The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Nazis Are Not Socialists

Th above idea, because they were called National Socialists, tends not to die.

The Nazis reduced wages and shattered unions. Being a socialist got you sent to a camp.

Under the Nazis, corporate profits and the percentage of national income going to high income people increased.

And the Nazis also privatized a great deal, in fact their privatization regime was very similiar to how neoliberals have run the economy.

Nazis were right-wingers, who believed in poor workers and rich capitalists and that the state should mostly be involved in military and police. They were not socialists, by any definition of the word socialist of which I am aware.


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40 Comments

  1. StewartM

    Heh, yeah, some fallacies never die. I’ve argued the pretty much the same thing with many a libertarian and Randian.

    Funny, it’s Rand herself, and her followers, in their apologias for the genocide of Native Americans come closer to Nazism than any real socialist. Hitler was a great fan of Western movies and fiction (Karl May was one of his favorite authors) and indeed he admired the United States as a continental power because it had pursued a policy of genocide against its original inhabitants, and wanted to emulate that same policy in Eastern Europe. The United States for its part knew it was guilty of genocide, which is why it refused to sign the United Nations convention against genocide in 1948, because it knew it would be guilty on all five counts, some practices did not stop until the 1970s.

    I’d also add that Rand’s first works in the 1930s, written during a time when fascism was on the march, in all the countries in Europe (including democracies like France) and in China (Chiang’s Blue Shirts) didn’t sound the alarm of fascism threatening her sacred ‘individualism’ at all. Instead, she focused on the dangers of Soviet communism; fascism she apparently thought wasn’t worth commenting about. Maybe, just maybe, that’s because Rand’s heroic capitalist ‘individualist’ was uncomfortably close to Hitler’s fuhrerprinzip and *his* celebration of ‘individualism’? These types seem to ignore or forget how fascists celebrated ‘great men’ who towered over the unwashed masses.

  2. V. Arnold

    Oh lordy, lordy; now we’re discussing Nazis vs socialist’s ?
    In the U.S.A/Canada?
    As though there is room for the Nazis?
    If that is in fact the premis of this post; then we’re lost; it’s that simple.
    I think, given the collusion of the U.S. with the Nazis during WWII is a huge tell; and the bag of lies fed to the Usians needs to be understood, in toto.
    The U.S. is not the country you grew up with; that was a total lie; and until you; understand the reality of that time you will never understand the reality that is today!
    History, damn it! Learn your bloody history!
    If you cannot do that, then fuck all; you’re lost!

  3. realitychecker

    Right-e-o!

    Fuck Jonah Goldberg, who has made a living and a career off this misdirection.

  4. realitychecker

    Our industrialists, and others, who supported the Nazis did so, in my understanding, because the Nazis were seen as a bulwark against the effects of the Communist takeover in Russia in 1917. They were expected to keep the unions from getting too “uppity.”

    Some socialists! (snort)

  5. The Stephen Miller Band

    The government will not protect the economic interests of the German people by the circuitous method of an economic bureaucracy to be organised by the state, but by the utmost furtherance of private initiative and by the recognition of the rights of property. ~ Adolph Hitler to The Reichstag in 1933

  6. The myth survives because there is an element of truth to it that requires some knowledge of history to understand.

    Reading wikipedia on Ernst Rohm & the ‘second revolution’ lays it out clearly. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Röhm#Second_Revolution

    Short form:
    Rohm: So when can we start the land redistribution?
    Hitler: Oh yeah, about that, have you seen my new knife? It’s really long.

  7. Willy

    Totalitarianism is a different axis. People driven to power don’t really care about “their” system, whether it even works or not, just the power.

  8. I’ve long thought it gaslighting, misdirection. Nazis were right wingers who believed in poor workers… a demographic sympathetic to socialism. The “socialism” in “National Socialist” was a bone tossed to the rubes.

  9. BlizzardOfOz

    Hmm … the Nazis were some species of socialist, while being fanatically anti-Communist. Hitler was clearly pro-labor in his background and sympathies. Would you say Stalin wasn’t a communist because he ended up alienating factories from the workers, and fighting a nationalist war?

    Does “right” mean blood and soil, or laissez-faire capitalism? The two are often in stark conflict. You can see this tension again today: many alt-right, whom the media would call extreme far-right, are for single-payer healthcare, thus to the left of both major parties on that issue.

  10. jonst

    I think you are wrong about this Ian. Certainly in a theoretical sense. And perhaps in limited, practical, sense as well. There was a significant ideological split between the ‘Right’ in Europe. In fact, I would argue, elements of the Right WERE anti capitalist. They were disdainful of commercialism, and what they called, materialism, of the capitalist. This was true of the Italian Right, the French Right, the Spanish Right, and yes, the German Right. They believed thee ‘Nation’, was something that preceded the State…and the Capitalists. These elements were equally disdainful of ‘thee Monarchy’ as well. See Mussolini and José Antonio Primo de Rivera on the subject.

    I do not claim this thinking represented the full spectrum of the Right Wing, or Fascist thought. And to the extent this ideology existed it is true, they got pushed aside by the perceived need to build an aggressive military-industrial complex (i.e. stifle, at best, murder, at worst the labor community) to implement their (the Fascists) dreams of domination. But it–this disdain for capitalism and a desire to have the ‘Nation’ look out for its ‘tribes’ was there…..Francois Furet’s Passing of an Illusion, covers this controversy best in my opinion.

  11. bruce wilder

    What is the definition of “socialist” we are working with here?

    Are you trying to say something definitive about Nazi’s or socialists or both? Are you saying “socialists” are always and everywhere the reasonable, humane good guys? I am not sure political identities, ideologies and programs work that way.

    I have seen people try to explain interwar fascism as if it was a coherent ideology. I have seen people try to impose a one-dimensional left-right categorization of political programs.
    .
    The Nazi’s called themselves national socialists for strategic propagandistic reasons. There was a purpose at work. The Bolsheviks called their states, the People’s Democratic Republic of . . . . Despite constitutions and parliaments, these were not liberal representative democracies. This is how language is used in politics.

    In ten thousand places across the internet this morning, you can find people labeling centrist policy, “neoliberal” and in another ten thousand, people denying that that label means anything definite or specific and this argument is often employed as part of an apparent attempt to defend the merits of neoliberal policy.

