The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Author: Ian Welsh Page 28 of 411

Dollar Hegemony Decline Watch

So, nice little chart here:

Seems… bad. At least for America and Europe.

Let’s lay this out:

  1. Most of what you want to buy you can buy from China, you don’t need to get it from the West, so why use dollars?
  2. China almost never uses sanctions or seizes foreign currency. The US often does. US dollars are risky, the right to use them can and is often taken away, and so often are the dollars themselves.

So why use the dollar, except that it’s still easier in some cases?

What happens when it’s no longer easier? The BRICS are spending a lot of time on an international banking system which bypasses the West and it’s allies (Japan and South Korea, basically). As that system becomes easier to use, why use the Western system or the dollar? It only exposes you to risk.

This is similar to what happened after the Huawei sanctions. Chinese firms saw the damage that was done to Huawei (they’ve roared back, but it was touch and go for a couple years.) The cry in Chinese business was “delete America.” If you bought anything important from the US you needed to find another source outside of the West, which for manufactured goods usually meant domestically, and for resources meant Africa, South America and Russia.

For a long time the way the banking system was set up you had to use the dollar, but more and more you don’t. And for a long time some key providers, like oil producers, would only take dollars, but now they’ll take Yuan.

So, again, why use the dollar when there is a safer alternative which can be used to buy or sell almost anything you want?


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The Necessity Of Surplus For Tech Innovation

by Bruce Wilder

(Ian–this is an elevated comment from my post on Breakout Societal Power. It fills in much of the gap elided to in this phrase “Small groups in competition have the chance, though not the certainty, of fast progress, stuck as they are in a cauldron. It doesn’t always happen…” but does so better than I would have. It’s not just about why some societies in sharp competition don’t make it, however.)

There is an underlying dynamic of solidarity and surplus that seldom gets the attention it deserves.

Ancient Greece at the end of the of the Bronze Age participated in the famous but mysterious collapse and entered a Dark Age of significantly diminished population, political organization and culture. They emerged beginning around 800 BCE, apparently with a new set of technologies, politics and agriculture and trade that generated surplus. People were healthy and well-fed (comparatively). Greece experienced a population boom, increasing in numbers roughly ten times over 400 years and a critical part of the competition among city-states was to found colonies. It wasn’t just Greece, Phoenicia and the Etruscans and others were involved.

Technological innovation is not a merely moral phenomenon; it is a matters of surplus and numbers. There must be a surplus to feed an artisan class and trade and a differentiation of labor.

The surplus that fed the urban civilization that Rome engineered diminished with soil erosion. The extraction of the tradeable surplus from a slave class on the great latifundia was inefficient and self-defeating on many levels, undermining the economic foundation of an urban civilization. People at the bottom of the system were unhealthy. Famines and plagues ensued. Trade declined with falling division of labor in a dimishing artisanal class, compounding the effects of declining agricultural surplus.

The rise of China followed on the creation of enormous agricultural surplus to feed vast armies and an urban civilization with a huge artisanal population, with trade driving deep division of labor and technological inventiveness. The surplus originated in vast hydraulic projects and the elaboration three-crop rice production.

There would be no social barrier in China to ever more labor intensive agriculture: more and more hands in the fields until the extraction of surplus was choked off by congestion losses. By 1500, Chinese peasants could barely feed themselves. Ordinary people were physically weak. The cities were huge, but represented only single-digit percentages of total population.

Europe recovering from the Dark Ages that followed the collapse of Rome saw a revival of surplus, especially after iron plows turned the heavy but fertile soils of Northern Europe and dug deeper in the south. But, the congestion losses of too many hands in the fields showed quickly too and the flowering of the High Middle Ages ended in overpopulation and the Black Death, which was driven as much by imminent famine as rats and fleas.

The contrasting aftermaths of the Plague of Justinian and the Black Death — two, long series of bubonic plagues sweeping thru Europe is worth contemplating. One destroyed a civilization and the other seemed to spark a new civilization.

Agricultural surplus feeding a growth of artisanal production and merchant trade, but being choked off by congestion and extractive oppression is a recurrent dynamic. It underlies the peculiar history of rivalry between England and France. France, with the greatest agricultural potential in western Europe, occupying an extensive well-watered plain, had a vastly greater population than England thruout the Middle Ages and well into the 19th century. But, France became overpopulated. Famine and hunger drove the French Revolution when bad weather triggered bad harvests that threatened the surplus that fed Paris.

