Reality, red lines and minimalism

The most important facts in Afghanistan right now is that we are approaching Peak Foreign Fighters (PFF) within the next couple of weeks.  US forces are still flowing in-country for McChrystal’s attempt at a Surge ™ and NATO forces are not leaving yet.  PFF is aimed at creating a temporary bubble of security for some population segments through targeted violence in the Pashtun heartland to create new facts on the ground before PFF declines.

However the PFF is short term and it is poised to quickly decline as US surge brigades rotate out without replacement, and NATO and other ISAF nations begin to drawdown their forces from an expensive and unpopular war in a secondary theater.  On the other hand, the Pashtuns will be in Afghanistan for several dozen more generations.

Those are the two most important facts when analyzing the political situation in Iraq, Afghanistan.  The local elites know foreign influence is declining, and therefore they don’t have to play as much to the foreigners, except to get guns and money, while they need to pay way more attention to their immediate neighbors and thus potential allies and competitors.

President Karzai’s maneuverings since he won re-election over US objections illustrates this point very nicely.  He is enriching his supporters while also attempting to solidify his position after the US leaves.  He is reaching out to multiple insurgent groups, including the Quetta Shura Taliban (which is most of the former government) and the Hekmayter’s HIB fighters to see if there are multiple deals to be cut over the long term.

This is predictable, and the US should only have one red-line in any deal-making as our long-run influence is minimal despite the current local peak.

The United States will not achieve its maximalist goals.  It will not achieve the intermediate goal set announced by President Obama when he authorized a troop surge.  It is time to identify critical American interests in Afghanistan, secure those interests through talks with the relevant local power centers, and not care about secondary interests or losing the next two weeks in the news cycles to reactionary shriekers.

There is only one red-line from the American perspective from talking with anyone in Afghanistan.  That red line is active, material support for “far enemy” terrorist groups.  Preventing long-distance support and planning cells for operations against US and allied civilians in their home territory is the only significant interest that we have in the region.  Everything else is a local concern that does not impact US security all that much.

The Obama Administration, or at least some of its players, may be coming around to this minimalist, interest securing viewpoint.  Richard Holbrooke echos the red-line I outlined a month ago after the Afghan peace jirga:

Richard Holbrooke has said that Washington accepts that the final political solution in the war ravaged country could involve ‘reformed’ Taliban in the government if certain “red lines” are respected…

He also noted that while it was impossible to negotiate with Al-Qaeda, the case was different with the Taliban. “It’s going to have some different ending from that, some form of political settlements are necessary … you can’t have a settlement with Al Qaeda, you can’t talk to them, you can’t negotiate with them, it’s out of the question. But it is possible to talk to the Taliban leaders,”

Almost everything in Afghanistan from a geo-strategic perspective that acknowledges some nature of constraints on American actions and options is a secondary issue. The only first tier issue is far enemy terrorism, so everything else should be negotiable including whack-a mole eradication or other counter/anti-drug efforts.    Minimal but realistic goals may now be on the table in Afghanistan.