    What the Nazi’s are to us, as symbols of political evil in a narrative of the good war and a holocaust almost no one alive remembers, is not what the Nazi’s were to Germans circa 1930.

    There was some discussion in the other thread on Charlottesville and the affection the center bears for the authoritarian right of parallels to the 1920s and 1930s. You cannot understand as a matter of historic reality who the Nazi’s were unless you understand who the Germans were between the wars.

    The political regime of the German Empire had used the fervent nationalism of Germany to instigate a war. The political psychology — and it was a psychology not a philosophical debate — that led the fragile empires of Europe into a general war is difficult to fathom now, but maybe we have some faint whiff now as we watch the Russia hysteria. For Germany, WWI was a national effort, an act of national will that swallowed individual identity.

    It happened that the Social Democrats had risen very rapidly in the immediate pre-war period to become the predominant political party in a parliament that had not yet imposed its authority on the monarchy, the aristocracy, the military or the bureaucracy. The imminence of that political evolution may have something to do with the anxiety and irresponsibility that decided instead for war. In the collapse after the war, the Social Democrats inherited official power, but Germany inherited a degenerate and fractured political culture. The intense experience of national effort had ended in disaster. The wound to the national psychology was gaping and the economic catastrophe set in motion by the war just added to the craziness.

    That actual Nazi’s wanted to call themselves socialists was a tribute of sorts.

    The opening to authoritarianism, however, was in the dysfunction, political and economic. Elites were unwilling to solve problems rationally and responsibly, within Germany or anywhere in Europe really. For the deliberation democratic politics requires, that sapping of political will is deadly.

    And, it seems to me that a politics of symbolism not economic substance built around the narcissism of personal identity and virtue has something to do with it. For the interwar Germans, the narcissistic wound was deep and intense and shared. The institutions of Weimar did not figure in German self-regard or confidence in the ability to govern themselves.

    I do not think Americans want to govern themselves today. Establishment Democrats less than many Republicans. Occupy was many good things, but it did not express a wish to rule. The rote anti-state gibberish of libertarians on the right is an invitation to authoritarianism. antifa wants political theatre. So do the Democrats in Congress who want to take away Ivanka’s security clearance.

    It is a problem.

    For the U.S., the turn toward authoritarianism went into overdrive with Obama. I think Ian’s commentariat is ready to recognize that, but most of those who lean toward the historic Democratic Party would be uncomfortable admitting it.

  12. Cagliostrowned

    “Would you say Stalin wasn’t a communist because he ended up alienating factories from the workers, and fighting a nationalist war?”

    Stalin was definitely not a communist. He was a Stalinist. I mean, come on, it’s right there in the name.

  13. StewartM

    @Blizzard of Oz:

    Would you say Stalin wasn’t a communist because he ended up alienating factories from the workers, and fighting a nationalist war?

    A lot of people, myself included, would call Stalin a state capitalist (I mean, he practiced enclosure, no?)

  14. Ché Pasa

    BW:

    +1

    A few quibbles:

    I do not think Americans want to can govern themselves.

    [A]ntifa and the white right fascists want political theatre. So do the Democrats [and Republicans] in Congress.

    For the US, the turn toward authoritarianism went into overdrive with Obama Bush/Cheney, particularly after 9/11.

  15. Arthur

    Since Saturday I’ve checked a variety of sites, from the crackpot right to the let’s sign a petition left, concerning the tragedy in Charlottesville. Now more than ever I think the situation in America right now can only end in bloodshed. When that concludes no one will win. The United States will be as broken as Rome at the end. And no one will mourn its passing.

  16. Richard McGee

    We can safely ignore most of the theoretical underpinnings of populism and the alt-right. The right may dangle single-payer or some other trinket in front the handful of neo-Strasserites, but there will be no socialism in the final product – national or otherwise.

    Libertarianism, neoliberalism, the alt-right, and the Tea Party are paths that converge at the same destination. All roads lead to Rome, one might say.

  17. The Stephen Miller Band

    You know, I, once upon a time meaning only just last year, thought history could be instructive, but I no longer believe that. History, at this point, is entirely irrelevant. Whether the Nazis were Socialists or not is completely & irrevocably moot. History, like God & Golf & Us & Much Else, is Dead. Realities are transplanting one after the other so rapidly now, that the history of twenty or thirty realities preceding the ephemeral current reality, is not only irrelevant but also only comprehendible by an exponentially diminishing few.

  18. I think you’re way off, and not being well served if you want a simple categorization of their economic philosphy.. Don’t want to get into this. Instead, suggest you read, Economy of Nazi Germany; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Nazi_Germany . I only looked at the section “Pre-war economy: 1933–1939”.

    “By the late 1930s, taxation, regulations and general hostility towards the business community were becoming so onerous that one German businessman wrote: “These Nazi radicals think of nothing except ‘distributing the wealth,’” while some businessmen were “studying Marxist theories, so that they will have a better understanding of the present economic system.”[48] In other cases, National Socialist officials were levying harsh fines of millions of marks for a “single bookkeeping error.”[49] The anti-business motives behind the Nationalist Socialists has been attributed to the Nazi leadership’s aim “to soak the rich and ‘neutralize big spenders,’” since they harbored “hostility towards the wealthy.”[50] The Nationals Socialists were also hostile to trade associations and small corporations. Hitler’s administration decreed an October 1937 policy that “dissolved all corporations with a capital under $40,000 and forbade the establishment of new ones with a capital less than $200,000,” which swiftly affected the collapse of one fifth of all small corporations.[51] On July 15, 1933 a law was enacted that imposed compulsory membership in cartels, while by 1934 the Third Reich had mandated a reorganization of all companies and trade associations and placed them “under the control of the state.”[52] While some National Socialist diehards proposed a total ban against all trading of stocks and bonds in an effort to prevent the spread of “Jewish capital,” others, in their anti-capitalist quest, sought “the abolition of income not earned by work or toil and distinguish between ‘rapacious’ and ‘productive’ capital.”[53] Nonetheless, the Nazi regime was able to close most of Germany’s stock exchanges, reducing them “from twenty-one to nine in 1935,” and “limited the distributed of dividends to 6 percent.”[54] By 1936 Germany decreed laws to completely block foreign stock trades by citizens.[55]”

  19. Bill Hicks

    Prior to Hitler coming to power, that Nazi Party DID have a left wing–including the likes of Gregor Strasser and even Joseph Goebbles–and that left wing was indeed socialist. It wasn’t until Hitler keened to the fact that the easiest path to power was to get the industrialists, bankers and military behind him that he purged Strasser and Goebbles got the hint and changed his tune.