England’s ability to feed its industrializing cities was a near-run thing in the 18th and 19th centuries. The additional surplus generated by the British Agricultural Revolution was a paltry thing and Ireland was kept on the edge of famine by overpopulation until pushed over the edge.

The productive often desperate competition that Ian draws attention to has a multi-path causal relation to the generation and/or extraction of surplus. That surplus may originate in accidents, be managed or neglected by elites and be extinguished without intention.

The Conditions For Breakthrough Societal Power

Societies become breakthrough powerful under fairly specific historical conditions.

Competition in a concentrated area.

This covers most breakthrough shifts. Let’s give some examples.

Europe

A large number of kingdoms and republics, in constant competition. If you didn’t advance militarily, culturally (administration and culture matter) and technologically, you were in trouble. As administration improved and military technology changed to favor “despotic kings” like Louis XIV and Henry the VIIth (a very underrated King), decentralized and smaller power, internal (nobles) and external were brought under control. Constant warfare and other forms of competition lead to rapid advancement.

Fail, and you could fall. If the English hadn’t defeated the Spanish armada, well, that would have been the end of an independent England. Many other principalities did fall.

In addition, there was external pressure, from the more advanced, at least initially, Ottomans, whom the Europeans were terrified of. The Ottoman threat was real, and a few key battles and wars could have swung the other way, and Eastern Europe fallen under Ottoman control.

With no central control of the entirety of Europe, people could move easily, and find a place where whatever new thing they wanted to try was allowed.

The end result was a huge increase in technology, administrative control allowing more and more resources to be brought under central control, and swift advancement in the military. Even before the industrial revolution Europeans wound up conquering a vast chunk of the world, one they had industrialized, the world was at their feet, and they wound up in control of about three-quarters of it, with the rest terrified and compliant. (This is the case with China: never actually conquered, but under the thumb, though they did fight as best they could, they were defeated.)

Ancient Greece, then Rome

Greek city states were in ferocious competition with each other. Militarily, culturally and even technologically. The Greeks were far more advanced than the Romans. If you lost, terrible things could happen, like the destruction of your entire city and the enslavement of every survivor.

The Greeks were also under threat by a great neighbouring power: Persia, and the wars against Persia, were, again, close run. They could have gone the other way. By the time of of the Ten Thousand, when Greek mercenaries who had fought for the losing side in a Persian civil were were able to march across much of a hostile Persian empire, crushing all in their way, it was clear to the Greeks that Persia was ripe—their armies were vastly larger, but the Greek way of war was vastly superior.

Greece itself was conquered by Macedonia, which was essentially Greek, but still somewhat Barbarian, then Macedonia, under Alexander, conquered Persia and Egypt. The Persians, even if their leadership hadn’t been cowardly, never stood a chance. Then the Greeks ruled the Eastern Med and the Near East until the Romans. After Alexander, however, they didn’t expand much. The successor states were not dynamic.

Rome was also in savage  competition. Against the Greeks, the other Italian tribes, the Celtic tribes and Carthage. They were almost always at war, and they learned well. Eventually they were able to conquer Greece, Span, most of what is now France, and Egypt, though they never had much luck against most of what had been the Persian Empire.  Once the Republic fell, Rome didn’t spread much. The occasional Emperor would conquer some land, but they could rarely hold it. The dynamism of the Republic, and the pressure required for advancement no longer existed. Indeed, as time went by the Romans lost a fair bit of their technology, as well. The big single Empire was not dynamic.

The Mongols

Before Temujin the Mongols and the other steppe nomads near China were in constant competition against each other, and were also constantly subject to manipulation and war from China, which sought to keep them down, fearing (quite rightly) that they would invade. Most of Temujin’s life was spent conquering and unifying the steppe nomads, then changing their culture to be more disciplined and usefully warlike. The steppe nomads had always been fearsome, but Temujin changed how they fought: ordering them in groups of 10, 100, 1,000 and 10,000 and enforcing amazing levels of discipline. The Mongols were not just disciplined in battle, strategically they moved faster than any other military of the time and were able to pull off amazing coordination. Columns of troops would meet hundreds of miles away, on the exact day planned.

