The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Category: Development Economics Page 3 of 4

World Poverty Is NOT Decreasing

I’ve said before that world poverty isn’t reducing, but let’s say it again.

The trend that the graph depicts is based on a poverty line of $1.90 (£1.44) per day, which is the equivalent of what $1.90 could buy in the US in 2011. It’s obscenely low by any standard, and we now have piles of evidence that people living just above this line have terrible levels of malnutrition and mortality. Earning $2 per day doesn’t mean that you’re somehow suddenly free of extreme poverty. Not by a long shot.

Scholars have been calling for a more reasonable poverty line for many years. Most agree that people need a minimum of about $7.40 per day to achieve basic nutrition and normal human life expectancy…

…So what happens if we measure global poverty at the low end of this more realistic spectrum – $7.40 per day, to be extra conservative? Well, we see that the number of people living under this line has increased dramatically since measurements began in 1981, reaching some 4.2 billion people today.

We also know, for example, that Indians have been eating less calories than 30 years ago (and having traveled in India in the 80s, I can tell you they weren’t overfed.)

As Hickel also points out about the earlier parts of the graph, and as I have pointed out previously, most of the “people are making more money” comes from “people were forced off their subsistence farms so that they had to use money to buy what they got from their own labor before.”

So, for example, when NAFTA went into place, millions of Mexican susbsistence farmers were forced off their land. This lead, directly, to the massive increases in immigration to the US that occurred in the 90s and early 2000s, by the way.

People miss the essential point: it’s not how much money you have. It’s whether or not you have enough food, shelter, clothes and so on. It’s whether you have what you need and some of what you want.

Only a moron (or someone as disconnected from the realities of life like Bill Gates) could think that being able to buy as much as $1.90 a day, in the United States of 2011, would qualify as enough money. I have been poor. I have been very poor, by first world standards. I can tell you that even back in the late 80s, $1.90 wasn’t enough (I could have barely eaten on that, I could not have saved up and paid rent.) Today it is completely inadequate, and the diet it would barely allow is basically starch and sugar.

(Which, again, anyone who actually has tried to shop cheaply would know. That won’t include Bill Gates.)

These people who say with certainty how poverty is massively decreasing make me sick. They are either ignorant, very stupid and disconnected from reality, or they are very evil.

Essentially all of the poverty reduction of the past 30 years comes from one source, and one source only. China. Which industrialized by classic protectionist policies which the IMF, World Bank and poverty ghouls do their best to make impossible.

And as for China, what is also clear from their experience, and in the data, is that the Chinese who moved to the cities to get those great new jobs are less happy than the people who stayed in the villages. Further, great amounts of force have had to be used to move peasants off the land, because they know the new factory jobs suck even worse than being a peasant. (As they did in Britain during the Industrial revolution.)

What made some parts of the world better wasn’t capitalism, per se. It was steam power and oil power. Those parts of the world then used that power, along with gunpowder and whatnot, to conquer most of the world and take what they wanted.

Today we do it different ways, but the bottom line is simple enough: measured by any semi-reasonable standard (would you want to try to live on $7.40 a day, including paying your rent?), poverty is not getting better. It is getting worse.

If you say poverty is decreasing, what you are saying is “it is ok to keep doing what we’re doing.”

If you’re wrong, you’re a monster, because you’re saying “we don’t really need to do more.”

And you’re wrong.


The results of the work I do, like this article, are free, but food isn’t, so if you value my work, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

The Destruction of the Third World

The first thing to understand is this: 3rd world GDP growth in the post-war liberal period (roughly 46-68 or so), was good.  It was above population growth in most cases.  That changed around about the time OPEC grabbed the West by short and curlies, squeezed and wound up with tons of money they didn’t know what to do with.  This is an act in three parts:

ACT 1: Banks Loan Money to Third World Countries

Lots and lots of it. The pitch is this: we know how to develop countries. You’ll borrow this money, invest in development and have more than enough money to pay off the loans. Except that they didn’t know how to develop countries and even those countries in which the leaders didn’t steal the money, the loans grew faster than the tax base, leaving governments less and less able to administer their own countries.

ACT II: Money, Money, Money and Cash Crops

So, you need $.  Foreign dollars.  How do you get them?  You could do what Japan, Korea, the United States and Britain all did, and develop real industry behind trade barriers, of course, but that’s not what the experts are telling you to do.  What they’re saying is “you have a competitive advantage in certain commodities: cash crops and maybe minerals. You should work on that.”