    But all that history is irrelevant to what we mean when we use the term “socialism” today, which most people interpret as meaning modern, post-WW2 European style socialism, which has nothing whatsoever to do with Nazis other than the fact that their defeat helped bring it about.

  20. Ian Welsh

    Alternatively:

    Stock market restrictions indeed happened but that didn’t mean the rich didn’t do well.

    https://libcom.org/history/against-mainstream-nazi-privatization-1930s-germany

    Nationalization was particularly important in the early 1930s in Germany. The state took over a large industrial concern, large commercial banks, and other minor firms. In the mid-1930s, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in western capitalistic countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. Privatization was used as a political tool to enhance support for the government and for the Nazi Party. In addition, growing financial restrictions because of the cost of the rearmament programme provided additional motivations for privatization.

    See also:
    https://t.co/lmvTOdszkg

    In Nazi Germany, economic history shows us a rapid change in the distribution of income and the emergence of a managerial elite who obtained an outsized share of national income, not just the now-proverbial one percent, but the top 0.1 percent. These were Nazi Germany’s equivalent to today’s so-called “supermanagers” (to use Thomas Piketty’s now famous term). This parallel with today’s neoliberal society calls for a closer examination of the place of supermanagers in both regimes, with illuminating and unsettling implications.

    Behemoth: The Political Economy of Nazism

    Thinkers like Adorno and Arendt tended to approach Nazism through the lens of philosophy. They accepted Nazi self-assertions of “totalitarianism”; that a total, unified society was bound together through identification with party and leader, that all was driven through a Volksgemeinschaft (national community, or the consciousness of being part of an “authentic” national community). The reality was considerably messier. Adorno’s colleague Franz Neumann considered the same questions from the vantages of political economy and law. Far from “state capitalism,” where the profit motive is eliminated and production is under the complete control of the state, Neumann noted that under Nazism, business — especially large corporate interests — was given extraordinary leeway. They did not have perfect free rein, but large business interests were relieved of many previous social democratic restrictions. Independent labor organizations were crushed, and business was allowed to coagulate into massive, profit-generating monopolies as long as it produced the necessary goods and services the party and the army required.

    The closer Neumann looked at the day-to-day operations of Nazism, the less convinced he was that one could call Nazi Germany a “state” in any traditional sense of the word. Along with his fellow Frankfurt School colleague Otto Kirchheimer, they noted that power, authority, and responsibility were not, as propaganda would have it, bound up entirely in the person of the Leader, but rather were confusingly diffuse throughout a disjointed and irrational system. Everyone (that is everyone included within the national-racial community) was to fall in line or develop themselves through Führerprinzip into autonomous self-starters, entrepreneurs, and pioneers of the national spirit in whatever sector they worked. Even as a rump state maintained the appearance of a heavy bureaucracy, with a great deal of actual organization still left to technocrats, industry was given wide berth. Society was dominated by myriad (in the parlance of our time) “thought-leaders” with overlapping and competing fiefdoms. The party itself maintained personnel connections within nearly every sector, and its own areas of control, particularly over racial questions — the sine qua non of Nazism. A deal was struck whereby the armed forces, still bruised and feeling “betrayed” by German surrender from World War I, came to an internal balance of powers agreement. Hitler was in charge, to be sure, but only through a constant negotiation between these sectors and their own mini-sovereignties. And even Hitler wasn’t the sovereign decision maker both his fervent supporters and adamant critics wanted him to be; Hitler’s office was more of a clearinghouse, often receiving conflicting positions in, sometimes sending conflicting positions out to be resolved by some other, smaller leader elsewhere. Certainly, the Führer was a dictator, but he was first among many, neither the striding colossus of Nazi propagandists nor the all-powerful, mini-mustachioed evil of moralistic Western popular culture.

    In his final analysis, Neumann realized that Nazi Germany was not really a state in any recognizable sense at all. Far from Hobbes’s Biblical Leviathan — a mechanistic vision of a commonwealth functioning collectively for the safety and flourishing of its individual subjects whose power is bound up, expressed, and represented in the person of a monarch or ruling council — Neumann saw in Nazi Germany Hobbes’s alternative vision, the rumbling horror of the land monster Behemoth, a beast for Hobbes composed of Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army, the Long Parliament, and Puritan businessmen taking on the appearance of a new state but in reality a mere disjointed assemblage of military, economic, and even restrictive sexual power that in Hobbes’s analysis spelled out the essence of anarchy in Britain and the utter devastation of Ireland. The German Behemoth under Nazi rule was a similar amalgam. Famously, it was only with the handshake agreements of traditional conservatives, the new far-right nationalists, the army, and, most importantly, the business elite, that the Nazis were given a shot at “governing.” Several of the business elite had to personally petition Hindenburg to appoint Hitler in the first place.

    Profits and Salaries in Dark Times

    Neither Neumann (nor Hobbes for that matter) should be misunderstood. A “behemoth”-like structure can be highly efficient. Nazi efficiency in disenfranchisement, slavery, and genocide was unparalleled in terms of their speed and thoroughness. But such a structure functionally overturns the most basic logic of the state; it is diffuse sovereignty.

    In this diffuse sovereignty, soaring profits went not simply to the one percent of its day, but to reinforce the power of a nascent class of executives across different economic and social sectors. Even while internal regulations on, say, labor conditions were dismantled, external quotas and quality controls were implemented. These regulations often had the blessing of business, especially big business, which used such controls to crowd out small- and medium-sized firms that could not meet the substantial party, “state,” or military demands. And this meant that large German business did well. So well, that the only real Nazi-era restriction (before they were removed altogether at the start of the war) on profit was a 1934 rate cap of six to eight percent on dividends and even then, the surplus beyond this was merely redirected into short-term government bonds which would pay out against the taxes owed by the firm. But, as Neumann noted of profits in the Nazi-era, “profits are not identical with dividends. Profits are, above all, salaries, bonuses, commissions for special services, over-valuated patents, licenses, connections, and good will.” These profits went to the “supermanagers” of the Third Reich.