Though horse archers are always dangerous, it was Genghis Khan’s unification PLUS his changes to society and military organization which turned them into a terror so great that they were not defeated for over a hundred years. In their time, they were just as dominant as the Europeans in the late 19th century.

There are other examples: the Zulus, who had the bad luck to run into the British at the height of their power are one. Warring States China is another. Ancient India around the time of the Buddha is a third. The Sengoku period of Japan is a fourth, and once Tokugawa took power, Japan, in many ways stagnated. (During the Sengoku period, the Japanese had more firearms than anywhere else.)

Concluding

Large empires are stagnant. There may be some advancement, though often there is none or even retrogression, but they don’t make breakthroughs into revolutionary power. At best they inherit it.

Small groups in competition have the chance, though not the certainty, of fast progress, stuck as they are in a cauldron. It doesn’t always happen: the tribes of New Guinea were caught in zero, indeed, often negative sum competition and remained backwards.

But the general rule of breakout power is small states in serious competition, usually with an outside threat.


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Has Communism Happened Yet?

Marx was probably the most important intellectual of the 19th century, based on impact, but it’s generally believed he was wrong about his major predictions, and thus his theories are largely garbage. I have some sympathy for this view, but let’s look at the counter-argument.

Marx said that Communism would develop from industrial nations, with the proletariat, finally realizing they were producing all the value, taking control. What happened instead is that the two major “communist” revolutions happened in agrarian societies: Russia and China, and while China’s hard communist period (pre-Deng) advanced China significantly, they didn’t become a massive surplus society until market reform took place.

If you call a dog a duck, it’s still a dog.

The correct response is simply that they weren’t Communist nations: they called themselves that, and China still does, but that’s ridiculous. They couldn’t be, because the proletariat wasn’t in charge. (One might make an argument that it was, briefly, in Russia, but if so it didn’t last.) The proletariat couldn’t be in charge, in agrarian societies they hardly exist.

Central to Marx’s argument is that over time the global rate of profit under capitalism will fall. That argument has been dismissed, but there’s a good case that it is, it’s just taking quite a while. Michael Roberts makes the case, and I’ve included some of the key graphs below.

Global Rate of Profit:

x

US profit rate.

Now it’s fair to say that technical arguments can be made against these charts, but they support the general idea of lower profit over time. The crisis of capitalism is expected to occur when surplus produced by the system falls to catastrophic levels.

Again, I could argue against this, but the simplest argument is that Marx didn’t foresee climate change and ecological collapse and they’re going to hit first.

Arguing that communism hasn’t failed because those who claimed to be communist does smack a little of neoliberals and other ideologues screaming that their system has never really been implemented, so their ideas are still fine, but Marx was clear about the process of how Communism would occur and it didn’t include revolutions in agricultural states. By Marx’s dialectic, that wasn’t possible: you have to go through capitalism first.

I don’t, personally, expect real communism to happen any time soon. Even if Marx was right, the timer is running out. Perhaps in collapse, workers will, indeed, unite and take over. The problem is primarily what Marxists call “class consciousness”: the realization of shared interests and that the people running the system are both evil and stupid—they produce terrible results, over and over again. They are sociopath & psychopaths or people who might as well be, because the decisions they make are psychopathic.

They aren’t needed. Oh, the scientists and engineers are, certainly, but the capitalists? No. We just need another system of allocating capital which doesn’t make it accumulate in the hands of the worst people.

If that happens, we’ll have something better, whether or not it’s communism.


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The “China Cycle” Is Mostly A Thing Of the Past

So, this was true once:

The Chinese learned a lot from Western Joint Ventures, and I remember talking to a consultant back in the early 2000’s about tech transfer. He said it was very clear: you got into the Chinese market and/or used their lower cost production and what they got in exchange was tech transfer. This isn’t some evil conspiracy, back in the 80s when the US fell behind on cars they basically forced Japanese car companies to set up factories in the US, and yeah, there was transfer of knowledge to American companies.

