The details of the Syriza request to the Troika are here, for those who want to read the actual list. The public statement is here.

The best analysis I’ve read of the deal, as compared to Syriza promises, is by Stathis Kouvelakis, in the Jacobin Magazine.

Kouvelakis makes the case, convincingly to me, that Syriza caved, and got virtually nothing of what it wanted.  Here is a summary of what Syriza wanted:

Not consenting to any supervisory or assessment procedures, it requested a four-month transitional “bridge program,” without austerity measures, to secure liquidity and implement at least part of its program within balanced budgets. It also asked that lenders recognize the non-viability of the debt and the need for an immediate new round of across-the-board negotiations.

But the final agreement amounts to a point-by-point rejection of all these demands.

…..

In the Eurogroup’s Friday statement, the existing program is referred to as an “arrangement,” but this changes absolutely nothing essential. The “extension” that the Greek side is now requesting (under the “Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement”) is to be enacted “in the framework of the existing arrangement” and aims at “successful completion of the review on the basis of the conditions in the current arrangement.”

Kouvelakis goes through the agreement point by point, and backs up his argument.  You should read the entire piece.  More important than proving the obvious (that Syriza got virtually nothing) is why.

The question that emerges, of course, is how we landed in this quandary. How is it possible that, only a few weeks after the historic result of January 25, we have this countermanding of the popular mandate for the overthrow of the memorandum?

The answer is simple: what collapsed in the last two weeks is a specific strategic option that has underlaid the entire approach of SYRIZA, particularly after 2012: the strategy that excluded “unilateral moves” such as suspension of payments…

Kouvelakis calls part of this the “good euro” strategy—the supposition that anyone in power in the Euro area wanted Syriza and Greece to get real debt relief and exist austerity.  This, as I have argued in the past, is delusion:

The key here is psychological. Greeks need to admit that their fellow Europeans do not care how badly they suffer; need to acknowledge that they are not seen as Europeans by their fellow Europeans, and need to look East and South for their survival and future prosperity.

Until Greeks get through their heads, and hearts, that the other European countries are not their friends, they will continue to suffer.

Unilateral is the key word.  Greece cannot depend on any other nation in Europe to look after its interests, let alone Germany (the very idea that the German government cares one whit how much Greeks suffer is so laughable as to move beyond fantasy into insanity).

Greece must do what it can it unilaterally.  This doesn’t mean no negotiation, but that negotiation will not be with Europe or Germany or the ECB, it will be with other countries who need what Greece has to offer enough to make a deal.

Read the Jacobin article.  And understand what just happened, because as Kouvelakis notes the only thing worse than defeat is pretending it was victory.

None of this means that victory is not still possible.  But it is only possible if Syriza spends the next few months planning moves which do not require Europe’s approval.

I genuinely hope they do.  The sooner they do, the sooner Greeks will be better off (though yes, the transition will be painful), and the sooner the current European and World system, which is causing so much unnecessary suffering, will end.


If you enjoyed this article, and want me to write more, please DONATE or SUBSCRIBE.