Most cash crops are best grown on plantations, so if you want to move your economy to cash crops, you have to move the subsistence farmers off their land.  That means they will go to the cities and need food that you no longer grow (since you’re growing cash crops to sell to Westerners.)  But hey, that’s ok, because with all the foreign currency you’ll be getting from bananas, coffee and so on, you’ll be able to buy that food from Europe and America and Canada.  Right?  Right!


(I am fundraising to determine how much I’ll write this year. If you value my writing, and want more of it, please consider donating.)


Except that everyone is getting this advice, and everyone is growing more cash crops, and the price drops through the floor and you have a thirty year commodities depression.  You can’t feed the people you’ve shoved off the land without taking more loans; there are no jobs for those people, so now instead of self-supporting peasants you’ve got a huge amount of people in slums.  But, on the bright side, while not enough hard currency has been created to develop, or even stay ahead of your loans, enough exists so that the leaders can get rich; the West can sell grain to you; and you can buy overpriced military gear from the West.  Win!  For everyone except about 90% of your population.

ACT III: The IMF

The above was standard IMF and World Bank advice, of course.  Don’t let anyone tell you that the World Bank or IMF want a country to develop; their actions say otherwise.  What they do need to do is push neo-liberal doctrine.  So, now that your country is vastly in debt and can’t feed itself without foreign food which must be bought in hard currency, the IMF says “well, we could give you more money, BUT”.

The but is that they want you to stop subsidies of food and let food prices float.  Then they want you to reduce tariffs on goods, even though tariffs are a huge source of tax revenue, because your government is crippled and your people have tiny incomes, so you really don’t have the ability to tax them.  Then they want you to open up your economy to foreigners buying it up, so foreigners can own every part of your economy worth having (anything that generates hard currency, basically.)

FINIS

After all this your country is a basket case.

Win, Win, Lose.

(This was the great commodities depression. It ends about 1998, but the vast debt overhang remains in most cases.)

Originally published October 10, 2014. I can’t write this any more succinctly than this.


If you enjoyed this article, and want me to write more, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

Review: Cities and the Wealth of Nations by Jane Jacobs

Jane Jacobs came to prominence with the publication of The Death and Life of Great American Cities, which examined what made cities succeed and fail in extremely minute detail–such as how pedestrians walk on sidewalks and what makes parks safe. It’s a brilliant book, and reshaped urban planning, but I’ve always found her economic duology, The Economy of Cities and this book more useful to my interests.

Cities and the Wealth of Nations was published in 1984, and starts with the observation, and case, that the economy of much of the world seemed to have gone off track in a semi-permanent fashion: Something had changed from the post-WWII economy, something which downshifted the economy.

When I first read this book, around 1990, I didn’t think much of that position, but I now know it’s true: Between 1968 and 1980 a vast variety of economic and social metrics all shifted to new tracks; bad tracks. From inequality to wage growth to productivity to growth in the third world, it all went bad.

Jacobs thinks that the way we analyze economies is wrong from the bottom up. Nations, to Jacobs, make no sense as economic units. Canada and Singapore and Britain have almost nothing in common except the fact that they are sovereign units.

To Jacobs, as one would expect, cities are the fundamental economic unit. It is in cities that new work, new industries, are created. It is cities which generate economic forces, forces which affect non-city regions unevenly.

When you lump cities together with non city regions, economics gets ugly. Part of this is feedback: Because cities are the fundamental economic units, when they grow, they should receive the feedback of imported items growing cheaper; and when they are stagnant or shrinking, imported items should become more expensive.

Put simply, cities should have their own currencies, but don’t. They are lumped together with other cities and with non-city regions, and the import/export effects of those regions swamp what each city needs.

In sovereign areas, with multiple economically active cities, this tends to crush all cities but one: You can see this most clearly in England, which used to have many economically active cities and which, as of Jacobs’ writing, was down to two: Birmingham and London.

London, basically, drove the value of the pound. This was inappropriate to the needs of other cities and strangled them, turning them economically inert: They were cities only in the sense of their populations, they were not economically viable cities where large amounts of new work was still generated.

Large hinterland regions do the same thing: If you have a lot of agriculture or a lot of mineral resources or anything else from your hinterlands, the exchange rate will tend to be propped higher than the city(s) need, again strangling growth.

Workarounds for this are always inefficient. You can do what the US did in the 19th century and have tariffs, but that hurts agricultural and resource regions–they simply aren’t receiving what they should from their labour, and is doesn’t eliminate the multiple cities problem.

So, ideally, cities should have their own currencies, and so should non-city regions, so that everyone is getting the feedback they require (steps must also be taken to ensure that currency rates are driven almost entirely by export/import, and not by speculation or by central bank/government manipulation).