Now, for the West, what Western companies and the West in general got in return for their tech was not worth the cost: it was stupid and short-sighted, but companies were lining up to do it and economists and business gurus and politicians in the West were for it: the only thing that mattered was making more short to mid-term profits and all sorts of nonsense about it not mattering where goods were produced was espoused by very important intellectuals and officials. There was no attention to the long term cost in terms of loss of technological lead and moving the industrial base to China. I know: I was one of the voices warning, publicly, to stop taking short term profits by selling China our future.

But at this point it’s no longer accurate. Chinese car companies are more advanced than Tesla: they have better batteries, better HUDS, better auto-pilots and they also have faster product cycles.

Again, in most fields the Chinese are now more advanced than the West: the remains are important but in a minority—things like lithography and aerospace, but they’ll catch up in both in time and for Aerospace I’d already buy a jet-liner from China before Boeing, and Boeing’s problems have nothing to do with China. Airbus is still clearly better, but it won’t be in twenty years, and possibly not even in ten.

The West was 100% complicit in the “China Cycle”, but that cycle is almost entirely over and China is now just straight up more advanced and out-competing us.

The West made this choice. We could have maintained our tech lead for another fifty years or so if we wanted to and followed the necessary policies. We didn’t, and to expect China to not use the same methods every other major country used to industrialize is insane. Every accusation made in the “China Cycle” is something the US did to Britain back in the 19th century.

Perhaps China could have industrialized without it being disastrous for the West, but not under any sort of laissez-faire or neoliberal international trade regime.

If you’re young, learn Mandarin. Maybe even if you’re not young.


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Open Thread

Use to discuss topics unrelated to recent posts.

Pharma Charges 80K to cure Hepatitis C. The Manufacturing Cost is $78

Yeah.

Unlike many other drugs that treat viruses, Sovaldi does not suppress hepatitis C, a virus that kills roughly 250,000 people around the world each year. It cures it.

“Normally you have a virus, and your body fights it off or your body fights it to a standstill and you just have it forever, basically, and hope it remains dormant more or less,” Laufer said. “The holy grail for every virologist is to find a way to drain the viral reservoir, and Sovaldi does this. You take one pill of Sovaldi a day for 12 weeks and then you don’t have hepatitis C anymore.”

The problem is that those pills are under patent, and they cost $1,000 per pill.

“Literally, if you have $84,000 then hepatitis C is not your problem anymore,” Laufer said. “But given that there are other methodologies for managing hepatitis C that are not curing it and that are cheaper, insurance typically will not cover [Sovaldi]. And so we’ve got this incredible technology and it’s sitting on the shelf except for people who are ridiculously wealthy.”

So Four Thieves Vinegar Collective set out to teach people how to make their own version of Sovaldi. Chemists at the collective thought the DIY version would cost about $300 for the entire course of medication, or about $3.57 per pill. But they were wrong.

“It’s actually just a little under $70 (83 cents per pill), which just kind of blew my mind when they finally showed me the results,” Laufer said. “I was like, can we do the math here again?”

So, the laws should be changed and every pharma exec, board members and so on who prices like this should be locked up for life.

Next, all laws need to be changed to end the doctrine that only profit maximization for shareholders matters.

Third, pharma needs to move a bounty system. According to WHO there are 58 million people with Hep C around the world. Put up a bounty of 1,000 times that: 58 billion, for a cure, minus the cost per cure. Research costs can also be added to the bounty, once the cure is certified, not before. A consortium of rich governments can create the bounty funds, with poorer countries allowed in for free. A UN org reporting only to the general assembly should probably administer it.

Fourth, end pharma patents. All of them. All information, including manufacturing information is shared.

Fifth: for all palliatives, profits must be capped at 5% max.

Sixth: move most research to government and non-profits. Real non-profits, none of the Chat-GPT nonsense.

Seventh: remove further monetary incentives to just research forever: everyone involved is capped at a salary of 2xmedian income in the G-20 or something similar. You want the big pay off? You have to actually cure the disease.

Eighth: Force scientists and technicians to be “in on the bounty.” Some sort of fairly even split between people who worked on the cure.

There are other actions which should be taken, but these are the basics. Right now we aren’t curing people we can, and companies prefer palliatives to cures because they can charge until the person dies. We need to emphasize cures and make sure no one gets rich selling palliatives.