    Men (and they were almost always men) like this were the linchpin of Nazi society. After soaring, inflationary highs during World War I, and an unsurprising loss in the subsequent crash compounded by the Great Depression, the share of income of the top one percent in Germany began to return to relatively normal levels during the Weimar years. But once the Nazis consolidated power, the fortunes of the Thousand Year Reich’s one percent truly took off. This was particularly the case for those supermanagers at the very top, the 0.1 percent. From just under four percent in 1930, their share of the national income under the new Nazi order would nearly double by the eve of World War II.

    In contrast, during roughly the same period, the United States saw not only a drop for the top 0.1 percent but a choppy and precipitous one, from above eight percent before 1930 to below four percent by the middle of World War II. These figures refer to the top share of labor income alone, excluding return to capital. Despite similar counter-cyclic spending, whatever was so richly rewarding for Nazi-era Germans in the highest income group did not correspond to their American counterparts. This is not peculiar to the United States; similar trends can be observed in, for example, France and Sweden. A new “managerial class” appeared in nearly all developed economies, but clearly it was in some way less valued in social democracies (or for that matter, in the Soviet Union) than in the new fascist societies.

    Over the last 35 years, our own “neoliberal” society has developed some rather unexpected parallels with Nazi Germany. In his much celebrated work Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty noticed an odd feature of our contemporary economy: though income inequality levels in the United States are today similar to those that existed at the beginning of the 20th century, there has been a change in how high-income earners derive their income. In Piketty’s overall argument the vast economic growth, stability, and equity of the postwar to mid-1970s era, the Trente Glorieuses, was due to the historic idiosyncrasy of rebuilding after the World Wars, pumping economic output in North America, Europe, and Japan far above where they “naturally” lie at about 2.5 percent. Yet the general tendency is for the return on capital (historically stable at around four to five percent) to always exceed the growth of the economy. This has the distributional consequence of allocating a higher share of national income to investors (capital income) relative to workers (wages), and will gradually lead to societies characterized by high income and wealth inequality (i.e., a kind of neofeudalism). In such societies, it makes more economic sense to marry into wealth than pursue any kind of a career because income disparities are primarily driven by inherited wealth and the significant advantage of earning a return on capital over earned wages. However, the odd bit that pops up in Piketty concerning our contemporary economic situation is that the gradual increase in income inequality over the past three decades is the direct result of a surge in top wages, rather than a revival of capital income — this is not the “idle rich.”

    The salaries of the top one percent have increased from roughly eight percent of total income in the 1980s to a staggering 18 percent of total income today. While wages for the vast majority of Americans have remained largely stagnant for the past 35 years, the top one percent has seen growth by nearly 140 percent and of that massive income — so large as to actually exceed capital returns — nearly three-quarters goes to the tiny top 0.1 percent. The bulk of these “star salaries” do not come from, say, high-earning celebrities (artists, actors, athletes), but rather from individuals such as corporate executives, hedge fund managers, university presidents, etc. Piketty calls the individuals who comprise this top 0.1 percent “supermanagers.”

    How do we explain this explosion in salaries? We could begin with the theory that high pay reflects a supermanager’s productivity and skills (i.e., large contributions to corporate profits), yet this does not hold up to scrutiny. To begin with, there is a very sharp discontinuity of salaries between those at the very top and those immediately below, where one would have expected a gradual increase if qualifications or professional experience were the key driver. Executive pay has been found to rise when sales and profits increase for reasons that are beyond a manager’s control (e.g., price fluctuations). Further, given the size and complexity of the modern corporation, it is difficult to determine what share of a firm’s performance can be directly linked to the skills of any particular executive manager or officer as opposed to the rest of workers. Controlled experiments (e.g., determining the performance of a different manager in the same environment) are impossible. Assessing performance on the basis of some “objective” measure, such as shareholder value, also proves difficult.

    If “star salaries” can’t be explained by contribution to the productive enterprise, high managerial compensation would appear to be what economists call “rent” — essentially, profit extraction. Managers could quite simply have their “hands in the till,” or be facilitated in their ability to extract rent through bargaining power and market power (including a manager’s ability to bring to the table things that cannot easily be replaced or commoditized, like personal connections, or to make it costly for any potential replacement to take over). Piketty concludes that the rent element is probably high, with high pay for supermanagers an institutional practice shaped by social norms.

    In our view there is another way to understand the rise of the supermanager in terms of value (though in a rather unconventional sense) produced for the firm. The supermanager is neoliberalism’s governance mechanism, a way to negotiate and smooth over differences between sectors of power in society, just as the supermanager avant la lettre did so in Nazi Germany.

    Supermanagerial Governance

    Supermanagers provide a very specific kind of governance needed in very specific kinds of regimes. The supermanager and their seemingly outsized share of national income is not merely a phenomenon of our own neoliberal era, from the Reagan/Thatcher “revolutions” to the Clinton/Blair era. It was a conspicuous feature of Nazi Germany (and although the data is thinner, it would seem 1920–’30s fascism in general). The most plausible explanation for this compensation draws not from any particularly radical theory of value, nor from moralistic parables about corruption, nor from fairy tales about superheroic capacities. The most plausible explanation is that supermanagers are paid for governance where the state has been redeployed elsewhere or, even, effectively dissolved.

    One could think of this as a peculiar kind of rent extraction for the ability to shift seamlessly at the boundaries of these sectors — from one board, to another, from a corporation, to a foundation, to a university, to government, to a think tank and back again. One could think of this in a rather perverse way as real marginal added value, compensation for the difficult work of governance without a Rechtsstaat — without a rational, sovereign state, or with a receding or redistributed one. Seen in this light, the ability to provide political backing through connections is a highly remunerated component of this type of governance. What we think of today as the “revolving doors” between corporate offices, consultancies, government regulatory agencies, think tanks, media, etc. were part of everyday economic, political, and social life in Nazi Germany. The heightened and more powerful form of interlocking directorates commonly observed in advanced capitalist economies were, for the Nazis, highly formalized as powerful supervisory boards and chambers between sectors and firms. Firms who were heavily invested in the party before the Nazi takeover (only about one-seventh of total firms but, taking into account the size of firms, over half of the total German stock market) saw immediate gains of six to eight percent by mid-1933 already. Comparable levels of remuneration for direct political connection are found only in developing and advanced neoliberal states.