This is hard to do in the real world, for obvious reasons, but I agree with Jacobs we should find a way to do it.

Jacobs also spends a lot of time detailing how cities influence non-city regions; almost always in ways that deform the non-city regions and often harmfully.

The first of these influences are supply regions, which produce something cities want. In the modern era, the foremost of these might be Saudi Arabia: It’s rich, because it has oil, but with almost nothing else it is doomed to poverty once oil is no longer important. Economically productive cities want the oil and want nothing else Saudi Arabia produces. When those cities stop wanting that oil (or enough of it), doom will fall. (Jacob uses the example of Uruguay, which was once very prosperous, but never had economically active cities.)

The second influence is regions workers abandon–a place where everyone leaves to go to cities, because there is no work in the region. Examples are distressingly common, and all the screams in the US about immigrants are essentially about such regions in Mexico and further south–places where people can’t make a living, and have to leave.

A variation on this is clearances. New technology displaces workers out of regions. The classic case was peasants forced off their land in Britain, so landowners could enclose the land and grow crops or tend sheep for more money. But this happens all the time in the third world, where subsistence workers are forced off the land for plantations, and is a regular occurance today in China, where people are cleared out of a place so that suburbs or mines or whatnot can be built.

The next type is capital for regions without cities. Jacobs uses the example of the Volta dam in Ghana. It has a huge hydroelectric power supply, but there’s no real value to it, because there is no industry to take advantage of it. All the while, the dam itself destroys local agriculture, hunting, and fishing. Large amounts of money also often go into picturesque regions used for vacations, driving out most of the people who were there before the money arrived, distorting their economy.

Then there are places that were once cities; economically productive, which lose their productivity. Jacobs gives ancient Egypt as an example: the heart of a technologically sophisticated civilization, eventually reduced to mostly subsistence agriculture and no longer one of the beating hearts of the ancient world. A better example, I think, is Europe in the Dark Ages. When the Arabs cut off trade, Europe swiftly became a backwater hole, losing almost all of its advanced cities and spending centuries sinking into poverty before it started growing and advancing again the Middle Ages.

Economically active cities, in short, are powerful, and they often do nasty things to regions that are not cities. Even when what they do seems good, as with demand for oil, or Uruguay’s produce and minerals, it is a boon that can disappear at any time.

Jacobs points out one other thing of note: Backwards cities are best off trading with each other, rather than with the more advanced cities. This was, by the way, a more prevalent pattern in the post-war period before neoliberalism, and in that period growth was faster. The argument is simple enough: Advanced cities often don’t need the goods produced by backwards cities, but other backwards cities do.

Overall, this is an important book. One of the most important I’ve ever read. The point about broken feedback and economic units not making sense is absolutely fundamental and explains a simple fact: City states which can manage to survive the political-military environment, almost always do very well. The ideal economic circumstance is a world of city states, but we don’t have that due to military political reasons (they can’t defend themselves).

That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t figure out a way to get the results of city states while allowing for defense.

To me, then, it’s a must-read book, and perhaps Jacobs’ most important.


The results of the work I do, like this article, are free, but food isn’t, so if you value my work, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

A Quick Note on Venezuela

The common cry in right-wing circles to anyone who suggests anything resembling socialism is: “It failed in Venezuela.”

What failed in Venezuela was being a petro-economy, not diversifying the economy. Chavez spread money around, but was never able to get off oil.

When you combine that with US hostility, which included sanctions and robust support for opposition groups, along with the world system’s basic set up at this time (which is meant to make it impossible for countries to be able to meet their own needs), you have Venezuela’s downfall.

None of this is hard to predict. Back in 2004 or so, on the late BOP news, I wrote an article criticizing how Chavez was running the economy, very specifically on these exact points.

Socialism works when it is done correctly, just as capitalism does. Back in the 30s, if you were a capitalist, every time you tried to argue in it’s favor, I’m sure someone would say, “What about the Great Depression?”

It is also, again, hard to run a socialist economy in this world economy, because the world’s super power and most of the great powers will be hostile. If socialism is seen to work, after all, it could threaten the wealth and power of those who run capitalist countries.

I favor a mixed economy, with some role for the free market. But Venezuela’s problems prove nothing except that resource economies are vulnerable and that the world system and its super powers are hostile to socialists.

(See also: 7 Rules For Running A Left Wing Government.)


The results of the work I do, like this article, are free, but food isn’t, so if you value my work, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

Brazil’s Economic Tumble

No surprise, but…

Brazil’s economy has fallen further into its worst ever recession, contracting by 3.6 percent in 2016…

…Brazil’s economy is now eight percent smaller than it was in December 2014.

