The horizon is not so far as we can see, but as far as we can imagine

Tag: Treasury

Libby: Washington December 2006

She is slight and crisply gray suit clad, her hair pinned into a bun and her lip bitten. The office is large, with only one window letting in dusk’s strained light. Three walls are covered with maps and graphs, each pinned neatly in place. In one corner, a muted television changes channels each minute and the final wall is nothing but crisp LCD screens. Some display stock tickers, others charts, still others a blur of words or news tickers. The woman sits cross legged in her chair at the center of this, completely motionless. She is looking in the direction of a series of charts whose titles all relate to housing and credit risk derivatives, but her eyes are unfocused..

When the man says her name, “Libby”, she doesn’t so much as twitch until long seconds have gone by. Slowly, with a shift of her weight, she swivels the chair to face the silver haired man.

“John.”

He smiles faintly, “Libby.”

“Credit derivatives.”

He nods. “Offloading default risk from banks onto investors. The chairman says they make the market much… stronger.”

“Who’s buying these derivatives?”

“Hedge funds are big. Those boys need big profits. No one parks their money in a hedge fund to get mutual fund returns.”

“Lot of them are getting mutual fund returns.” She nods towards one of the charts.

“I’m guessing their risk profile isn’t the same as a mutual fund’s.” It’s not a question but Libby nods to another chart.

“Nope. Lots of refi exposure too. ‘Cause the risk of someone defaulting on a second mortgate is no big deal.” She gestures with her chin to a series of charts pinned to one wall and he turns to look at them.

“Time to sale of housing. Seems to be going up in a lot of markets.”

“When a market hits a sharp discontinuity who gets hurt worst, first?”

“People who expect it to continue trend.”

The silver haired man turns back to Libby. His voice is weary, “are we going to hit a discontinuity?”

“Ever blow bubbles as a kid?” One corner of her mouth tilts up. “Any of them ever not burst?”

John shakes his head, but says, “well, not that I know of. But maybe one’s still blowing on the wind somewhere.”

Libby raises a hand slowly, then purses her lips and blows. John turns to look in the direction off her breath, “still going”.

She shakes her head, then cracks her hands together. The two of them match gazes for a few seconds and the older man finally breaks the gaze to look at the monitor. With a stride he stands next to the slight woman, then crouches, his head level with hers. “Show me the numbers.” She swivels back to the monitor and as the last pale light of the sun dims he follows her flashing white hands in a darkness lit only by the light of her screens.


Note:

This is one of the John Q. Treasury series of short stories, the majority of which are no longer online.  There have been some requests to repost them, so here’s one of the last.  I’ll repost more as time goes by and perhaps write some new ones.  There’s certainly plenty of reason for John,  Libby and friends to return.  Unfortunately.

Market Rallies On News of Trillion Dollar Giveaway

Image by TW Collins

Image by TW Collins

Is anyone really surprised the DOW is up almost 500 points, after Geithner promised to give private investors almost $1 trillion to gamble with?

The details of the giveaway are fascinating.  I sure wish that I could get financing like this to play the market:

Under one part of the plan focused on bad loans, the Treasury will provide up to 80 percent of initial capital alongside investment by private funds. The FDIC would then offer debt financing for up to six times the pooled amount.

Now, unless I’m messing up my math, that’s 24/1 leverage.  If older details hold, and the 80% is a non-recourse loan, meaning that it’s secured only by the value of securities bought, then it’s even sweeter.

PIMCO has announced it’s interested in participating, which means that the plan has succeeded in one sense—it has the buy-in of some very smart money.  That doesn’t mean that it’s necessarily good for taxpayers, or that it will be good in the long term for the economy, necessarily, but at least it isn’t being laughed out of Dodge.  On the other hand, would you refuse 24/1 to one financing?  Or even matching funds, as contained in part two of the plan?

I sure wouldn’t.  And PIMCO have been scavengers before.  They bet heavily in Fannie and Freddie bonds after it was clear Fannie and Freddie were insolvent, which was a bet that the government wouldn’t shear bondholders when it bailed out Freddie and Fannie.  Smart bet, but not a good return for taxpayers, who would have been better served by letting Freddie and Fannie’s debtholders lose money.

I am becoming increasingly convinced that my original call was the right one: that the various bailouts would lead to Japanification.  For 20 years now, since its own bubble burst, Japan has had an economy which slips in and out of recessions like clockwork and which never ever really got good again.  In Japan’s case, the lousy economy was in large part because they left a lot of debt debt on the books of private corporations.  In America’s case, the debt may be transfered to taxpayers, but the end result is likely to be the same, only compounded by attempts to create secondary bubbles so that the toxic waste regains enough value to claim a win.

Given that Geithner’s trillion dollar giveaway has been greated ecstatically by the financial sector, I expect we’ll see more money used in this fashion.  This plan appears to be good for about $2 trillion of lousy debt ($1 trillion from the matching 1/1 program, $1 trillion from the high leveraged portion).  Total current toxic waste on the banks books is probably about $4 trillion, which will still have to be dealt with.

That money will have to be paid off, eventually.  Doing so will cost the US  and the world a great deal of future growth, and individuals a great deal of future income and employment.  As things stand right now, I don’t think employment levels as measured by employment/population ratios will recover in the forseeable future—post recession “full” employment will just be lower than pre-recession “full” employment.  There are still some ways this could be made to work for everyone, and I’ll discuss those at a later date.

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