    The parallel between the Nazi “revolution” in the 1930s and the neoliberal “revolution” in the 1980s and ’90s goes much further. The Nazis were also pioneers in what was then the uncharted economic waters of “privatization.” In the face of the Great Depression, states across the world — including the Social Democratic led Weimar Republic — nationalized key industries and, in some cases, like Germany, nearly the entirety of the financial sector. The Nazis — despite early propaganda indicating otherwise — were the unique exception. Not only did they avoid further nationalization but they innovated a process so idiosyncratic at the time that it required coining a German neologism: Reprivatisierung.

    Quickly transferred into English as “reprivatization,” the phenomenon and its potentially salutary effects were observed by such notable organs of liberal economic thought as The Economist and mainstream outlets like Time magazine. Before Margaret Thatcher began the privatization of council housing and long before welfare reform was a twinkle in Bill Clinton’s eye, the Nazis were turning heavy industries, nearly the entirety of the financial and banking sector, and even some social services over to private hands and to new, innovative public/private hybrids. Even before this process was “enhanced” by “Aryanizing” previously Jewish held property, rates of privatization were as high the European average would become some 70 years later when neoliberal reforms began on the continent.

    The resulting market concentration, the decrease of small businesses and the growth of monopolies and cartels in Nazi Germany are well documented. It’s no surprise that supermanagerial governance would go hand in hand with the consolidation of large industrial and financial interests, as the value it provides is enhanced when sectors and market power are concentrated. This is another interesting parallel between the Nazi era and our own. Today we find that antitrust and intellectual property laws have favored the concentration of market power in a handful of companies in key sectors such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, media and entertainment, not to mention the financial sector. And we find that unsurprisingly, today’s supermanagers thrive, in particular, in large, profitable firms. A recent study finds that during the period 1978–2012, a large share (two thirds) of wage earnings inequality was driven not just by the deepening of pay differentials (between those at the very top and the rest of workers) throughout all firms, but also by the emergence of higher-paying large, profitable firms.

    The parallels don’t end with political and economic power but stretch, horrifyingly, into the everyday. As Kirchheimer wrote of the Nazi-era police force in a report for the OSS in 1945:

    The general “task” presumed to have been given to the police in the Nazi state — that of safeguarding the state and regime against any disturbance — implies the supremacy of any of its actions (whether in the form of decree, directive, internal instruction, or pure action) over any existing law […] Thus, the police becomes “a function whose activities are determined solely through what is politically necessary […] This means that the police as such can do whatever it deems necessary, without being restrained by legal authorities.

    Just as it was for fascists, neoliberals depend on the arbitrary power of the police, only to be checked, if ever, by post-facto political considerations. Far from cowering in fear of cartoon Hitler in the 1930s and ’40s or for that matter in the face of the Constitution today, police are deeply empowered, with almost no enforceable judicial or legislative check on power. This is the necessary “on the ground” counterpart — learned well from colonization abroad — to supermanagerial control of the endlessly complex, newly “marketized” governance apparati, public-private initiatives, and the labyrinthine overlapping jurisdictions between sectors in the neoliberal state.

  21. The Stephen Miller Band

    The Nazis weren’t Socialists, they were ultimately Marauders. Effect is more important than words when it comes to what something is or isn’t. The words National Socialist are meaningless if, in effect, private property concentrated in the hands of a few Wealthy Elite is the rule. But let’s face it, The Nazis were Criminals. They were, collectively & individually, Criminally Insane. They confiscated, absconded, tortured & murdered & genocided their way to Power and ultimately destruction. Yes, that theft & murder was part of a Redistribution Scheme, but in no way did that Redistribution Scheme resemble a Socialist Redistribution Scheme in structure and/or sentiment.

    Of course, this is all Intellectual Masturbation. The Freaks referred to as Nazis today haven’t the capacity to comprehend the intellectual parsing of this, so to perform a comprehensive deconstruction of it & them is tantamount to deconstructing a pile of dung to determine an uncertain future. Some people read the Tea Leaves and others read Dung Corn, I suppose. I’ll stick with the Tea Leaves, thank you very much. Tea Leaves are much easier on the olfactory & you can brew them and drink the resultant elixir once they’ve rendered their divination. Or, you can eat shit.

  22. The Stephen Miller Band

    On another forum someone said the following:

    ….again I will point out , according to the U.S. governments own census, 90% of those who fought for , suffered for, and died for , the Confederate States of America were not slave owners.

    Of course, this Freak submitted this in order to absolve The Rebels but in doing so he/she/it only digs The Hole of Indictment deeper. These Rebels were MORONS then, and they’re MORONS still today. Southern Culture & Folkways is/are not something that should be preserved and/or appreciated. It was a Culture of MORONS lorded over by CRIMINAL PSYCHOPATHS despite the feigning eloquence of some of the latter. As Ché Pasa advised, don’t be a Sucker. These Contemporary Nazis, Hitler is gasping in his afterlife if he has one, are not only MORONS, they’re also SUCKERS. They always have been, and apparently they always will be.

    Albion’s Seed, Part II: The Cavaliers 1642-1675

    The wave of Puritan migration from England to America slowed dramatically after 1641. Through the English Civil War and Cromwell’s Protectorate, the Puritans found themselves politically and economically ascendant in England — which greatly diminished their interest in leaving it. But the Puritan victory came at the expense of another English subculture, whose flight from Cromwell propelled the second wave of English migration to America.

    These were the Cavaliers — loyal Royalists, many of them nobles and courtiers, who sought refuge from the chaos in Virginia. David Hackett Fischer notes that Southern historians have long debated the actual extent and effects of the Cavaliers’ influence on the region’s culture; but 210 pages of Albion’s Seed are given over to studying their specific folkways and cultural values as they existed on the estates of southern England, and as they later expressed themselves in the Chesapeake region. The detailed analysis is convincing: like the Puritans, the Cavaliers brought the culture they knew, and transplanted it firmly and deeply in the soil of tidewater Virginia. In the process, they added a second enduring English voice to America’s conversation about rights, freedom, and power.