Recently, there was a legislative coup in Brazil, but that was a symptom, not a cause, as are Venezuela’s problems, the electoral reversal in Argentina, and so on.

All that is required to understand what is happening is this chart of commodity prices.

 Bloomberg 5 years commodity index March 8 2017


Bloomberg 5 years commodity index March 8 2017

We have a very foolish economy. The developed world has been in austerity since 2008, China does not have a rich enough middle class to take up demand. Without demand for goods and services in the developed world, commodity prices have crashed.

Our lords and masters don’t want growth they can’t capture, and they value low wages and debt-slavery more than they do a thriving economy. As a result, the economies which prospered by supplying commodities to China and other manufacturers have stumbled and crashed out. This simple fact is behind many headlines which seem unrelated to it, including virtually every change of government in South America.

A globalized economy is moronic. It makes countries dependent on policies over which they have no control. There is virtually nothing that Brazil’s government can do about this (though engaging in austerity of their own is stupid); nor was there a damn thing Venezuela could do about it (though, yes, the Bolivarian economy was mismanaged, something I said as far back as 2004).

This is by design. Our elites don’t want national elites to be able to make policy. As a result, there are only two nations which approach full sovereignty in the world: the United States and China. Only they are powerful enough and rich enough to make unilateral moves without suffering vast consequences (and maybe not even them). The EU could almost be sovereign, if it wasn’t run by ideological morons, but it isn’t, and Russia has enough resources and military power to have some sovereignty, and that’s basically it.

And so, the Brazilians will suffer what they must, because however large and rich they think they are, they are still a non-sovereign state in the ways that matter in our world.


The results of the work I do, like this article, are free, but food isn’t, so if you value my work, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

Saudi Arabian Debt Will Not Be Among Safest in World

Saudi Arabia is issuing 5, 10 and 30 year bonds.

The debt will be among the most secure in the world given the country’s strong balance sheet, net foreign assets, and ~$13 trillion worth of proven oil reserves.

On Wednesday, Saudi Arabia is set to issue its first wave of sovereign debt to foreign investors. The measure, first announced last November, is being offered in response to a historically severe compression and enduring slump in oil prices that has squeezed the nation’s fiscal budget. Accessing the debt markets can help mitigate short-term fiscal pressure and provide financing during a necessary bridge period to a more diversified economy.

Well, the five and ten years are safe enough.

Saudi Arabia’s problems are both inevitable, and caused by the new generation of leadership’s stupidity. Remember, Saudi Arabia, seeking to destroy the US fracking industry, is the one who broke the back of oil prices in the first place.

That said, the prices had nowhere to go but down anyway. The world is in a wave of austerity and options which avoid the use of oil are coming online. Somewhere in the early 2020s, electrical cars will be as cheap as gasoline cars.

Game over.

As for the bonds, Saudi Arabia isn’t going to “bridge to a more diversified economy.” Not going to happen. They simply import too much, and do not have enough domestic producers capable of replacing imports and creating new work. Nor are those conditions easy for them to create when their currency value is almost entirely based on vast volumes of resources, which means it isn’t providing the necessary feedback (low, low) to make production in the country viable.

Saudi Arabians have a joke: “My grandfather rode a camel, I drive a Mercedes. My grandson will ride a camel.”

Correct, in essence.

On the bright side, once they’re broke, the money flooding out to promote their particular take on Islam will subside to a dribble.

I expect economic collapse and civil war in Saudi Arabia. Within 20 years.


If you enjoyed this article, and want me to write more, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

 

The Venezuela edition of “imports will kill’ya”

So, the New York Times has an article on how Venezuelan stores are running out of basic goods, because they import so much, and with the drop in oil prices, they don’t have enough hard currency to buy what they need.

Repeat after me for the 100th time, “all resource booms end.”

All of them.  Always.  Gold, oil, rubber: it always ends.  Period.  The question is only when.

Back around 2004, myself and Stirling pointed on the late (and defunct) BOP News that Chavez was screwing up his revolution.  That’s not a way of saying I disapprove of his goals, I very much agree with what he was doing in general terms. But in specific, he was not making his country independent of high oil prices.

What a country needs it must either be able to produce, or have product it knows it can sell to someone who can produce what it needs, and who is a reliable partner. (No Western country is a reliable partner to an actual left wing revolutionary government.)

Period.

If you do not, things may go well for a long time, but you are ALWAYS vulnerable to the hegemonic economic state and its allies.  Right now that’s the West.  For a long time, if the West were jerks to you, you could run to the USSR, but right now there is no complete replacement, though China, as leader of the BRICS, is coming on strong.

