment. In principle, there ought to be diminishing returns; people snap up the good opportunities and, over time, the opportunities get worse and worse until returns equalize (this happens faster when currency values are decided independent of government intervention, but it doesn’t always happen — even in the long term, when we’re all dead).

Profit is just how much surplus you’re receiving. Let’s say my workers are capable of producing $5 of goods for every hour they work and my costs are $3/hour for everything (property, taxes, capital costs, and wages). I’m making $2 an hour for every worker I have working for me.

That’s Country A. In Country B, the average worker produces $10 an hour, but my costs are $9, so my surplus is $1. This is half the profit of Country A, even though my workers are more productive.

That’s why US workers are more productive and people are shipping jobs to China and India. Costs in the US are higher for property, wages, and taxation.

To stop capital (and jobs) moving from Country B to Country A, you have to increase surplus. There are two ways to do that: You can reduce costs (most easily by cutting taxes or wages), or you can increase productivity. If the average worker produces one more dollar of goods while costs stays the same, and Country A’s worker’s productivity doesn’t increase, then you’re even.

Or Country A could increase wages, taxation, or property costs and become less competitive.

In a world without mass capital flows, there was another way. You could have lower capital costs. But having the Fed set lower capital costs than another country means little — borrow in the US, invest it where the ROI is higher.

More than that, money you can’t use is, well, useless. Let’s say you’re investing in a factory in China, but you want to live in Europe or the US — and Europe and the US won’t let you use the money you have in China in their countries (or will only let a fraction back in). In this scenario, you’re not likely to invest in China, are you? In addition, money that can’t move is captive to political unrest and other such events, which gives mature, stable countries a big leg up. If moving money is hard or slow, then you’d better be sure that where you have it is stable because if something goes wrong, you can kiss it goodbye.

A key problem right now is demand. Capital flows to low-production-cost/high-surplus domiciles. But there’s only so much demand for goods and only a limited amount of growth in demand for goods. So you’ve got your profits, and you have to figure out what to do with them. You can’t plow all of it back into productive investment, because you’d wind up with more productive capacity than there is ability to buy the goods. As a result, the excess money has to go into nonproductive uses.

The money that does go into productive uses will go to the domiciles that produce the greatest surplus (profit). Many people have pointed out that the US hasn’t lost jobs to outsourcing, that’s only true in a technical sense. What has happened is that the new jobs have been mostly created overseas (in cases where they can be done overseas). Old jobs haven’t been moved (mostly) because of sunk capital costs. Once you’ve paid ten million dollars to create a factory, spending another ten million dollars to relocate the factory usually doesn’t make sense. But if you have to build a new factory anyway (either because you need more capacity or because the old factory would have to be replaced for some reason), then it makes sense to build it in the domicile with the higher surplus production. That’s exactly what we’ve seen over the last few years: China and India getting the new jobs in non-protected sectors. It’s not rocket science, it’s just ROI (Return On Investment).

Because you can’t put all the money back into production, you’ve got to stick some of the money elsewhere. And what we have going is a nice, reinforcing trend. Oldman has called it strip mining the US economy. The money is used to buy your customers’ assets or lent to your customers. In exchange, they put up as collateral either the full faith of their government (we’ll see how good that is in a few years) or their assets, which in the current case means mortgage-backed securities, bonds, and common shares in companies (which represent ownership of assets). They then use that money to buy your goods, and the cycle continues.

This vicious cycle (or virtuous if you’re the one getting rich, and you get out in time) results in excess productive capacity, a slow decline in employment in the low-surplus domicile, and an increase in debt in the low-surplus domicile. It also pushes costs in the low-surplus domicile lower (meaning wages and taxation, primarily).

In the meantime, if the developed world (and specifically the US) were to stop borrowing to buy, the entire engine would collapse. This is not a sustainable development; if the US were to buy only what it could afford, based on its own exports, there would be an economic shockwave — not just in the US, but in China, India, and other high-surplus/low-cost domiciles. And right now, the dynamic is being funded by taking money out of the US and other high-cost domiciles, which must ultimately end in a reduction of demand. If the low-cost domiciles, which have been getting the capital investment, are not capable of soaking up the excess capacity when the US’s consumption comes in line with what the US can afford, then you will have a worldwide recession at the least — and likely a depression.

Economics views systems as moving towards equilibrium. But it’s more useful to view systems as subject to multiple different tendencies. At any given time, different tendencies may be stronger than others. What should be happening is that US costs should drop and developing country costs should rise. It is happening, but it’s not happening very fast. Where these costs meet is going to be somewhere a lot south of the current US standard of living. In the meantime, the dynamic has the US shipping its capital and its growth in productive capacity to lower-cost/higher-surplus domiciles. This will continue until the conditions enabling it end and not before. The conditions which can end it are increased shipping costs (favouring more localized production), the evening out of surplus production, a political decision to discourage either trade or capital flows, or an unwillingness or inability of either the US to borrow or its creditors to lend (the end of the housing bubble strikes directly at this). Until then, capital will go to the higher returns, and since the highest returns on production are mostly not in the US, capital that creates production jobs will flow disproportionately away from the US while asset bubbles form in the United States in order to pay for imports. (And the assets they have bought, or allowed the US to borrow against, are likely to crash in the final days of this system. A suckers’ game all around, but the only thing worse than playing is trying to stop playing.)

(Originally published years ago at BOP news, I put it back up here because this is what is at the heart of problems with globalization and why comparative advantage no longer works. April 25, 2015 — and back to the top again, in honor of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement. Sept 2021, and again, twice a decade seems appropriate.)


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