    Aristocrats and Peasants

    The Cavalier wave actually brought two kinds of people to Virginia. About the quarter of the immigrants between the peak years of 1641 and 1675 were either “distressed nobility,” or (later) the younger sons of England’s best families, looking to re-create their older brothers’ grand English farming estates in their Virginia plantations. Frequent visits, business interests, and intermarriage across the Atlantic kept their ties to the old country close: culturally, the Old Dominion still looks back to England with more fondness than most of the rest of America does.

    Sir William Berkeley, Virginia’s governor throughout this period, granted these fortunate sons high offices, titles, and vast land grants upon their arrival — thus creating an instant oligarchy of elite landholding families that kept an iron grip on the colony’s developing economic and social orders. Where John Winthrop worked to prevent class extremes on either end in Massachusetts, Berkeley deliberately set out to recruit a new Royalist aristocracy, and put control of the Chesapeake entirely in its hands. These families built their self-sufficient plantations all throughout the Tidewater, duplicating the rural model of their old southern English country estates in almost every detail.

    Of course, there’s no point in being an aristocrat if you don’t have serfs to boss around. After the local Indian tribes were offered the job — only to vigorously decline it — Virginia’s would-be elite sent home for indentured servants. By 1675, these servants — almost entirely uneducated, unmarried, unskilled young men between 15 and 35 — comprised the other three-quarters of the colony’s white residents. At the same time, the number of African slaves began to burgeon as well. Between 1642 and 1675, the population of Virginia Colony grew from about 8,000 to an estimated 50,000 souls.

    Most of the white servants worked as farmers on the plantations. Illiterate, unpropertied, unlikely to marry, and locked into the most rigid social hierarchy in the Colonies, they were in no position to determine the direction of Virginia’s culture, despite their far greater numbers. For that reason, Fischer’s story only touches on them. Their lives, like so much of the history of the Chesapeake, were dominated by the actions of their masters.

    Like agricultural societies around the world (and in strong contrast to the mercantilist Puritans), the Cavalier culture that emerged during these early generations was tradition-bound, static, patriarchal and hierarchical, suspicious of book-learning, and more than a bit authoritarian — attributes which were buttressed by the teachings of Virginia’s state-supported Anglican churches. As a direct result, Virginia very soon distinguished itself with the widest inequities in wealth, social mobility, education, domestic conditions, and political rights in colonial America.

    While the Puritans held up the Calvinist belief that power, freedom, rights, and authority all legitimately rested with the community, early Virginians brought with them the reigning view of the British upper classes: that is, that the legitimate exercise of power, freedom, rights, and authority properly belonged in the hands of free white male landowners. They believed that the country would be best served if these autocrats were given their liberty to create wealth, exercise power, and lead the lesser folk forward toward a future of their choosing.

    This second view of “liberty” is still a very recognizable part of our national conversation to this day, so it’s useful to have Fischer’s account of where it began, and how it played out in the earliest years of English settlement in America.

    More at link.

  23. rkka

    Metamar,

    While Adolf indeed hated international finance capitalism, he was an enormous fan of privately held companies.

    His platforms also advocated free enterprise as the only possible economic system, traditional roles for women, religion being at the center of moral life, rebuilding the military, hell, he was even anti-abortion and relaxed Weimar Germany’s strict gun ownership laws!

    What’s not to like for a good cultural conservative!

  24. They were the same kind of socialists that you find from every right wing state:

    1. The state will not allow you to marry a foreign debased person, especially Jewish.
    2. The state will make sure that every other form of human is lesser than you.
    3. The state will make sure all of your needs are met – for example the Autobann. Paying no attention to the defense uses. Really.
    4. You will have marriage for its purpose.
    5. In return, the state demands everything from you.

    It was the right wing’s idea of what people really wanted: a leader and a vision. Democratic socialism, no – good heavens no – but autocratic socialism of the right wing. It promised that. of course, a rich and powerful capital list class is part of the right-wing idea of socialism. As does its modern forms. the right wing leaders of the time, which included Great Britain, understood this as what the common people wanted – order security discipline. Of course, it would betray, but look at the Republican party now – everything for the most well-off and their servants.

    Just look to the leader for everything. especially a left wing nemesis – who own should be noted was promising the left-wing equivalent, again not the Democratic left wing. Democracy rules out a total reliance on the leadership, and for very good reason.

    Think like a demagogue: promise everything – deliver nothing. The reason right wing socialism exists is to fool right wing people.

  25. The Stephen Miller Band

    From Ian’s link:

    The resulting market concentration, the decrease of small businesses and the growth of monopolies and cartels in Nazi Germany are well documented. It’s no surprise that supermanagerial governance would go hand in hand with the consolidation of large industrial and financial interests, as the value it provides is enhanced when sectors and market power are concentrated. This is another interesting parallel between the Nazi era and our own. Today we find that antitrust and intellectual property laws have favored the concentration of market power in a handful of companies in key sectors such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, media and entertainment, not to mention the financial sector. And we find that unsurprisingly, today’s supermanagers thrive, in particular, in large, profitable firms.

    Wall Street has slept with The Enemy so much, it is THE ENEMY, and many of you are sleeping with it if you have your Life Savings invested with it. I don’t, but of course, I have foregone the enticement of Life Savings and instead, I have chosen to Walk The Line. You should too. If enough do, maybe, just maybe, we could accomplish something positive and transformative.

    The Empire of I.G. Farben

    Farben was Hitler and Hitler was Farben. (Senator Homer T. Bone to Senate Committee on Military Affairs, June 4, 1943.)

    On the eve of World War II the German chemical complex of I.G. Farben was the largest chemical manufacturing enterprise in the world, with extraordinary political and economic power and influence within the Hitlerian Nazi state. I. G. has been aptly described as “a state within a state.”