In the meantime the right to make your own medicines needs to be 100% legal and supported.


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Why The Left Taking Over The Republican Party Is Even Harder Than Taking Over The Democratic Party

By Swamp Yankee

(Ian–this is another elevated comment. I thought (and think) it’s an excellent one, informed by life experience. In general the quality of comments lately has impressed me.)

For those advising an attempt to take over the Republican Party. I think candidly that that is even less likely than taking over the Democratic Party.

I live in, and am involved in local politics and environmental activism in, a region that, despite being in a very Blue State, is quite conservative, with some of the towns around here reliably voting for GOP candidates — in Massachusetts — at rates above 60 and 70% (other towns are more reliably Democratic, these differences are fascinating at a sociological level, and quite complicated).

I am in coalition with these conservatives on a critical important local issue where 90 percent of the populace agrees that a corporation is lawless and must be stopped. I grew up with some of them, and know them well, we are of the same small communities (this is also true of the liberals, the left, the non-engaged, the right-wing and left-wing online street fighters, many more — these are smaller towns for Massachusetts, with one exception).

Despite this coalition, or rather because of it, and dealing with them, I think it’s unlikely they are going to be a good candidate for entryism. For one thing, they are viscerally and often just off the wall in their hardcore anti-Communism and 1950s-era redbaiting.

The other thing is that they have as kind of their Ur-Principle the idea that Private Property Is Sacred (this is, as Ur-Principles so often are, is frequently and seemingly without dissonance contradicted by them in the actual practice of their lives). They do not distinguish between the person owning a small cottage and Elon Musk; for them, private property is private property.

A third factor is that fifty years of talk radio, cable news, and now Facebook and other social media have marinated them in a culture of querulous suspicion and anti-reason; they fall for just lunatic conspiracy stuff, and while some of them are just naturally intelligent enough that they fight through this and make real contributions to our local governments, it’s still their native idiom, if that makes sense (like, believing basically every election is stolen; despite the minimizing of certain interlocutors of Trump’s misdeeds, this is a real one, this baseless accusation of fraudulent or stolen elections — this is a corrosive rhetorical move, and one that makes the actual practical life of our bodies politic in the real world more difficult.
Nor is Russiagate apposite here; Russiagate was nonsense, but Hillary Clinton, of whom I am not a fan, did show up to Trump’s 2017 Inauguration; she did acknowledge the vote totals were correct, and that she legitimately lost in the electoral college; this is _categorically_ different than Trump’s conduct in 2020-21).

A fourth factor: they genuinely dislike Difference and a pluralistic and open society; many of them are openly bigoted towards LGBTQ people. We had a Klan presence here in southeastern Massachusetts into the 1950s, and that impulse didn’t just go away. Indeed, my own Town’s High School, from which I graduated 20+ years ago, had a significant problem with what can only be described as anti-Semitic and Nazi-sympathizing public behavior by the football team. We have the local evangelical holy rollers running for School Committee (in Plymouth, Mass.) talking about banning books, in just total disregard for the U.S. and Mass. Constitutions.

They are also obsessed with culture war nonsense. Just, like, obsessed.

The thing I should emphasize: the conservatives are often extremely intelligent, and will see any kind of entryist from a mile away. I should also note I actually quite like many of them at a personal level; I don’t think they are bad people (some are, but not most), just misguided and wrong on many issues (sometimes, they are right, and I take coalition with them where it presents itself; this is natural in the parliamentary environment of Town Meeting societies).

Finally, Republicans have their own Machine which is even worse than the Democratic Machine, which at least has to pretend to some notion of human well-being. The GOP Machine in my experience down here are connected to local business elites and are also canny, and just like, wildly amoral, and won’t give up the party without a fight.

So, taken together, and played out across the country, I think it will be extremely difficult to engage in any kind of Left entryist strategy in the Republican Party.

My own strategy is premised on local politics — I live in a directly democratic Town Meeting form of government, and if I want to write a statute for the Town, I can get myself and nine other inhabitants of the Town together and put it before the Annual Town Meeting. That’s a lot of power, so I exercise what power I am able to in order to advance the goals of the Commonwealth thought that guided the authors of the Massachusetts Constitution, and, at a larger level, the American Revolution.

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