Note that when the USSR fell, Russian support for Cuba almost entirely went away.

It was a huge shock, but Cuba survived it.

Chavez was a great friend of Castro’s, but he did not learn from Castro.  He did not figure out how his country could survive being cut off from what amounted to essentially it’s only source of support (in his case, oil sales).

Now Venezuelans pay the price.

Learn the lesson.


If you enjoyed this article, and want me to write more, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

Japanification and the end of the American Dream

Stirling Newberry and I have been writing about Japanafication for years—on blogs, at least since 2004.

Those of us who are old enough remember when Japan was THE miracle economy.  Technologically advanced, vibrant and rich.  It was eating America’s lunch, and most other countries.  For peak alarmism at this fact in a fictional form, read Michael Chrichton’s Rising Sun.

Tokyo real estate was worth more than the entire world’s real estate combined.

Then the bubble crashed.  Japanese policy was to protect the banks, and to bury the bad loans on the books.  They undertook literally decades of stimulative policy, mostly pouring useless concrete (exactly the wrong thing to do unless your country really lacks that sort of infrastructure, which Japan did not.)

To put in terms familiar to my readers, they extended and pretended.

Japan went into semi-permanent stagnation.

We have, now, the news of a quarter drop in GDP of 6.8% annualized for the last quarter.  (This is blamed on increased sales taxes, but it was coming anyway.)

The long stagnation is over (it’s been over for a bit).  Japan is actually in decline.

This is important because Japanification was always the plan for the US after the bubbles: extend and pretend, stagnate wages and employment.  Pretend.

But there were significant differences between the two countries.  Japan started with massive savings and a huge trade surplus.  It is now in trade deficit and savings compared to debt are way down.  Economic equality was relatively high, as well, spreading demand.

America came out of the financial crisis with a trade deficit, a pathetic savings rate and massive inequality.  This is why I predicted that Japanification would not work in the US.  It could not, because there was no saved fat to be used to create the long bright depression the Japanese had.

This brings us to stimulus and development (not just for developing countries).  The money must be used not for pork projects with no follow on, but to create new industries or to bring money off the sides into the economy.  Pouring concrete (and not even bothering to shore up nuclear reactors in areas which were not electorally viable) was pointless in Japan.  Buying bonds is pointless and even harmful.

Likewise you cannot have real open trade flows and expect to keep whatever you are building.  You build it, you make it work and once an industry is systemized, it can be moved to a low cost domiciale. It takes deliberate government policy to prevent that.

Monetary policy in Japan could never work, because the money went to the wrong things, and much of it immediately decamped overseas in the so-called carry trade—borrow low in Japan, buy securities somewhere else where they had a higher return.

All of this should be obvious and uncontroversial. It is not, it flies directly in the face of modern neo-liberal theory and it is that theory, in the face of decades of failure, that the Japanese followed.

The human capacity for ideologically driven stupidity and atrocity is endless. (Those who do not believed me are invited to study Church history and its effect on society from 1000 AD to 1900 AD or so.)  People will ignore the evidence in front of their eyes, years of failure and continue doing the “safe”, “orthodox” thing no matter what the results.  This is true even for well-meaning people.

Of course, in the US, Japanification has a US twist: it massively increases the wealth of the already wealthy, through unconventional monetary policy.  American leaders are far too greedy to make Japanification work: any surplus, or room to lend, or room to print money, must be given away to rich people as quickly as possible.

I point out, finally, that the first sin in Japanification was buying the bad loans.  This was a huge mistake in the US too, bailing out the banks and not forcing them and their share and bondholders to take their losses was the main mistake of the financial crisis.  Yes, things might have been worse if the US had done so (though steps mitigating the hit on the regular economy would have been easy enough to take with the 4 TRILLION dollars used bailing out rich people), but even so, the US would have recovered better afterwards.

Instead the US has an economy in which 90% of the population has seen an actual decrease in income and wealth, while 10% has seen an increase: with the 1% and the .1% and the .01% benefiting most of all.

Japanification was the plan for America. It isn’t working, it could never work, but the policies in place are nonetheless doing what is most important to their architects: they are making the rich richer, and everyone else poorer and doing it quickly.

The Bush years were the long suck.  This is the deep dive, and remember, the US isn’t in recession yet (though it is in depression).  The pain when it happens (and absent nuclear war, there is always another recession), will be unbelievable.


If you enjoyed this article, and want me to write more, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.

 

Page 3 of 4

Powered by WordPress & Theme by Anders Norén