    The Farben cartel dated from 1925, when organizing genius Hermann Schmitz (with Wall Street financial assistance) created the super-giant chemical enterprise out of six already giant German chemical companies — Badische Anilin, Bayer, Agfa, Hoechst, Weiler-ter-Meer, and Griesheim-Elektron. These companies were merged to become Inter-nationale Gesellschaft Farbenindustrie A.G. — or I.G. Farben for short. Twenty years later the same Hermann Schmitz was put on trial at Nuremburg for war crimes committed by the I. G. cartel. Other I. G. Farben directors were placed on trial but the American affiliates of I. G. Farben and the American directors of I. G. itself were quietly forgotten; the truth was buried in the archives.

    It is these U.S. connections in Wall Street that concern us. Without the capital supplied by Wall Street, there would have been no I. G. Farben in the first place and almost certainly no Adolf Hitler and World War II.

    German bankers on the Farben Aufsichsrat (the supervisory Board of Directors)1 in the late 1920s included the Hamburg banker Max War-burg, whose brother Paul Warburg was a founder of the Federal Reserve System in the United States. Not coincidentally, Paul Warburg was also on the board of American I. G., Farben’s wholly owned U.S. subsidiary. In addition to Max Warburg and Hermann Schmitz, the guiding hand in the creation of the Farben empire, the early Farben Vorstand included Carl Bosch, Fritz ter Meer, Kurt Oppenheim and George von Schnitzler.2 All except Max Warburg were charged as “war criminals” after World War II.

    In 1928 the American holdings of I. G. Farben (i.e., the Bayer Company, General Aniline Works, Agfa Ansco, and Winthrop Chemical Company) were organized into a Swiss holding company, i. G. Chemic (Inter-nationale Gesellschaft fur Chemisehe Unternehmungen A. G.), controlled by I. G. Farben in Germany. In the following year these American firms merged to become American I. G. Chemical Corporation, later renamed General Aniline & Film. Hermann Schmitz, the organizer of I. G. Farben in 1925, became a prominent early Nazi and supporter of Hitler, as well as chairman of the Swiss I. G. Chemic and president of American I. G. The Farben complex both in Germany and the United States then developed into an integral part of the formation and operation of the Nazi state machine, the Wehrmacht and the S.S.

    I. G. Farben is of peculiar interest in the formation of the Nazi state because Farben directors materially helped. Hitler and the Nazis to power in 1933. We have photographic evidence (see page 60) that I.G. Farben contributed 400,000 RM to Hitler’s political “slush fund.” It was this secret fund which financed the Nazi seizure of control in March 1933. Many years earlier Farben had obtained Wall Street funds for the 1925 cartelization and expansion in Germany and $30 million for American I. G. in 1929, and had Wall Street directors on the Farben board. It has to be noted that these funds were raised and directors appointed years before Hitler was promoted as the German dictator.

    My quote:

    Wall Street was, and is, Hitler and Hitler was, and is, Wall Street. (The Dishonorable Stephen Miller Band to The Ian Welsh Committee of Correspondence, August 15, 2017.)

  26. justsomeguy

    And “neoliberals” are not liberal.

  27. Christ, you make the Nazis sound like any of the world governments currently in existence.

  28. bruce wilder

    @ Ché Pasa

    fair enough — though volumes could be written on the interplay of not-wanting-to-govern and not-being-able-to-govern

    @ Arthur

    “as broken as Rome at the end” seems to be a tad melodramatic. But, yes, we are riding a predictable cycle into a phase of rising political violence and diminished political legitimacy.

  29. bruce wilder

    Think like a demagogue: promise everything – deliver nothing. The reason right wing socialism exists is to fool right wing people.

    The political psychology underlying authoritarian demagoguery rests on the interaction of two kinds of “right wing people”: leaders and followers. The followers, stuck in subordinate and often precarious dependency in the social and economic hierarchy, have their political attitudes and expectations pre-prepared by fear and narrow horizons. The leaders — I am speaking particularly of those who assume a demagogue’s role — aspire to the privilege and power of an apex role in the social and economic hierarchy. They want to dominate socially and economically. And, they find out that appeals of certain form work well to persuade authoritarian followers, who are easily fooled when the forms are observed. Being amoral, the demagogue will say anything, and is thus free to exploit the effective rhetorical forms. If racism works (and it does), use it. Hypocrisy is a skill for the demagogue and the only consequence that matters is the achievement of power, status and wealth by the demagogue.

    I expect Ian’s commentariat and readership fall into neither category. We are not amoral nor inclined toward demagoguery and by dint of education or temperament, we are mostly people of sufficient curiosity and awareness to be unsuited to uncritically adopt the attitudes of authoritarian followers in place of political understanding. Both demagogues and authoritarian followers are Other for us, though we may be closely acquainted thru family connections with the latter and, perhaps, by social acquaintance with sociopaths with some potential as demagogues.

    We live in hierarchical economies, where there’s a lot of professional and technical as well as managerial call for domination for functional reasons. All domination is not demagoguery. Demagoguery only really works out-of-doors, out of the established hierarchy that functions to organize the routines of productive life. It might be used selectively as rhetoric, as when factory managers rail against union bosses or conservatives rail against corruption in government welfare programs.

    Domination poses political problems. Who will guard the guardians? All power corrupts. Et Cetera. Demagoguery goes beyond that into a realm of dysfunction and degeneracy.

    In the comments about, excerpting extensively from historical studies, there’s a lot about the relationship of the managerial and professional classes to the politics of the sociopathic demagogues.

    In the interwar politics of Germany, both the petite bourgeoisie of small professionals (organized politically throughout the period in hostility to the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic for idiosyncratic reasons) and the moguls of cartelized industry played supporting roles in bringing the Nazi’s to power. This is of some historic interest.

    In our politics, the relationship of both the C-class of top managers and financiers and the electorally much broader professional class of educated, credentialed people to the economically precarious and increasingly desperate “working” classes bears examination.

    We who are neither demagogues nor authoritarian followers are free to deplore both, but I will submit that authoritarian followers are “right-wing people” only if no one contests political leadership with the demagogues, only if no one is willing to make sincere populist appeals.
    And, oh yes, having made sincere populist appeals, the sincere populist must be able to form effective alliances with more “progressive” political groups to achieve and wield political power against the mega-rich and giant business corporations.

    Before we get too carried away with parallels to the fascists of the 1930s, I will say that totalitarianism was a feature of this politics worth noting: mass mobilization of followers was a key factor. In our politics, mass demobilization would seem to play the corresponding structural role. Our demagogues appeal to overweight couch potatoes mostly.

    And, in the 1930s, there was a living legacy of a vast array of elaborate political ideologies trying to make sense of erupting, emergent capitalism and the New Economy of the Second Industrial Revolution. A vast migration into cities was a recent memory or still underway, nightlife, radio, movies still novelties.

    Now, we have the pablum of neoliberalism pretty much alone. “It’s complicated” and “There is no alternative” are its slogans. And, “markets”!

  30. realitychecker

    @ BW

    Don’t forget the decline of personal moral values, which we have certainly been living thru for the last few decades.

  31. Hugh

    A comment I wrote here last year:

    “It is important to define fascism. The term comes from the Latin word “fasces” a bundle of bound rods. The meaning is that there is strength in unity. While each rod is easily breakable by itself, the bound bundle is essentially unbreakable. In Roman times, fasces were carried by lictors before Roman magistrates and signified the power and authority (imperium) of the magistrate imparted to him by the inseparable union of the Senate and the Roman people (SPQR and all that). In 19th century Italy, the descendant word “fascio” was used to refer to any political grouping. In 1919, Mussolini formed his political party Fascii Italiani di Combattimento (Fighting Italian Political Groups) which adopted the Roman iconography and gave us, for better or worse, the term fascism. Mussolini’s fascism was an aggressive, anti-democratic, authoritarian form of Statism marked by the tripartite alliance of the state with corporate interests and acquiescent labor unions. These unions were not there to defend workers’ rights but to enforce discipline among them. The hallmarks of fascism were the one-party state, mobilization of the population, discipline, corporatism, exaggerated nationalism, militarism, surveillance, intolerance of dissent, suppression of individual liberties (at least those of ordinary citizens), and the embrace of state and state-sponsored violence to achieve these goals … In classic fascism, the guiding myth was the populo, the Volk, the People, not as individuals but as aggregate, mobilized to achieve a manifest destiny.”

    Most of our political terminology has been so debased that it has lost all meaning. It is used now only to obfuscate and insult.

  32. Hugh

    I would add that in National Socialism from which the term Nazi derives we need to understand that the word “nation” refers to the Volk and “socialism” to its unity of action, as with the bundled sticks of the fascis. And no, this has nothing to do with classic socialism.

  33. Hugh

    I did not realize that using the term Na*zi would throw a comment into moderation. Sort of difficult to have a discussion about it when it does.

  34. realitychecker

    Count your blessings-I responded to you, and I’m not even being told my comment was held in moderation.

  35. realitychecker

    OOOPS, my bad, wrong thread-abject apologies proffered.

  36. Emma

    When internet douchebags try the “Nazis were socialists ergo Bernie Bros derpso facto lorem ipsum” thing with me, I remind them that that means they have to acknowledge David Koresh as their Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. Because we’re believing absolutely everything anybody says about themselves now, even if it’s contradicted by observable reality. Right, guys? Am I right?

    Still trying to forgive you for the “Bannon has some good ideas lol” post, btw.
    Richard Spencer supports single-payer.
    Nazis don’t have good ideas.

  37. V. Arnold

    Most of our political terminology has been so debased that it has lost all meaning. It is used now only to obfuscate and insult.

    Excellent point…

  38. Webstir

    “Most of our political terminology has been so debased that it has lost all meaning. It is used now only to obfuscate and insult.”

    I agree with this statement in general. But in this particular context, I think the proponent uses the argument more as a bromide. The “Democrats invented the kkk” argument provides the same guilt reducing effect.

    Conversely, the libs tend to rely on the “But you’re supposed to be the party of Lincoln” style arguments to achieve the same purpose.

    Most people’s arguments are not “arguments” per se. They’re post hoc rationalizations used to justify behavior and thereby mitigate negative emotions.

  39. Noam Chomsky sort of defines socialism in such a simple way even I can understand it. In “Chomsky on Lenin, Trotsky, Socialism & the Soviet Union” @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQsceZ9skQI , starting at 4:20, he says, “the core of socialism was understood to be workers’ control of production”. By such definition, the Nazi economic regime was certainly not socialist.

    However, I was motivated to make my prior post by the part of Ian’s post that says “Nazis were right-wingers, who believed in poor workers and rich capitalists “.

    Well, my previous link says, “Wages increased by 10.9%” and “By 1938 unemployment was practically extinct.” Furthermore, I vaguely recalled, via TV documentary, that the Nazis sought to make workers’ life rather pleasant (untermensch and slave labor are obvious exceptions), guaranteeing vacations, facilitating the Volkswagon (for the volk), etc. This link has more info
    http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/tch_wjec/germany19291947/2economicsocialpolicy2.shtml

  40. Hugh

    John Stuart Mill, certainly no radical, was in the process of writing a book on socialism when he died in 1873. The first draft of his work came out posthumously in 1879. Mill saw socialism mainly in terms of the consequences on property caused by the extension of the right to vote.

    In Great Britain the suffrage is not yet so widely extended, but the last Reform Act [of 1867] admitted within what is called the pale of the Constitution so large a body of those who live on weekly wages, that as soon and as often as these shall choose to act together as a class, and exert for any common object the whole of the electoral power which our present institutions give them, they will exercise, though not a complete ascendency, a very great influence on legislation. Now these are the very class which, in the vocabulary of the higher ranks, are said to have no stake in the country. Of course they have in reality the greatest stake, since their daily bread depends on its prosperity. But they are not engaged (we may call it bribed) by any peculiar interest of their own, to the support of property as it is, least of all to the support of inequalities of property. So far as their power reaches, or may hereafter reach, the laws of property have to depend for support upon considerations of a public nature, upon the estimate made of their conduciveness to the general welfare, and not upon motives of a mere personal character operating on the minds of those who have control over the Government.

    Although writing more than one hundred forty years ago, Mill was too optimistic about wage earners. As our present society demonstrates, it is, and has been, rather easy for those higher ranks to distract and turn against each other those in the lower classes and effectively subvert and pervert the general welfare to their own private ends.

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